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A bstract
This thesis compares women's current fertility with their fertility 
preferences during the period of rapid fertility decline, with special reference to 
Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality in China. It explores the 
gap between the government's birth control targets and couples' individual 
aspirations for children, the reasons for the differences, and the policy implications.
China’s powerful government and stringent population policy played a 
crucial role in the radical and sustained fertility decline during the 1970s. Besides 
socio-economic development and the transformation of the institutions, the ideology 
of the leaders, the function of all political administrative and mass organizations, 
and mass movements, were the major elements in the enforcement of China's 
unique population policies that resulted in a dramatic fertility decline. Significant 
changes in these aspects since the post-Mao reforms offer partial explanations for 
the stalling of fertility decline in the 1980s.
Empirical evidence from the three reference regions suggests that the 
fertility transition occurred in China with dramatic suddenness; the radical fertility 
decline was triggered by the rapid spread of the government supported family 
planning program, under the direction of the mandatory population policy. This is 
particularly true in largely rural regions such as Hebei and Shaanxi where the 
conditions of socio-economic development were not sufficient to induce a dramatic 
and sustained fertility decline.
These gaps between current fertility, desired fertility, and the government 
target fertility imply that a significant part of the achieved decline in fertility may 
have been caused by unwilling submission to the pressure of the government birth 
control policy; thus it can be considered an unstable level of fertility. Any 
relaxation of the population policy and regulations could lead to a fertility rebound.
The great effort of China's family planning programs somewhat reduced 
couples' demand for children, but did not change their attitudes towards 'male 
superiority'. Whether or not the third or higher order births can be eliminated is 
crucial to the success of the further reduction of fertility. In Hebei and Shaanxi, the 
strong birth control policy overrode the influence of some major socio-economic 
characteristics of women with two children to go on to bear a third child, while son 
preference became the most significant factor that continued to exert a great 
influence on bearing the third child even during the period of vigorous birth control 
campaigns; and the overall quantitative effect of sex preference on recent fertility 
is substantial. Furthermore, the high and rising overall sex ratios at birth, and the 
increasing sex ratios across parities seem to be the results of the confounding effect 
of son preference and rigid birth control policy.
The custom of arranged marriage remains to some extent, particularly in 
some inland regions such as Shaanxi, and betrothal during the teens is still 
prevalent in largely rural regions; these are among major obstacles to the 
acceptance of late marriage.
Consequently, the fertility decline was accompanied by a unique pattern of 
fertility control with low fertility, but relatively low contraceptive effectiveness and 
high incidence of induced abortion. This implies that China did successfully control 
its fertility at the society level within a short period, but not yet at the individual 
level in terms of couples' voluntary control of their reproductive behaviour. In the 
long term, the attainment or continuation of low and stable fertility will have to 
rely more strongly on fundamental changes in socio-economic development and 
some elements of the traditional culture that favour higher fertility.
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1Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 The main theme
China experienced an unprecedentedly rapid fertility decline during the 1970s; and 
from the early 1970s the Chinese government has implemented a strong family 
planning program. China’s One-Per-Thousand Population Fertility Sampling 
Survey data showed that the total fertility rate of China's women was 5.87 in the 
1950s, 5.68 in the 1960s, 4.01 in the 1970s, and 2.43 in the first two years of the 
1980s (Chen, 1983: 54). However, after the great achievements in the 1970s, the 
fertility decline stalled and fluctuated during the 1980s, although the government 
introduced the stringent One-Child Policy in 1979. What were the resistant forces 
preventing further fertility decline? This thesis compares women's current fertility 
with their fertility and nuptiality preferences during the period of rapid fertility 
decline, with special reference to Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, based on the first phase of the 1985 In-Depth Fertility Survey (IDFS) 
in China. It explores the gap between the government’s birth control targets and 
the couples' individual aspirations for children, the reason for the difference and 
the policy implications; it evaluates the role of the government population policy 
and the family planning program, socio-economic development and traditional 
culture in fertility decline. First, it is necessary to briefly review the theories on 
fertility change and some studies of fertility decline in China.
1.1.1 A b r ie f p ersp ective  o f th eories o f fer tility  ch an ge
The classical theory of demographic transition traced the aggregate relation 
between socio-economic development and fertility, and did not test whether these 
general relationships applied at the local or individual level, although the 
aggregate relationships were certainly derived from assumptions about the effects
2of broad socio-economic changes on individual motivation. The most pervasive idea 
of this theory is that modernization changes the economics of childbearing in such 
a way that to have a large number of children becomes disadvantageous to 
parents.
In his discussion of fertility reduction in the developing countries, Caldwell 
(1976, 1982) modified the classic transition theory by combining the concept of the 
demand for children with the cultural transmission of Western ideas and values 
such as the nuclear family pattern, which ultimately undermine that demand. He 
argued that fertility decline in the Third World is not dependent on the spread of 
industrialization or even on the rate of economic development. Fertility decline is 
more likely to precede industrialization and to help bring it about than to follow it 
(Caldwell, 1976: 358). The theory of intergenerational wealth flows is an approach 
which unites the economic and sociological aspects. Caldwell (1982) claims that a 
reversal of the direction of this flow is the driving force behind fertility decline.
Freedman (1979: 68) asserted that in developing countries the causes of 
fertility decline are very complex: 'I t  is very likely that there are facilitating and 
inhibiting factors that depend on the cultural context.' Freedman (1979: 69-70) 
agreed with Caldwell about the possible major role of the dissemination of Western 
ideas in motivating a desire for smaller family size. But on the basis of evidence 
from Taiwan, he argued that adoption of the Western nuclear family pattern and 
abandonment of traditional family values are not always prior conditions for 
fertility decline.
The demand theory models for fertility analysis developed by Becker (1960) 
and others offered a micro-economic approach that is known as 'the New 
Household Economics' or 'the Chicago School approach’. The theory argued that 
the major reasons behind the reduced demand for children are the changes in the 
cost and benefits of childbearing in the context of available alternatives to them,
3the improvement in the social status of women and the increased opportunity cost 
of women's time.
Cleland and Wilson (1987) challenged the demand theories using evidence 
from both historical and World Fertility Survey data. They argue that the central 
assumptions of economic causation in transition theories do not provide a plausible 
explanation of fertility trends during the last 100 years (Cleland and Wilson, 1987: 
5). They suggest that demographic changes are more closely linked with cultural 
and educational factors than with economic factors.
McNicoll(1975, 1980, 1988) and others (e.g. Cain, 1981; Potter, 1983; Hull, 
1987) developed an institutional approach that accommodated various models of 
fertility transition (McNicoll, 1988: 17-18). This framework particularly emphasizes 
that the dynamics of changes in socio-economic institutional and cultural settings 
shape the environment of fertility decision-making, and this can explain a major 
part of the fertility transition.
Recently Greenhalgh (1990a) proposed a political-economic approach that 
encompasses not only social and economic, but also the political and cultural 
aspects of demographic changes. This variant of the institutional approach 
operates from the top down, starting from global factors, tracing the effects of these 
factors on regional, national, and local institutional behaviour. It is a supplement 
to McNicoll's bottom-up approach (Greenhalgh, 1990a: 87-88).
These general theories of fertility change have important implications for 
the study of the fertility transition in China. At high levels of generality based on 
the experiences of European society the underlying causal structure of classical 
transition theory appears sound. The emphasis on the changes in the structural 
developmental levels is still noteworthy, since the functions of these factors were 
still observed in the process of fertility transition in some developing countries. For 
example, before and during the period of fertility decline, China did have
4substantial changes in socio-economic conditions, though the conditions were far 
from compatible with those of modem industrial societies. The large differences in 
the achievements of fertility reduction among provinces can mostly be related to 
the differences in socio-economic conditions. Shanghai, a metropolis with per 
capita income of about 6000 yuan (RMB) in 1984, had successfully cut the total 
fertility rate to 1.12 by 1984, but the rate is 2.70 in Shaanxi, a province with per 
capita income of only 680 yuan (RMB) in 1982. Furthermore, the low level of 
development is probably the main reason why developing countries like China, 
which are successful in fertility control, still have a higher level of mortality and 
fertility than industrial countries.
However, a main limitation of the classical transition theory is that it 
cannot explain why the patterns of fertility decline in developing countries differ 
markedly from those of Europe. In the case of China, a country which is still 
fundamentally poor and agricultural, the fertility rate was much higher when it 
began to decline than it was in Europe at the same stage and the tempo of China's 
decline in fertility was much more rapid. It is impossible to explain the cause of 
fertility decline in China within the classical framework.
Another major weakness of the classical approach is that in its empirical 
tests the macro-structural variables were related directly to fertility. Moreover, it 
failed to deal empirically with the changes in the family and in changing 
aspirations for self and children which are direct links between the macro variables 
and fertility (Freedman, 1979: 65). The modifications and challenges to the 
classical approach made by Caldwell, Freedman, Cleland and Wilson, McNicoll and 
others exhibit great efforts to examine the social, cultural, ideological and 
psychological factors using micro-individual variables. Becker offered a unique 
micro-approach in which the variables such as social status of women and 
opportunity cost of women's time were considered. All these studies can shed light
5on the case of China, a country with a unique political system, strong traditional 
culture and customs.
1.1.2 The lev e l o f fer tility  and its  d em ograp h ic  determ in an ts in  
C hina
Among the several studies that provide quantitative descriptions of fertility trends 
and patterns in mainland China, there is little disagreement on China's fertility 
trends during the 1970s, although there is some slight variation in the precise 
extent of the fertility decline described by different measures (e.g. Coale, 1984; 
Feeney and Yu, 1987; Feeney et al., 1989). This is partly due to the fact that the 
rapid fertility decline began at a high level: the total fertility rate was 5.93 in 1970 
(Coale, 1984: 47), and the magnitude of the decrease in fertility was remarkable. 
It is also partly because the population policy goals and family planning program 
were generally uniform nationwide in the 1970s, but a difference has always been 
maintained between the urban and the rural areas.1
Unlike in the 1970s, the fluctuations in crude birth rates during the 1980s 
have evoked some controversy regarding the trend in fertility and its demographic 
determinants. The combination of changes in several important aspects exerted a 
complicated influence on nuptiality and fertility through: (1) the passage of the new 
marriage law in 1980; (2) the decentralization of the socio-economic system,
especially in rural China, which since the mid-1980s has been accompanied by 
shifts and local variations in population policy (Greenhalgh, 1986); and (3) the very 
large cohort born during the second birth peak (1963-73) which began entering the 
normal age of marriage and childbearing during the 1980s. Two different levels of 
impact of these factors can be highlighted: the effect of changes in age structure on
1 During most of the 1970s, population planning goals were fairly constant. Comparing 
the birth control policies and regulations in the 1970s with those in the 1980s shows that 
far more regional variations were created in the latter period (see Chapter 3).
6annual number of births and the crude birth rate; and the effect of other factors on 
the total fertility rate.
In a comprehensive report on China's changing population, Coale (1984) 
made a sophisticated evaluation the impact of age at marriage and marriage 
patterns on total fertility rate. He stated that about one-third of the reduction in 
the total fertility rate from 1970 to 1980 was attributable to the rise in age at 
marriage (Coale, 1984: 4). However, by 1981 the contribution of marriage change 
to lower fertility had decreased by 50 per cent of its contribution during 1977-79 as 
a result of the marriage boom in 1980 and 1981 (Coale and Chen, 1987: 4). Most of 
the upturn in total fertility rates after 1980 was the result of the marriage boom 
(Coale, 1984: 4).
Feeney and Yu (1987: 78) argued that parity-progression based measures 
provide a better indicator of the fertility level for populations characterized by low 
and fluctuating fertility. In contrast to Coale, they concluded that the decline in 
fertility in the period 1970-1981 was due entirely to the control of marital fertility, 
especially to a decrease in births of third and higher orders (Feeney and Yu, 1987: 
99); changes in marriage patterns contributed essentially nothing to the decline 
and none of the decline was due to childlessness.
The actual and perceived fertility changes in China since 1982 have also 
been discussed by Feeney and some Chinese demographers (Feeney et al., 1989). 
Recent fertility change was considered a clear example of the confounding effects of 
age structure and of marriage patterns on the crude birth rates (Feeney et al., 
1989: 304). Feeney et al. (1989) argued that fertility decline in China stalled in the 
late 1970s, and since then fertility has declined only very slowly with significant 
fluctuations during this period.
Demographers and family planning program administrators (e.g. Wei, 
1989b; Li, 1989) in mainland China are more concerned about the rebound of
7Chinas crude birth rate and rate of natural increase in recent years, which was 
mainly attributable to the cyclical effect of the second baby boom, that had lasted 
for 12 years from 1962 to 1973.
In the illustration and decomposition of the current level and pattern of 
fertility in China, it is necessary to use age-based period measures to examine the 
timing or tempo of fertility. The basic rationale of China's population policy relied 
on presumed relations between macro-demographic changes and macro-economic 
growth. Therefore, top Chinese decision-makers are particularly concerned with 
total population size, the crude birth rate and the annual number of births. Hence, 
the fluctuations of crude birth rates, annual births, and the inevitable 
consequences of changes in period fertility are important in the effort to fully 
understand and evaluate China's population policy.
The parity progression ratio is a good measure for examining and 
interpreting the long-term trend in fertility in terms of the underlying reproductive 
behaviour. It eliminates distortions inherent in the age-based measures and the 
crude birth rate. Furthermore, the shift of the focus of China’s population policy 
during this period from timing or spacing to parity and birth-order considerations 
will result in more frequent use of the parity progression ratio in measuring 
fertility. In short, both of the measures should be applied in drawing a complete 
and accurate picture of China's current fertility.
Many demographers have also addressed the incomplete reporting of the 
number of births in official records. A comparison of births reported in the survey 
for 1981 and the registrations figure shows that more than three million births in 
that year were not registered (Coale, 1984: 26). From a moving average of the 
annual numbers of registered births, Coale (1984: 29) estimated that the 
completeness of registration rose from about 80 per cent in the mid-1950s to above 
90 per cent from 1963 to 1974; but it decreased to less than 85 per cent in the late
81970s, probably because of the official pressure for restriction of the number of 
births.
On the basis of analysis of the 1987 One-per-cent Fertility Survey data, 
Feeney et al. (1989: 299) asserted that the official birth rates for the years since 
1982 are significantly distorted. The very low official birth rates in 1984 
exaggerated both the success of the family planning program and the extent of the 
increases in 1986 and 1987. Feeney et al.(1989) concluded that the official birth 
rate omitted about 23 million births during the 14-year period 1973-1986.
By more closely examining the reported births in the 1982 One-per- 
Thousand Fertility Survey in terms of the sex ratios at births, Coale (1984: 25-26) 
ascertained that male-female ratios in higher-order births were relatively high in 
the much more complete birth reporting in the official survey. In recent years, the 
sex ratios at birth have been rising, reaching 110.9 in 1986-87 and 111.3 in 1990 
(Hull, 1990; Hull and Wen, 1992). The possible explanations are omission of the 
births of surviving female children, unreported sex-selective infanticide (Coale, 
1984: 26; Hull, 1990), sex selective abortion (Hull, 1990) and unreported female- 
baby adoption (Johansson and Nygren, 1991).
1.1.3 E xp lan ation s o f  fer tility  d ec lin e  in  C hina
A number of studies illustrate the socio-economic determinants of the 
fertility decline. Tuan (1979) described China's fertility decline as an 'organized 
transition' using some elements of classical demographic transition theory as well 
as some quite new elements, in particular certain institutional dimensions, such as 
the changes in the function of family during the transition to socialism. A Chinese 
demographer, Wu (1986: 76), in assessing the factors in China's fertility decline, 
emphasized the function of politics and in particular the socialist system, on 
which, he argued, a successful family planning program must be based.
9Tien (1984: 390) confirmed the role of the family planning program in 
fertility decline in China, and also considered the role of socio-economic conditions. 
He pointed out that birth control is the result not only of the administratively- 
induced family planning program but also of the development of the economy. 
Poston and Gu (1987) produced an empirical analytical model of interrelationships 
among socio-economic development, family planning program and fertility. They 
asserted that both the level of socio-economic development and the implementation 
of the birth planning program have played important roles in China's fertility 
decline.
Chen (1983: 54) believed that although changing fertility reflects changes 
in politics, the economy, and society, the dramatic fertility decline during the 1970s 
was due to the decisive role of the family planning program. Similarly, Qin (1987: 
12) evaluated the effects of the family planning program, applying both Coale's 
Index and the Bongaarts Model, and asserted that it was the strong family 
planning program that caused the sharp decline in fertility in such a short period.
Despite the general impression of China's fertility decline, Peng (1989, 
1991, 1993) illustrated the great local variations between the provinces in terms of 
the pattern and tempo of fertility changes as well as socio-economic development. 
Some variation in fertility levels and behaviour among rural production brigades 
has been observed (Freedman et al., 1988: 39). W. Chen (1986: 56), in an analysis 
of regional differences in age specific fertility based on the 1982 census data, 
classified two broad fertility models, the unplanned fertility model and the planned 
fertility model, according to different levels and patterns of fertility. The results 
showed the strong impact of socio-economic factors on the regional fertility 
patterns. Similar results were obtained by Lin (1987: 15) in a quantitative 
analysis of the relationship between fertility and socio-economic factors, through 
regression analysis on three variables: per capita GNP, education level, and degree
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of urbanization. Lin (1987) identified a negative relationship between fertility and 
those social and economic variables.
1.2 Research objectives and analytical framework
In reviewing the empirical studies of China's fertility change, there was a 
common problem, namely that most of the explanations followed the classic 
approach: using macro-structural variables to describe or interpret the levels and 
patterns of fertility change, with the addition of some new dimensions, such as 
institutional, population policy and program factors (see Chapters 3, 4). Little 
attention was paid to micro-variables, in particular, those related to attitudes to 
birth control, and nuptiality and fertility preferences. Women or couples seem to be 
merely passive recipients in the grip of social, economic, and government policy 
pressures. The attitudinal factors that reflect couples' individual decisions were 
neglected. Such studies were unable to answer the following questions:
(1) Why have the annual unregistered births increased to 1-3 million since 1973, 
although the registration and statistical regulation systems appear to be more 
efficient than ever before?
(2) Why have the sex ratios at birth been rising, especially in higher-order births, 
since the implementation of the rigid birth control policy ?
(3) Why, since the new marriage law of 1980 increased the minimum age of 
marriage by two years, did the mean age at marriage fall instead of rise in the 
1980s?
(4) Does the current fertility transition, an 'induced' or 'organized' transition, reflect 
real changes in the fertility behaviour of Chinese women, based on individuals' 
independent and autonomous decisions?
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(5) Why did the rapid fertility decline level off and fluctuate in the 1980s? What are 
the resistant forces preventing further fertility decline?
(6) Is the current low fertility pattern in China stable? The fertility trends in the 
late 1980s showed an upward tendency; how should this be interpreted? Apart 
from the role of population structure, what other factors might explain this 
tendency?
(7) Does the fertility transition represent substantial changes in the traditional 
culture, which placed a high value on children and demonstrated a strong son 
preference?
It is impossible to resolve these questions without considering attitudinal 
factors, including nuptiality preference and fertility preference. It is also impossible 
to identify clearly and accurately the determinants of fertility changes in China 
only from an analysis of current fertility level using macro-structural variables. 
Often an over-optimistic evaluation and view of the future will result. The critical 
issue is whether the current fertility level and patterns are compatible with the 
desired fertility. The current fertility in mainland China appears to be heavily 
affected by high-pressure population policies, especially the One-Child Policy; the 
effects of socio-economic factors are constrained by the policy influences. Therefore, 
the broad aims of this study are:
(1) To measure the level of fertility during the period 1970-1984 and the 
desired number of children in the three areas.
(2) To examine the difference between current fertility and desired fertility 
within and among the three areas.
(3) To investigate the difference between the government regulations on 
marriage and individual marriage behaviour.
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(4) To assess the causes of differences between current fertility and desired 
fertility and the obstacles to the acceptance of the government late-marriage 
regulations in the three areas.
(5) To discuss the implications of the study for population policy and the 
family planning program.
The suggested theoretical framework for the analysis of fertility decline in 
China is shown in Figure 1.1, which was derived from many fertility transition 
theories that were reviewed in the early sections. As Jones (1982: 285) pointed out, 
a framework broad enough to include all the different factors influencing fertility 
may lose specificity for particular situations. Hence, theories and models for 
measuring the factors affecting fertility should be designed with particular social 
settings in mind. Some of the social contexts have an independent history of their 
own and an independent effect on both reproductive behaviours and the perceived 
value of children.
There is no single demographic transition, caused by forces common to all 
places and all times. Rather, there are many demographic transitions, each 
driven by a combination of forces that are, to some unknown extent, 
institutionally, culturally, and temporally specific (Greenhalgh, 1990a: 88).
For the sake of specificity and simplicity, the framework (Figure 1.1) does 
not include all of the possible factors and causal arrows, and especially ignores 
some of the feedback mechanisms, some of which could be important. In the 
framework, individual fertility behaviour can be traced as the outcome of the 
social, political, economic and cultural environment within which the individual 
childbearing decision was made. However, this environment can only indirectly 
impinge on individual behaviour through other intermediate factors. The present 
study examines the impact of four aspects of social environment on fertility decline
in China.
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Figure 1.1 Analytical framework for the study of China’s rapid fertility decline
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(A) The changes in ideology are very important in determining the political, 
economic and social systems. In China the ideology of the top leaders of the CCP is 
the source of initiative and the most abstract formulation of policy. It became not 
only a vague legitimation of the institutional structure of authority, but also an 
instrument for the exercise of political and administrative power and for the 
implementation of policy (Dittmer, 1990: 42). The integration of ideology of leaders 
and the CCP members from the top to the bottom was an important monitoring 
mechanism in policy enforcement. Meanwhile, in a country with a long civilized 
history, the traditional culture and social norms were deeply rooted and strongly 
affected the people's reproductive behaviour.
(B) In the entire social setting, the government played a major role in 
intervening in people's reproduction using its policy and political and 
administrative power. The government population policy enhances the family 
planning program through propaganda and education to improve people's 
knowledge, attitudes and use of contraception, thus causing a direct reduction in 
desired fertility and current fertility. Meanwhile, the very explicit and compulsory 
population policy, including the One-Child-Policy, birth quota system, and other 
economic incentive and disincentive measures, stated by the central government as 
basic national policy and implemented by local government and Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) organizations at all levels, has even stronger direct 
effects on current fertility and some influence on reported desired fertility.
(C) Socio-economic development, to some extent, directly affects the real or 
perceived costs and benefits of children as well as the family's social, economic and 
demographic characteristics, and thus indirectly influences desired and current 
fertility. However, given the general low levels and great regional discrepancies of 
macro social and economic development these were not sufficient to initiate an 
unprecedented nationwide fertility decline; nevertheless they shaped the regional 
fertility differences. That some large cities experienced earlier fertility decline may
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be explicable by the indirect impact of higher stages of modernization than in 
backward areas, although there may also have been a direct influence of better 
education in those advanced areas (Lavely and Freedman, 1990).
(D) The fluctuations in the demographic characteristics of the entire 
population, such as age and sex structures, have significant impacts on the crude 
birth rate and annual numbers of births even if other factors remain constant.
1.3 The stud y  areas
Three provincial regions of China were selected as the main empirical study 
areas, the choice being influenced by the limitations of time and scope of the thesis 
as well as the data availability. There was no large-scale fertility survey in 
mainland China that included questions on fertility preference until the 1985 IDFS 
survey. Three study areas, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, were selected according to the data available in the first phase of the 
IDFS survey. Shanghai is the largest city and one of the most advanced areas in 
China; Hebei reflects the middle level of development in China's provinces; Shaanxi 
represents a relatively low level of development among the provinces in China (see 
Chapter 2).
However, China is a country with a billion people and enormous regional 
heterogeneity and complexity. There are considerable variations in socio-economic 
development, strength of family planning programs and fertility behaviour among 
the 30 provincial regions. The total fertility rates ranged in 1990 from a 1.47 in 
Shanghai municipality to 4.53 in Tibet (see Chapter 2); moreover, there are also 
substantial variations among the subregions. Although the three selected study 
regions, to some extent, represented different levels of socio-economic development 
and fertility control, and frequently, the national data were used for comparisons 
and discussions, the limitations of data and study scope must be kept in mind in 
the discussion of the findings and their implications, particularly in generalizing
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conclusions to the whole country. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this study will 
provide insights into the interpretation of the unique monitoring mechanisms in 
China's fertility transition.
1.4 Organization of the thesis
Chapter 2 briefly describes the main data sources of this study and the general 
socio-economic settings of the study areas.
Chapter 3 explores the role of China's unique population policy in the 
dramatic fertility decline; it discusses the major contextual elements of the success 
of the policy in the 1970s and the possible explanations for the stalling of fertility 
decline in the 1980s.
From Chapter 4 onwards the 1985 IDFS survey data on the three study 
areas are analysed. Chapter 4 analyses the fertility impact of China's powerful 
family planning program that was guided by the mandatory population policy.
Chapter 5 investigates the nuptiality preferences and behaviour of women 
over the period of rapid fertility decline, and under the changing marriage 
regulations and population policy as well as socio-economic circumstances. The 
analysis focuses on the difference between the government policy targets and 
individual marriage behaviour and the implications of these two factors.
Chapter 6 examines the preferences for family size and the sex of children 
and the desire to stop childbearing among women in the three study regions. The 
analysis directly links fertility preferences with current fertility, and particularly 
emphasizes the relevance of the population policy and the family planning 
program. The implications of the gap between desired and current fertility are 
discussed with special reference to the unique situation in China.
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Chapter 7 addresses the impact of sex preference on couples' family building 
process at both the micro-level and macro-level. The micro-level analysis evaluates 
the roles of sex preference and socio-economic characteristics of individual women 
in determining further childbearing under population policies and programs of 
different strengths. The macro-level analysis investigates to what extent, under 
China's intensified family planning program and population policy pressure, sex 
preference still exerts an impact on recent fertility.
Chapter 8 clarifies the confounding effect of son preference and population 
policy on sex ratios at birth at both the family level and societal level in the three 
provincial areas. The potential effect of sex-selected abortion on sex ratios is 
investigated, and births are analysed by place of delivery and by the kinds of 
assistance during the delivery, contributing to an understanding of the interesting 
problems of rising sex ratios at birth.
Chapter 9 presents the study's conclusions. It summarizes the major 
empirical findings derived from the study of the three provincial regions, and 
discusses the implications for understanding the unique mechanism in China's 
fertility transition and the future perspectives.
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C hapter 2 D ata and th e socia l and econom ic settin gs of
th e study areas
2.1 China 1985 In-Depth Fertility Survey
The main data source of this study is the China 1985 In-Depth Fertility Survey 
(IDFS), Phase I, which was organized by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) of the 
People's Republic of China with the technical assistance of the Research Centre of 
the International Statistical Institute, Voorburg, the Netherlands. The first phase 
of the survey was conducted from 1 April to 30 April 1985 by the SSB of China. 
The survey aimed to produce comprehensive information about the current levels 
and trends of fertility, and the progress of the family planning programs at the 
provincial levels in China.
The first phase of the survey was carried out in three provincial regions, 
Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, with a total population of 
94 million (SSB, 1986: 3). The systematic proportionate stratified sampling method 
was employed in the survey to select a multistage stratified sample. The primary 
sampling units were cities, towns and counties. The ultimate units were 
neighbourhood groups in the cities and village groups in rural areas. Survey 
respondents were ever-married women aged below 50. All eligible women in the 
selected households during the interviewing days were interviewed. Three 
questionnaires were used, including community, household and individual 
questionnaires. The questionnaires of this survey are modified versions of the 
standard questionnaires of the World Fertility Survey. The survey covers 
information on many aspects, including characteristics of the respondents and their 
current or last spouse, marriage history, detailed birth and pregnancy history, 
fertility preferences, contraceptive knowledge and history of contraceptive use. The
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present study is mainly based on the individual survey data tape, since the 
household survey data were not available during this research.
Between 4000 and 5000 women were surveyed individually, with very high 
response rates in all the three study areas (Table 2.1). Interviewers were required 
to probe and correct any inconsistency when recording the answer. Age was 
calculated by the solar calendar year and counted in completed years since birth. 
The age distribution of the usually resident population in the sample households in 
the 1985 IDFS survey was examined and Whipple's index and Myers' index were 
computed to test the accuracy of age reporting. Whipple's index is a very effective 
measure of age misstatement in terms of digit preference for 0 and 5. The results 
(Table 2.2) indicate that there is no significant heaping or digit preference for ages 
ending in 0 or 5 (index varying from 100 to 500). Myers' index produces an index of 
preferences for each terminal digit from 0 to 9 (index varying from 0 to 90). The 
results (Table 2.2) also reveal a high degree of accuracy in age reporting in all the 
three study areas. The preliminary results of the survey and more detailed 
information on the survey procedures were published in the Principal Report (SSB, 
1986).
Table 2.1 Sample size and response rates of individual surveys, China 1985 In- 
Depth Fertility Survey
Sample size
Regions Required Actual surveyed Response rates (%)
Hebei 5151 5080 98.6
Shaanxi 4248 4084 96.1
Shanghai 4178 4143 99.2
Source: SSB, 1986: 11
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Table 2.2 Measurement of age accuracy by Whipple's Index and Myers' Index
Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
Whipple’s Index
Total 103.4 101.3 105.6
Male 105.6 106.2 101.4
Female 101.2 96.3 109.8
Myers' Index
Total 2.52 2.33 2.16
Male 2.71 2.46 1.82
Female 2.62 2.38 2.77
Source: Computed from China 1985 IDFS Survey data.
Note: The age distribution of the resident population in the sample households was
examined.
2.2 Social and economic settings of the study areas
Some basic indicators of the socio-economic development of the three regions are 
provided in Table 2.3. Located on the East Sea coast, Shanghai is the largest 
metropolitan area and one of the most modernized regions in China. It is the 
largest economic centre and one of the major scientific, technical and educational 
centres. According to the 1990 population census, Shanghai had a population of 
13.3 million in its 23 administrative subdivisions (13 urban districts and 10 rural 
counties). The population density in Shanghai was 2118 persons per square 
kilometre and it is the most crowded area in China.
As the most advanced industrial region in China, Shanghai's per capita 
gross regional product was almost four times that in Hebei and five times that in 
Shaanxi provinces (Table 2.3). About 66.2 per cent of Shanghai population were 
urban residents in mid-1990, which was three times as many as in Hebei and
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Shaanxi provinces. The proportion of illiterate or semi-literate people aged 15 and
over was 11 per cent, which was lower than in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces.
Table 2.3 Population and socio-economic background for China and the study 
regions
C haracteristics China Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
National income (in billion yuan),1991 na 79.8 34.2 68.7
Per capita gross regional product (yuan),1991 1691 1568 1237 6157
N um ber of sta ff and workers (million),1991 144.0 6.7 3.9 5.1
Total population (million) 1133.7 61.1 32.9 13.3
Population density  (persons per square kilom etre) 118 325 160 2118
U rban population (%) 26.2 19.1 21.5 66.2
Illitera te  or sem i-literate population of age 15 and over { % ) 15.9 15.2 17.6 11.0
Crude b irth  ra te  (per thousand) 20.98 19.66 23.49 11.32
Crude death  ra te  (per thousand) 6.28 5.76 6.49 6.36
N atural growth ra te  (per thousand) 14.70 13.91 17.00 4.96
Total fertility  rate , 1989-90* 2.35 2.49 2.76 1.47
Proportion of b irths by parity  to all b irths (%), 1989
F irs t parity 49.5 47.4 41.5 92.0
Second parity 31.2 35.6 32.7 7.3
Third and higher parities 19.3 16.9 25.7 0.7
Average family size 4.0 3.9 4.1 3.1
One-child certificate acceptance ra te  (%), 1991 18.7 11.6 12.0 68.8
Proportion of one-generation households ( % ) 13.53 13.72 9.56 23.23
Proportion of two-generation households (%) 68.02 68.48 59.36 56.87
Proportion of three-generation households (%) 18.45 17.8 31.08 19.9
Source: Compiled from China 1990 population census, China Population Today, 1991, 8, 6: 8, 12; 
1992 ,9 ,5 : 6.
Note: *Figures for total fertility rate are from Li et al., 1991, and were estimated from the 1990
census by the State Family Planning Commission. The estimates refer to the period mid-1989
to mid-1990.
na: data not available.
Of the two peasant-dominated provinces, Hebei was chosen as 
representative of the coastal provinces and is relatively developed. It is located in 
north-eastern China on the Bohai Sea, and around China's capital city Beijing and 
another metropolitan area, Tianjin. Hebei has an area of 188,000 square 
kilometres and a population of 61.1 million in mid-1990 (Table 2.3). The population 
density was 325 persons per square kilometre. Northern and western Hebei are 
mountain or plateau regions while there are plains in the south-east region. Coal, 
iron and oil are the major mineral products and the main crops are winter wheat, 
barley, peas, corn and cotton (Li et al., 1991: 8).
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Regarding the level of socio-economic development, Hebei ranks about the 
national average. In 1991, its per capita gross regional product was 1568 yuan, 
compared with 1237 yuan in Shaanxi province (Table 2.3).1 The 1990 census 
showed that 19.1 per cent were urban population and 15.2 per cent of the people 
aged 15 and over were illiterate or semi-literate (Li et al., 1991: 9).
Shaanxi province was chosen els representative of the inland provinces, 
being located along the middle of the Yellow River. Northern Shaanxi is a plateau 
and the mountain ranges are in western and southern Shaanxi; plains are located 
in middle Shaanxi. It has an area of 206,000 square kilometres and a population of 
32.9 million in the mid-1990s, and a population density of 160 people per square 
kilometre (Table 2.3). Oil is the major mineral product and the main crops are rice, 
wheat and millet (Li et al., 1991: 10).
Shaanxi is at the lower-middle level of socio-economic development, 
compared with other provinces of China. In 1991, its per capita gross regional 
product was 1237 yuan, lower than that of Hebei and substantially lower than that 
of Shanghai. Urban population accounted for 21.5 per cent in mid-1990, and 17.6 
per cent of people aged 15 and over were illiterate or semi-literate.
2.3 Socia l and econom ic ch aracteristics o f the sam ple  
popu lation
Table 2.4 shows some selected characteristics of ever-married women interviewed 
in the IDFS survey. About 80 per cent of the women in the two provinces lived in 
rural areas and were working in agriculture, though a great number of them 
reported themselves as having never worked, instead of having worked part-time 
in agriculture or in their households (Tu, 1991: 262). In contrast, more than half of 
the Shanghai respondents lived in urban areas and 80 per cent worked in non- 
agricultural sectors. In the two peasant-dominant provinces, about 40 per cent of
1 In 1991, the official exchange rate was approximately five yuan (RMB) to one US dollar.
Table 2.4 Socio-economic characteristics of the samples of women in the three 
study regions, China, 1985 (all figures are percentages)
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Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
Characteristics (N = 5080) (N = 4084) (N = 4143)
Residence
Urban 18.4 22.0 56.0
Rural 81.6 78.0 44.0
Education (respondent)
No schooling 39.8 41.3 10.0
Primary 35.6 31.7 27.0
Secondary and higher 24.6 27.0 63.0
Education (husband)
No schooling 11.1 15.7 2.5
Primary 39.8 34.0 26.1
Secondary and higher 48.5 49.7 71.2
Don't know 0.6 0.6 0.2
Occupation (respondent)
Professional 4.4 6.6 22.7
Service 1.4 2.3 9.4
Agriculture 26.3 3.0 18.8
Industry 7.4 8.6 48.8
Never worked 60.4 79.9 0.4
Don't know 0.1 0.3 0.1
Occupation (husband)
Professional 11.2 13.8 33.3
Service 1.5 1.3 5.1
Agriculture 67.1 68.0 10.0
Industry 19.6 16.2 51.2
Never worked 0.0 0.1 0.1
Don't know 0.5 0.6 0.3
Live with parents
Yes 79.0 84.5 68.6
No 21.0 15.5 31.4
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: a great number of women in Shaanxi and Hebei provinces reported themselves 
as having never worked instead of having worked part-time in agriculture or in their 
households (Tu, 1991: 262).
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women had no education, compared with 10 per cent in metropolitan Shanghai. 
Although the husbands of the respondents in the three regions exhibited similar 
patterns of characteristics to their wives, the husbands generally had higher socio­
economic status than their wives did. As Table 2.4 indicates, more husbands 
worked in non-agricultural sectors than their wives, and the gaps were even 
greater in the categories of education. Most of the respondents appeared to still live 
in households with traditional family structure; they lived with their own or their 
husbands' parents after they married, while in metropolitan Shanghai the high 
proportion of couples living in an extended family structure may be partly 
explained by the housing problems.
2.4 F er tility  in  th e  th ree reg ion s
Although the population policies have developed in the same direction in all the 
three study regions, birth control education and family planning services began 
noticeably earlier in Shanghai than in the two provinces, particularly earlier than 
in Shaanxi (Shen, 1987: 81). In the mid-1950s the Shanghai municipal government 
had already proposed a birth control target to keep the annual birth rate under 20 
per thousand; Shanghai was one of the earliest provincial regions to supply 
contraceptive means free of charge (Peng, 1993: 121). Hence, Shanghai 
municipality is the best performer in the birth control program with the lowest 
birth rate, natural growth rate and total fertility rate in the country (Table 2.3 and 
Figure 2.1). The average family size was substantially less than that of the other 
provinces as well as the national average. Hebei province is a middle performer in 
the family planning program; its birth rate, natural increase rate and average 
family size were slightly lower than the national average, while its total fertility is 
slightly higher than the national average. Shaanxi province is a low-to-medium 
performer in family planning with higher level of birth rate, natural increase rate, 
total fertility rate and average family size than those of Hebei province and the 
national average.
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Table 2.5 provides the percentage distribution of number of children ever 
born of ever married women in the IDFS survey by age and parity. As expected, 
the total mean number of children ever born was highest in Shaanxi (2.80), 
followed by Hebei (2.45), and was lowest in Shanghai (1.54). The birth history of 
women who had completed or nearly completed their childbearing clearly indicated 
a rapid decline in fertility. When women aged 35-39 were compared with those 
aged 45-49, the mean number of children ever born dropped from 4.47 to 2.95 for 
Hebei and from 4.94 to 3.53 for Shaanxi. In Shanghai, the corresponding number 
dropped from 2.77 to 1.67, a very substantial decline, given that the number of 
children ever born for women aged 45-49 was already considerably lower than 
those of women in Hebei and Shaanxi. Therefore, of the three regions the speed of 
this decline was fastest in Shanghai with a 40 per cent drop, followed by Hebei and 
Shaanxi, with decreases of 34 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively.
The observation of parity distribution of children ever born (Table 2.5) 
reveals that in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, the decrease in number of births was 
mainly due to the decline in the fourth and higher parities, while there was an 
increasing trend in the proportions of second and third parities. In Shanghai 
municipality, the decline was attributable to the decrease in births of all third or 
higher parities.
Such a decline was also illustrated by the parity progression ratios in the 
three areas. Table 2.6 shows that in Hebei and Shaanxi, although the probability 
of continuing childbearing remained relatively high in the second parity, the 
probabilities of having additional births declined dramatically after the second 
parity. The progression ratios in higher-order births declined much more steeply 
among women aged 35-39 than among those aged 40 or older. In Shanghai 
municipality, the probabilities started to drop sharply just after the first parity, 
particularly among women aged 35-39 and 40-44. This pattern may suggest that
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the One-Child Policy was more vigorously enforced in metropolitan Shanghai than 
in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces.
Table 2.5 Percentage distribution of ever married women by age and by parity of 
children ever born, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, 
China, 1985
Age
group
Parity of children ever bom Total
0 1 2  3 4+ %
Mean 
N parity
Hebei province 
15-19 67.6 32.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 37 0.32
20-24 38.2 53.4 8.4 0.0 0.0 100.0 536 0.70
25-29 6.0 50.0 37.6 5.3 1.0 100.0 1145 1.46
30-34 1.5 18.6 46.0 26.5 7.4 100.0 1275 2.22
35-39 1.4 4.0 29.2 38.4 27.0 100.0 907 2.95
40-44 1.3 1.8 12.0 24.9 60.0 100.0 607 3.86
45-49 1.6 1.7 6.8 15.7 74.2 100.0 573 4.47
Total 6.9 22.9 28.3 19.4 22.4 100.0 5080 2.45
Shaanxi province 
15-19 71.4 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 49 0.29
20-24 35.1 49.8 13.0 2.0 0.0 100.0 552 0.82
25-29 6.2 38.6 40.4 11.9 2.9 100.0 850 1.68
30-34 1.3 14.4 41.5 28.3 14.5 100.0 855 2.45
35-39 2.2 1.5 16.8 31.6 47.9 100.0 680 3.53
40-44 1.9 2.0 4.9 21.6 69.5 100.0 587 4.31
45-49 0.8 2.0 6.1 12.9 78.3 100.0 511 4.94
Total 7.9 18.9 23.1 18.7 31.4 100.0 4084 2.80
Shanghai municipality 
15-19 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 1 0.00
20-24 33.5 65.4 1.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 179 0.68
25-29 16.1 78.9 4.7 0.3 0.0 100.0 1033 0.89
30-34 3.8 70.8 22.8 2.5 0.1 100.0 1053 1.24
35-39 3.0 38.7 47.7 9.5 1.1 100.0 820 1.67
40-44 2.7 13.5 46.5 29.6 7.6 100.0 550 2.28
45-49 3.0 6.7 30.2 37.3 22.9 100.0 507 2.77
Total 7.8 50.8 26.3 11.1 4.1 100.0 4143 1.54
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Table 2.6 Parity progression ratios by selected age groups, Hebei and Shaanxi 
provinces, Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
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Age
Parity progression ratio ( x 1000)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Hebei province 
35-39 986 960 691 413 253 226 214
40-44 987 982 876 707 489 388 290
45-49 984 982 930 825 640 551 440
Shaanxi province 
35-39 978 985 826 603 433 319 422
40-44 981 979 949 763 608 508 373
45-49 992 980 938 858 750 580 557
Shanghai municipality 
35-39 970 601 182 103
40-44 973 862 445 205 238 300
45-49 970 931 666 380 259 133
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
It is noteworthy that the proportions of childlessness (parity zero) reported 
by women aged 45-49 in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces were very low (Table 2.5 ), 
while in Shanghai the proportion of childlessness was close to the level of normally 
occurring infertility.^ In discussion of the possible reasons for underreporting 
childlessness, Frank (1983: 6) pointed out that, in sub-Saharan Africa, this may be 
partly due to a woman raising children who are not biologically her own. The 1982 
One-per-Thousand Fertility Survey in China also showed a very low level of 
childlessness, about one per cent. However, a level of about four per cent of 
childlessness was reported in the 1988 Two-per-Thousand Survey that included
2 A five per cent level of childless women at older ages is considered standard for natural- 
fertility populations; however, data on childlessness from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal 
indicate tha t the level could be lower, and a level of three per cent 'is  an acceptable 
benchmark for natural fertility populations' (Frank, 1983: 6). Evidence from the World 
Fertility Survey also shows tha t in 21 of the 28 countries, a t least 96 per cent of women 
aged 40-44 can expect to have one or more living children (Vaessen, 1984: 10).
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explicit questions on adopted children (Feeney and Wang, 1992: 25). Hence, it is 
likely that the very low levels of childlessness in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces were 
the results of the inclusion of adopted children in the reported number of children 
ever born.
2.5 Family planning practices in the three regions
Table 2.7 and Figure 2.2 illustrate the distribution of reported contraceptive 
prevalence rates by different age groups for the three regions, which include 
sterilization, and which excluded women who were pregnant, not currently married 
or infecund at the time of the survey. It appears that the gaps among the three 
regions in overall contraceptive prevalence rates were narrow, the rate for 
Shanghai being about seven per cent higher than that for Hebei and six per cent 
higher than Shaanxi. The overall prevalence rates in the two provinces were fairly 
close. This pattern suggests that in the three regions, the birth control practices 
almost cross the regional socio-economic classes. This was obviously a result of the 
strong government family planning program, though it is possible there was over­
reporting in contraceptive use in the two provinces. Furthermore, the curve of 
prevalence rates for Shanghai, as can be seen in Figure 2.2, shows a unique age 
pattern with about 70 per cent of women aged 20-24 or their husbands currently 
using contraception. Meanwhile, the curve for Hebei was also slightly skewed to 
the left compared with that of Shaanxi. This pattern implies that the family 
planning programs were most successful in Shanghai and slightly more successful 
in Hebei than in Shaanxi in raising contraceptive use among younger and more 
fecund women. The timing of initiation of birth control is more important in 
limiting family size, because most Chinese women use contraception for birth 
stopping rather than birth spacing. 3
3 Chapter 4 has a section that specifically discusses the impact of the family planning 
program on the initiation of contraceptive use and induced abortion.
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Table 2.7 Contraceptive prevalence ra tes of currently m arried women by age, 
Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Age Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
15-19 13.3 13.2 0.0
20-24 40.7 35.8 66.9
25-29 79.4 73.1 80.9
30-34 92.9 93.5 91.7
35-39 95.1 95.1 93.6
40-44 89.0 88.3 90.6
45-49 71.5 76.1 85.4
15-49 82.3 79.8 87.7
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: Excluding women who were pregnant, currently not married or infecund.
Figure 2.2 Contraceptive prevalence rates by age, Hebei and Shaanxi 
provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
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Regarding the distribution of specific methods of contraception, the clinical 
methods (sterilization and IUD insertions) overwhelmingly dominated the choices, 
with 93 and 94 per cent in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, while in Shanghai the 
proportion is 74 per cent, substantially lower than  th a t of the two provinces (Figure 
2.3). IUD insertions were the most prevalent method in Shanghai (55 per cent),
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followed by Shaanxi (53 per cent) and Hebei (40 per cent), while female 
sterilization was the most common method in Hebei (49 per cent) and less common 
in Shaanxi (36 per cent); only 16 per cent of women or their husbands underwent 
sterilization in Shanghai.
Several reasons may explain the predominant role of clinical methods in 
birth control, particularly in the two agriculture-oriented provinces. First, the 
government family planning program made a special effort to stress the clinical 
methods, particularly IUD insertion and sterilization, in rural areas, to ensure a 
permanent or semi-permanent end to births (see Chapter 3). This program effort 
was intended to avoid many outside-plan births that resulted from contraceptive 
failure, and to increase contraceptive use effectiveness. Secondly, knowledge about 
contraceptive use was still much less for rural than for urban women, given the 
large proportions of women in the two provinces who had no education. IUD 
insertions and sterilizations were undertaken by professional staff in the clinics 
and did not require the recipients to have much specific knowledge. In rural areas 
the side-effects of oral pills were exaggerated and temporary side-effects 
experienced after taking the pills were considered as causing long-term harm (Li et 
al., 1991: 16), so couples hesitated to use the supply methods (pills, condoms, etc). 
Thirdly, most Chinese couples tend to have a child immediately after marriage and 
most of them are not eligible to have a second or third child, depending on their 
residence areas; this implies that the younger couples have to practise birth control 
for 20 years or more. Many couples thought that the supply methods were not 
practical for such a long period. These factors largely explain the predominant role 
of clinical methods in the two provinces, and probably also in metropolitan 
Shanghai and in China as a whole (Li et al., 1991: 18). The marked difference in 
the choice of IUD and sterilization in the two provinces may be partly due to the 
accessibility of the methods, and partly because the family planning program in 
Hebei began to emphasize female sterilization in 1973, while sterilization was
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promoted much later in Shaanxi province (Li et al., 1991: 18). In brief, the three 
selected regions, to some extent, represented different levels of socio-economic 
development and fertility control.
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C hapter 3 P opulation  p olicy  and fertility  d eclin e
3.1 Introduction
How was it that the Chinese population policy, a distinctive policy with its targets, 
strength and approaches, could be implemented in a country with a thousand 
million people? What kind of role did the population policy play in China's dramatic 
fertility decline? What were the major contextual elements of the degree of success 
of the policy? Why could not the one-child-per-couple birth control target be 
fulfilled? These questions are the central focus of this chapter. They are key issues 
both in understanding the radical fertility transition in China over the last two 
decades and in anticipating the future scenarios of China's population movement.
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, three major explanations have 
previously been proposed for understanding the dramatic fertility decline in China: 
(1) the vigorous birth planning program under the guidance of the stringent 
population policy; (2) the joint effects and interaction of the population policy, 
family planning program and socio-economic modernization; (3) the role of 
transformation of community institutions (McNicoll, 1980; Greenhalgh, 1989). The 
transition to socialism since the early 1950s fundamentally restructured the social 
institutions and relations between the state and civil society. Consequently, the 
transition altered the socio-economic and cultural setting within which 
childbearing decisions were made. The basic collective units, such as production 
teams, brigades and communes in the countryside, and work units and residential 
units in the cities, were considered as the 'vehicles’ for the successful 
implementation of the birth control policy (Greenhalgh, 1989: 21). These primary 
units were important; they virtually represented the community level of socio­
economic and cultural settings. However, these basic units were at the bottom of
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the new 'state-dominated institutions', while the population policies were 
formulated by the leaders at the top of the institutions. Hence, it is interesting to 
inquire into the kinds of factors that linked the two strata in the institutional 
system in such a way as to modify, at both the community and societal levels, the 
social, economical and cultural environment in a direction supportive of low 
fertility. The functions of administrative organizations at all levels alone, though 
they were important, are not the whole story. There must be a key initiative and 
an operating mechanism for the whole institutional system to enforce the 
population policies. This chapter argues that in addition to socio-economic 
development and the transformation of the institutions, the ideology of the top 
leaders, the source of initiative", the function of all political administrative and mass 
organizations, the operating mechanism; and mass movement, the basic approach, 
were the major elements of the enforcement of China's unique population policies 
that resulted in a dramatic fertility decline. In the meantime, significant changes 
in these aspects since the post-Mao reforms offer partial explanations for the 
stalling of fertility decline in the 1980s.
3.2 S a lien t ch aracteristics o f C hina’s fertility  tran sition
The most salient feature of Chinese fertility transition is the stringent population 
policy which undoubtedly played a crucial role in the radical and sustained fertility 
decline during the 1970s. Nevertheless, the population policy and the birth 
planning program, while necessary conditions for the fertility decline, were not 
sufficient conditions (Greenhalgh, 1989); the sufficient conditions include the 
transition and dynamics in the institutional settings and socio-economic 
modernization as well as the evolution of the traditional culture and customs.
The fertility decline in mainland China may be divided into two broad 
components: gradual decline and accelerated decline. The gradual decline 
component was attributable to those factors beyond the population policy and
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program. The changes in these factors, such as social institutions, modernization, 
transformations in family structure and functions, and women's status, took 
several decades in reshaping the environment towards a propensity to low fertility. 
The effects of these factors on fertility were gradual and relatively stable, and were 
evident in the long term. Analysis of these factors could result in a positive answer 
to the question whether fertility in China would have declined without the 
stringent population policy (e.g. Cheng, 1991).
In some regions spontaneous birth control had been practised among certain 
social strata well before the government's direct intervention through the family 
planning program (Lavely and Freedman, 1990). In particular, the beginning of 
the fertility transition in metropolitan Shanghai occurred in the late 1950s (Peng, 
1989: 5). The radical fertility decline in the 1970s was facilitated by the 
accumulated change in socio-economic circumstances over the previous decades. 
The regional variations in the evolution of these factors were major causes of 
difference in the timing and pace of fertility transition among the provinces. In 
some areas where the fertility transition has made the greatest progress, profound 
changes in socio-economic development have occurred simultaneously (Tien, 1984: 
385). In brief, on the one hand, the changes in these factors provided a unique 
setting for the enforcement of the population policy, which was mainly mirrored in 
the 1970s. On the other hand, unfortunately, these factors also defined the limit to 
which the policy could push the fertility decline; this was apparently reflected by 
the fertility stalling and fluctuating in the 1980s. However, it could also be that it 
is relatively easy to reduce high fertility to near-replacement fertility, but much 
harder to reduce it further. The accelerated component of fertility decline was 
attributable to the direct intervention of the government through the mandatory 
population policy, which is the focus of this chapter.
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3.3 Id eo log ica l change and the form ulation  o f popu lation  
p olicy
Dittmer (1990: 42) pointed out that ideology was the most abstract formulation of 
policy in China, because of the relative absence of a legal (either constitutional or 
legislative) tradition. Ideology in China became not only a vague legitimation of 
the institutional structure of authority, but also an instrument for the exercise of 
political and administrative power and for the implementation of policy. As a 
routine, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government generate 
consensus about the latest interpretation of Marxist ideology. At a given period, 
the ideology will be construed in terms of a general line and a set of policies. The 
CCP and the government, then, mobilize the masses through the social pressure of 
an organized campaign to carry out the set of policies that are deemed consistent 
with the interpretation of ideology. The changes in the priorities of Chinese 
Marxism were fairly frequent, and certainly, only the CCP, particularly the leader 
of the CCP, had the authority to make changes.
The population policy and the birth control programs were thus the product 
not merely of decisions and actions but also of ideas. Drawing primarily on 
published Chinese sources and his conversations with Chinese scholars, Tien 
(1991) related a detailed history of the formulation and implementation of the 
population policy, which has gone through many twists and turns. A number of 
other studies of China's changing population policies have emerged, particularly 
since the creation of the One-Child Policy (e.g. Chen and Kols., 1982; Goodstadt, 
1982; Croll, Davin and Kane, 1985; Greenhalgh, 1990b; Wang and Hull, 1991; 
Hull, 1991). It is worthwhile to highlight some distinctive features that are 
relevant to the ideological evolution and the initiative of fertility control.
38
3.3.1 Id eology  and p o lic ies  in  the 1950s and 1960s
The evolution of the ideology of birth control went through several stages and 
varied under the changing socio-economic environment as well as the intervention 
of political struggles; so, correspondingly, did the rationale of the population policy. 
It took almost two decades for the Chinese government to completely shift from an 
optimistic view of population to a firm population control policy of such magnitude, 
with such strong determination and commitment from the leaders.
In the process of changing the ideology of birth control, the statements and 
directions of top leaders in the CCP and the state government always served as the 
basic guideline, played a decisive role in the formulation of population policy and 
affected the directions of China's researches in population theory. The thoughts of 
Mao Zedong, chairman of the CCP, were among the dominant factors that affected 
the Party's ideology and policy design. Mao pronounced on the eve of the founding 
of PRC in 1949:
It is a very good thing that China has a big population. Even if China's
population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution.....
[in short], revolution plus production can solve the problem of feeding the
population......Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under
the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind 
of miracle can be performed (Mao, 1961: 453-454, cited in Tien, 1991: 81).
Mao originally did not mean to encourage population growth; his remarks 
aimed to refute the pessimistic views and to increase the confidence of the CCP and 
the Chinese people in dealing with the serious problems that they were facing after 
the civil war, which included the problem of feeding and employing China's huge 
population, at that time numbering about 541 million. Nevertheless, Mao 
apparently denied the serious population problems and believed that the 
'revolution-plus-production' approach could solve these perceived problems. Since 
then Mao’s statement had been frequently cited as the principal premise in the 
dispute on population issues, and particularly, it had been used by pronatalists to 
counter the ideal of fertility control. In the earlier years of the 1950s, a fairly
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optimistic view of population control was promoted by the top leaders, and was 
supported by the rationale that the Malthusian population theory should be 
rejected; according to Marxist theory and the 'Soviet Union Model', population 
growth is one of the socialist characteristics. Consequently, the social and economic 
policies then indeed encouraged more births. For instance, after 1949 the 'supply 
system’1 continued to provide an extra allowance for every child born to persons 
who worked for the communist government; the propaganda attempted to affirm 
that under the guarantee of the new communist regime, families could afford to 
bear more children than under the old regime (Hou, 1981: 57-58). Copying the 
population policy of the former Soviet Union, the government provided awards for 
women who had borne many children as 'mother heroines'; there were strict 
government bans on sterilization and induced abortion (Shi, 1988: 53, 111, 113).
Early in the 1950s there were also some constraints upon China's top
leaders that precluded their attaining a rational decision for fertility control. First,
the top leaders were confronted with time pressures in comprehensively evaluating
the alternative priorities in the agenda. Under Mao's leadership the CCP had
always put political targets as the first priority. In the early years of the CCP in
power, the new regime put its major efforts in political struggles and in restoration
and reorganization of the war-damaged national economy, aiming to eliminate
anti-revolutionary resistance, and to establish and stabilize its power. Class
struggle ( to suppress both internal and external anti-revolutionists) and the
revolution of the relationships of production (socialization of the means of
production) were the urgent political tasks at the top of the agenda. During 1950-
53, enormous personnel and other resources had to be mobilized for the Korean
War. Secondly, in the early years after the CCP had taken the helm, there was no
accurate information on either population or natural resources, so there was no
1 A system of payment in kind practised during the revolutionary civil war and the early 
days of the PRC. The supply system provided all personnel and their dependants in the 
communist government and the People's Liberation Army with the primary necessities of 
life (Hou, 1981: 58).
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basis for formulating a rational population policy. The government did not 
anticipate the dramatic reduction in mortality and the radical increase in 
population growth rates.
After the 1953 census showed a total population of 583 million, the latent 
pressure of the huge population was gradually realized by some top leaders. They 
made speeches at higher-level government meetings and the CCP congress, and 
declared that the CCP endorsed birth control, and that it should be promoted 
rather than to opposed (Shi, 1988: 119-125). In the first two decades of the PRC, 
the basic rationale for birth control emphasized the health and welfare of women 
and children, which was consistent with the national constitution. Meanwhile, it 
could lay aside the complex dispute about the relationship between population, 
production, and consumption (Tien, 1991, 83). No new model of family size was 
clearly incorporated into the ruling ideology by the top leaders of the CCP and the 
government; in the 1960s there had been some discussion about a smaller family of 
two or three children, but it had not yielded any specific or clear directions on the 
number of births (Croll et al., 1985: 13).
Mao, the dominant CCP leader, did not consider that China’s huge 
population was a serious problem needing to be checked resolutely and urgently. 
Although he made comments and statements on fertility limitation, sometimes 
they were vague and even contradictory (Qu, 1987). Birth control activities were 
limited during the first two decades in their scope and strength, partly because the 
CCP and the government issued only a general call to limit family size and partly 
because of the disruption caused by many political and economic campaigns.
3.3.2 C hanges in  id eo logy  and p o licy  in  the 1970s
After a decade that included famine, political turmoil and economic stagnation, and 
an increase of nearly 200 million people, a firm consensus on birth control was 
eventually reached among the top leaders in the 1970s. Hence, the birth control
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programs during the 1970s differed markedly in scope and strength from the 
intermittent activities during the previous two decades.
Population control had been a highly sensitive topic for more than twenty 
years since the founding of the PRC. Hence, demographic research was seen 
essentially as an empty academic discipline in China, though there was some 
short-lived discussion of the issue of birth control during the 1950s. Theoretical 
research on the rationale for population control was not resumed until after the 
formulation of a stringent population policy and the initiation of the full-scale 
family planning program in the 1970s. As with other affairs in China, policy 
formulation was not part of the population researchers' task. Their assignment was 
only to theorize in the context of an established policy of population control, more 
specifically, to interpret and defend the policy. Any theories or new ideas that were 
contrary to the current policy were likely to be suppressed.
In the new era of birth control, the welfare rationale of fertility limitation • 
was replaced by a new and broad rationale: the principle of proportionality of 
human reproduction and material production. With some statements on population 
by Marx and Engels for basic ideological guidance, the theory of interdependence of 
the two kinds of production was widely discussed and elaborated. A remark of 
Friedrich Engels was frequently cited:
If communist society should one day be compelled to regulate the production 
of human beings, as it regulates the production of goods, then it and it alone 
will be able to do this without any difficulty (cited in Liu, 1981: 18).
It was believed that only in socialist China was it possible both for 
individual families to practise birth control and for society as a whole to exercise 
regulation over population reproduction in line with the needs of socio-economic 
development. In capitalist countries, while individual families may control their 
births for the interests of individual families, the population growth in the whole 
society 'remains spontaneous and anarchic’ (Liu, 1981: 18-19).
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In the late 1970s, the specific requirements of the population policy had 
become clear-cut terms rather than the vague general call. In 1979, the central 
leaders announced one of the most ambitious policies, the One-Child Policy. Why 
did the top leaders become so determined to carry out an unprecedentedly tough 
fertility control policy? It was certainly not because the attainment of sufficient 
social and economic development facilitated a drastic decline in fertility, nor 
because the Chinese people had gone through a fundamental change in their 
fertility preferences (see Chapters 6 to 8). Rather, the leaders were fully aware of 
the obstacles to fertility control, which were mainly caused by lack of 
modernization, particularly in rural China. No large survey was conducted to 
investigate women's reproductive behaviour until the 1982 One-per-Thousand 
Fertility Survey, or to inquire into women's family-size preferences until the 1985 
China In-Depth Fertility Survey (IDFS). These surveys were both conducted after 
the announcement of the One-Child Policy.
What in fact happened was that the leaders had concluded that failure to 
clamp down on rapid population growth was one of the big mistakes they had made 
during the previous decades of socialist development. As a result, China's economy 
had suffered from the burdens of a huge population on a limited resource base. The 
adoption of the One-Child Policy reflected the leaders' strong sense of urgency to 
control population growth, and the urgent attempt came from several 
considerations.
First, in the post-Mao era, the most imperative task was to strive towards 
rapid modernization, since the new leaders had already staked their legitimacy on 
the promise of'Four modernizations' and of raising the standard of living of all the 
Chinese people. Consequently, modernization would lower fertility, although only 
in the long term. On the other hand, the tempo of modernization was thought to 
depend on the degree of success of population control. To reduce the burden of a 
huge population became an important precondition for modernization, and it
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needed to be done immediately. Therefore, to break this circle of interdependence 
the government decided to directly intervene and introduce the radical One-Child 
Policy (Croll et al., 1985:1; Tien, 1991).
The purpose of population control as interpreted by the Chinese government 
was to improve the collective well-being of all the people, mainly according to the 
macro-economic principle of proportionality of reproduction and production. It was 
argued that childbearing is not an individual, private matter; every birth affects 
the life chances of other persons, therefore population control is a collective duty 
and responsibility (Hillier, 1988: 102). The dramatic fertility decline in the 1970s 
was associated with the several decades of ideological education about collectivism, 
which taught Chinese people to understand the necessity and urgency of 
controlling population growth for the whole nation's prosperity (Wu and Jia, 1991: 
6 ).
3.4 The cen tra lized  control system
Caldwell (1993: 315) has asserted that 'sufficient government duress could reduce 
fertility to below replacement level in any society on earth, providing that the 
government itself was not destroyed in the process'. Why did the PRC regime have 
the power and capacity to induce a radical and sustained fertility decline in the 
1970s? What were the monitoring mechanisms that turned the central leaders' 
population policy intention into nationwide organized behaviours, and then 
achieved the actual results of drastic fertility decline?
One of the most important factors had been the highly centralized and 
strong political-control system, which was built gradually under the transition to 
socialism. The highly organized system, stretching from the central Chinese 
Communist Party, state, and military apparatus to the lowest levels of Chinese 
communities, embodied powerful integrative mechanisms, which had shown 
impressive capacities to mobilize and focus activity (Lampton, 1987: 14). The CCP
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is the source of legitimacy and all political, administrative and military power in 
China. It alone decides the political, economic, and social goals for the Chinese 
society and directs the whole system of state and army to implement its policies. 
Under the leadership of the CCP, a huge network of auxiliary organizations was 
established, including all women's, workers', peasants', youth and other 
community-level mass organizations. The leaders of those organizations are CCP 
members, so that they shape their organizational priorities to fulfil or at least to be 
beneficial to the CCP's current central task, though these mass organizations have 
many other different functions.
At the bottom of the socialist institution, there were work units in urban 
areas, and a three-tier hierarchy of collective units in rural areas: commune, 
production brigade, production team. These rural units were replaced by ydang 
(townships) and villages during the rural decentralizing reforms in the late 1970s. 
The work units in urban areas were places where individuals acquired not only 
jobs and wages, but also housing, health care, further education, pensions, and 
other social security. The cadres who were in charge of these units had a wide 
range of political, administrative and economic punishments to ensure individual 
compliance with the current central policies. In rural areas, under the jurisdiction 
of the local cadres at the three-level hierarchical units, particularly the cadres of 
production teams, individual peasants had little choice in decision making but to 
comply with the orders of the intermediate cadres. This was because the rural 
cadres were entitled to substantial control over peasants’ necessities of life, such as 
daily job-assignments, workpoints (basic work record for distribution of the income 
of the production team), private plots of land and household registers (Greenhalgh, 
1988; 1989).
If centralized political control was the common characteristic of the 
communist regime, another distinguishing feature of China's fertility control was 
that birth planning was built as an integral part of the whole political and
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administrative structure that combined horizontal integration of all government 
functions at local levels, with vertical control from the top (Chen and Kols, 1982). 
By 1973, family planning offices were established at state, provincial or municipal, 
and county levels for overseeing the implementation of birth control policy. Under 
the supervision of the leaders of CCP branches, birth planning units at each 
hierarchical level managed, and coordinated with units of the health care system 
and other mass organizations to propel birth planning. The birth control delivery 
services were built into the health care system.
Apart from the guidance system, the effort to integrate ideology from the 
top to the local levels was also an important monitoring mechanism that facilitated 
centralized control of policy enforcement. At first, the CCP and top state leaders 
made a strong commitment and showed their solidarity with the population control 
strategy; then they made persistent efforts to imbue leaders at all levels with the 
same integrated ideology of population control and propel them to make the same 
commitment. In the meantime, the central leaders called on all members of the 
CCP and the Communist Youth League and the masses to submit to the central 
ideological indoctrination and the policy. Numerous documents and working 
meetings plus CCP and administrative disciplines were basic means to eliminate 
opposition groups or individuals among the regional and local cadres. Mass 
movement became the effective vehicle to ensure policy enforcement at the very 
grassroots levels.
This highly centrally controlled system also enabled the government to 
mobilize China's very limited local resources and concentrate on the family 
planning program. The socialist economic system ensured the firm grasp of the 
central state over society, through its role in the management of the economy. The 
state owned and managed all major means of production and private ownership 
was strictly limited. The government regulated the economy and allocated 
strategically significant resources through stated commands, such as five-year
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plans, rather than relying on market forces or monetary instruments of control. 
When population control appeared in the top priorities of the agenda, the 
government mobilized enormous human and material resources to support the 
birth control program. In 1980 China spent roughly US$ 1 per capita on the family 
planning program, while the figures were US$ 0.30 in India and US$0.70 per 
capita across all developing countries (World Bank, 1984: 148-151). China's 
expenditure on population control during 1981-85 totalled 3.06 billion yuan , with 
an average annual increase of 18 per cent. The number of full-time family planning 
workers increased from less than 45,000 in 1979 to 150,000 in the late 1980s, 
increasing more than 20 per cent annually. In addition, there were a million part- 
time workers also involved in the birth control program then (Wei, 1989b: 391).
3.5 The m ass m ovem ent o f popu lation  control
3.5.1 Political and economic campaign
As a number of scholars pointed out, 'The implementation of policy by means of
mass mobilization is one of the most distinctive features of the Chinese political
process' (Gardner, 1969: 477, cited in Cell, 1977: 6). Mass mobilization was
particularly useful 'to implement new policies marking a radical departure from
the status quo, which required active community commitment to foster an
atmosphere conducive to consensual enforcement (Dittmer, 1990: 48).'
Party-directed mobilization was the only means by which to cut through the 
bureaucracy and compel propaganda, health, family-planning, 
pharmaceutical, and financial departments to cooperate in the provision of the 
requisite human and material resources (White, 1987: 315).
In the early 1950s, the CCP started a revolution that was unprecedented in 
its scale, targets and approaches. This revolution can be divided into several 
different stages and consists of a series of political and economic campaigns. In the 
early years of the 1950s, most campaigns were conducted directly or indirectly to 
establish and consolidate the communist regime by eliminating or suppressing the
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remaining counter-revolutionaries or opposition elements. Afterwards, the CCP 
and its government continued to depend on the utility of mass mobilization 
campaigns to enforce socialist transformation in all aspects of Chinese social, 
political and economic life. Political and economic targets and slogans were 
announced at the beginning or modified during the campaigns. All the CCP 
members and members of the Communist Youth League, women and workers' 
organizations were called on to enthusiastically participate in the mass movement. 
The mass campaigns socialized the means of production, eliminated enemies and 
opposition groups, and rectified the ideology and traditional culture (Cell, 1977).2
After the CCP came to power, the successive political, economic and 
ideological campaigns demanded and produced millions of new CCP members. 
From 1954 to 1964, the CCP recruited over a million new members annually. 
While there was a temporary stop in recruitment during the early years of the 
Cultural Revolution, a massive recruitment of 'fresh blood' took place after the 
Ninth CCP Congress in April 1969. The CCP membership rose to 28 million by 
1973 and 35 million by 1977 (Chang, 1985: 46-47). These members were the most 
active components of the political and administrative control network and were the 
major driving force in the mass movements.
In China, many material interests were closely linked with personal power 
positions. Before the economic reform, CCP membership was the politically 
exclusive route for a person's promotion and to a successful career. Hence, political 
attitudes and performance in the mass campaigns and submissions to political 
discipline were major criteria for being recruited as a member of the CCP and for 
promotion. CCP members or cadres at different levels came to identify their 
interests, to a large extent, with those of their superiors rather than their
2 Cell (1977) made a systematic study of the campaigns in PRC, including the component 
process of mobilization and outcomes, and both shortcomings and achievements. 
Unfortunately, Cell did not include birth control campaigns in his study, although the 
campaigns mentioned in his book referred to the period 1949-1975.
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constituents. Presumably, these were some of the major reasons for Chinese people 
to be highly concerned about political issues and to take part actively in the 
campaigns launched by the CCP and the central government, and political life 
became the major concern of many Chinese people.
3.5.2 F am ily  p la n n in g  cam p aign
Concurrently, mass movement was also the major approach to adopting the 
population policy. From the mid-1950s, the government embarked on a series of 
national birth control campaigns, that usually are classified as follows:
1955-1957, First family planning campaign;
1963-1966, Second family planning campaign;
1971-1978, Wan Xi Shao (Late marriage, Longer birth interval, Fewer 
children) campaign; and
1979-1984, One-Child Campaign.
The four campaigns were distinguished from each other by their leadership 
commitments, strengths, targets, degrees of mobilization and the stages of social 
development at which they occurred. Consequently, the impacts of each of the 
campaigns on fertility were different. Particularly, the third and fourth campaigns 
differed greatly from the first two.
3.5.2.1 F irst fam ily  p lan n in g  cam paign
The first campaign was primarily an initial drive of birth control propaganda, 
which was abandoned at the launching of the Great Leap Forward economic 
campaign in early 1958. Although the first campaign had no significant effect in 
reducing China’s fertility, except perhaps in a few large cities, it did have some 
positive results. The leaders began to realize that more efforts were needed to solve
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the difficult and complex birth control problem, and that a national and provincial 
apparatus of birth control was required. By the end of the campaign, most laws 
restricting birth control had been revoked, and research on better birth control 
methods was encouraged (Banister, 1987:148-149).
3.5.2.2 Second family planning campaign
After the Great Leap Forward came to grief with the three years of famine (1959- 
1961), the second post-1949 birth peak emerged in 1963 with a crude birth rate of 
43.6 per thousand and a natural increase rate of 33.5 per thousand. At this point 
the second family planning campaign was started. In 1964, the central government 
established the first national Family Planning Office, and some corresponding 
provincial offices were set up by the regional governments. In January 1964, the 
first national conference on birth control techniques was held in Beijing, aiming to 
advance the research, design, and production of the means of birth control, and in 
July the second national population census was conducted (Shi, 1988: 148-150). 
The major focus of the family planning campaign was large metropolitan areas, 
cities and a few provinces with a high density of population, while the general call 
also encouraged rural couples to practise birth control. Urban problems which were 
related to population growth, such as unemployment, poor infrastructure and food 
shortage, were the major reasons for the program focus. Meanwhile, the lack of a 
network of contraceptive supply in rural areas may have affected the extension of 
the program to vast rural China. Not surprisingly, substantial fertility decline took 
place in many large cities during this campaign, before the major thrust and full- 
scale national family planning campaign began in the 1970s.
3.5.2.3 Wan Xi Shao Campaign
The most remarkable campaign in the history of China's fertility and family 
planning efforts was the Wan Xi Shao campaign in 1971-1978. As the One-per- 
Thousand Fertility Survey and successive surveys confirmed, the major component
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of China's sustained fertility decline took place in the 1970s (see Chapter 4). 
Despite sharp disagreements on other matters, the dreadful consequences of rapid 
population growth on China's ambitious goals of modernization and high living 
standards united the top leaders in firm determination to stop China's population 
growth. The Family Planning Office of the State Council was resumed after several 
years of social and political turmoil during the Cultural Revolution. By 1974, all 
the provinces and municipalities had set up family planning committees, and CCP 
leaders at all levels were leading members of the committees. Two important 
targets were set for this campaign: promote late marriage (see detailed discussion 
in Chapter 5) and propel family size limitation. A new family size norm was 
introduced with the slogan 'one is not too few, two is good, three is too many,’ 
aiming to promote the two-child family model.
The family planning network had reached from the central government 
down to the work units or neighbourhoods in the urban areas, and to communes 
and even most villages in the countryside. The contraceptive delivery system had 
been built into the primary health care system. The three-tier integrated health 
service system^ that had provided contraceptive and abortion services to China’s 
vast rural population became the largest community-based delivery system in the 
world (Chen and Kols, 1982: 584-585). In 1970, the government made a crucial 
decision to eliminate contraception costs for married couples; and two years later, 
married couples who accepted abortion, IUD insertions or other birth control 
operations could receive paid leave from work units of up to several weeks (Shi, 
1988: 158-164). This was the initial economic incentive to practising birth control. 
It was during this campaign that sustained and dramatic fertility decline occurred.
3 Before the economic reform, the primary health care system in rural China included 
three levels of health care establishment: the brigade's cooperative medical station, the 
commune health centre, and the county general hospital (Chen and Kols, 1982: 584)
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3.5.2.4 One-Child Campaign
In 1979, the central CCP and government embarked on the One-Child Campaign 
by announcing a universal and singular recommendation, the one-child family 
model, to the nation. This campaign was launched under the direct leadership of 
the central committee; the CCP's top leaders, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Hu 
Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, etc., had all personally directed the process of the campaign 
(Chen, 1981: 1). In early 1980 Chen Muhau, the Vice-Premier, interpreted the goal 
of the policy to be: only if 95 per cent of married couples in the cities and 90 per 
cent in the countryside had only one child in due course, could the total population 
of China be controlled at about 1.2 billion by the end of this century (Shi, 1988: 
188). The CCP's central committee issued an 'open letter' in September 1980, 
which urged all members of the CCP and Communist Youth League, particularly 
the cadres, to 'take the lead’ in birth control and accept the one-child norm, and to 
set an example to the masses.
These actions reflected the strategic changes in the population control 
program. One important indicator is that the emphasis of the program was shifted 
from two equal components, promoting later marriage and small family size, to 
strictly focusing on the number of births. The birth quota system is a family 
planning system unique in the world; it is designed on the basis of both national 
and local population targets. Under this system, each couple’s childbearing has to 
fit into the local birth quota limits in terms of both timing and numbers.
The concrete stipulations of the birth control policy were formulated by the 
State Family Planning Commission under the supervision of the top CCP leaders. 
The first family planning propaganda month was conducted in January 1983, 
immediately following the release of results of the 1982 third national population 
census. The CCP central leaders clearly instructed that the propaganda work
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should bring about practical results in contraceptive practices; in order to fulfil the 
basic principle that 'under no circumstance is the third child allowed’, the decision 
was made that 'those women who have already given birth to one child must be 
inserted with IUDs, and couples who already have two children must undergo 
sterilization by either the husband or the wife; women with unplanned pregnancies 
must adopt remedial measures as soon as possible’ (Shi, 1988: 24; Banister, 1987: 
212 ).
During the propaganda month and thereafter, sterilization was greatly 
emphasized. For example, Hebei province targeted 2.06 million sterilizations for 
1983 and had carried out 1.77 million sterilizations by May, which accounted for 86 
per cent of the year’s quota CHebei Daily, 5 April 1983, cited in Banister, 1987: 
214). Shaanxi province reported in late January 1983 that within the propaganda 
month, one of its counties had sterilized half of those who should undergo 
sterilization according to the birth control stipulation, and another county did even 
more than half (Banister, 1987: 214). Nationwide data showed that from January 1 
to February 25 1983, 8.37 million birth-control operations were carried out; 3.60 
million sterilizations, 3.52 million IUD insertions, and 1.77 induced abortions. 
Meanwhile, there were 1.65 million new acceptors of One-Child Certificates (Shi, 
1988: 24).
3.6 The ro le  o f popu lation  p olicy  in  the 1980s
After the great achievements in the 1970s, the Chinese government made a 
strategic adjustment by implementing the more stringent One-Child Policy and 
promulgating the new marriage law. However, the decision makers did not 
anticipate that the new marriage law, that mitigated the previous late-marriage 
regulations, would evoke a marriage boom; in addition the fertility impact of 
delayed marriage was somewhat offset by the shortened first birth interval (see 
Chapter 5). It has become clear that the role of the One-Child Policy in further
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fertility decline was limited; it could only serve, to some extent, as a means to 
discourage fertility from turning upwards, but did not bring a further substantial 
decline from the level achieved in the late 1970s. Therefore, it is interesting to 
inquire why fertility stalled in the 1980s. What were the resistant forces 
preventing further fertility decline? These are the focus of both the rest of the 
chapter and the successive chapters. First, empirical evidence from the three study 
areas is used to gauge the acceptance of the One-Child Policy.
3.6.1 The acceptance of the One-Child Policy
To what extent was the dramatic fertility decline in Hebei, Shaanxi and Shanghai 
due to the government policy to promote the one-child family? Rapid increases in 
the proportion of first births among all births and substantial drops in the third 
and higher-order births in 1979 and the early 1980s were evidence of initial rising 
compliance with the One-Child Policy.
Table 3.1 describes the changes in parity distribution among all births that 
occurred during the periods 1975-1978 and 1979-1985, which were distinguished 
by the initiation of the One-Child Policy. As expected, the most remarkable jump 
in the proportion of first births was found in Shanghai municipality where 
impressive drops in all second and higher order births also occurred. The increases 
in the proportions of first births were also considerable in the two agriculture- 
oriented provinces, particularly in Shaanxi where a 12-percentage-points increase 
in 1979-1985 had reduced the gap in the proportions of first births between the two 
provinces. Meanwhile, the proportions of second and higher order births declined in 
Hebei, with a more substantial decrease in births of the third parity. In Shaanxi, 
substantial decline was found in the proportions of third and higher parities, while 
the births of second parity increased by 3.4 percentage points. Comparison among 
the three regions suggests that the One-Child Policy had a dramatic effect in 
reducing second births only in metropolitan Shanghai, while the policy had great
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impact on depressing the third and higher-order births in the two agriculture- 
oriented provinces. This implies that even under the pressure of the official One- 
Child Policy, more than 50 per cent of couples in the two provinces wanted and had 
at least two children.
Table 3.1 Percentage distribution of live births by birth order, Hebei and Shaanxi 
provinces and Shanghai municipality, 1975-1979
Birth order
TotalYear 1st 2nd 3rd 4th+
Hebei province
1975-1978 40.7 32.2 19.1 8.0 1790
1979-1985 47.1 31.3 14.4 7.2 3509
Shaanxi province
1975-1978 32.3 27.5 20.1 20.1 1489
1979-1985 44.3 30.9 14.3 10.5 2555
Shanghai municipality
1975-1978 65.8 29.6 4.2 0.4 840
1979-1985 85.8 12.5 1.5 0.2 1897
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: births to women above age 40 were excluded to reduce
selective bias.
The initial compliance with the One-Child Policy was mainly the result of 
the launching of the One-Child Campaign. In the later 1970s and the early 1980s, 
before the full-scale rural economic decentralization, peasants were still confined to 
the collective communes and production teams, and were much more vulnerable to 
population policy pressure than they are in the present circumstances. Hence, such 
early cooperation by no means indicated that the government’s One-Child Policy 
was widely accepted.
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The government developed the One-Child Certificate as one of the major 
incentive measures to encourage compliance with the One-Child Policy. The 
certificate holders who pledged to have only one child may enjoy varied benefits 
and rewards (Feng and Hao, 1992). The One-Child Certificate rate was created as 
an indication of birth control performance, which was defined as 'the percentage of 
all couples with one child under age 14 who pledge not to have any more children’ 
(Chen and Kols, 1982: 604). Following the definition, some studies found quite 
high levels of acceptance (e.g., Arnold and Liu, 1986: 228)4, but these tended to 
overestimate the achievement of the One-Child Policy. In calculating this 
conventional certificate acceptance rate, the denominator used was the number of 
couples currently with one child only. However, this excludes women who had been 
eligible for the One-Child Certificate but subsequently chose to have second or 
more children. A better approach is to include all women who have been exposed to 
the 'risk' of accepting the certificate (Park and Han, 1988; Cooney, Wei and 
Powers, 1991).
With the new approach, the One-Child Certificate acceptance rates were 
calculated for the three study regions. The denominator was the number of women 
at risk of acceptance between 1979 and 1985, regardless of their current number of 
living children in 1985; women who had only one child but whose child was above 
age 14 were excluded in the denominator. As can been seen in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, 
the initial acceptance rates (estimated by the new approach) were about 20 per 
cent in the two provinces, considerably lower than the figures issued by 
government or previous studies. The rate for Shanghai was 88 per cent, which 
indicated the consequence of the much stronger birth control program. The urban 
and rural differences persisted in all the indicators of acceptance status. It was also 
evident that not all certificate holders kept their promises, except for women in
4 According to Arnold and Liu, the acceptance levels of the One-Child Certificate were 
about 34 per cent for Hebei and Shaanxi, and 78 per cent for Shanghai in 1982.
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Shanghai.* 5 The apparent renunciation of the certificate mainly occurred among 
rural women in the two provinces,5 and this renunciation resulted in an even lower 
ra te  of certificate holders, as indicated by the certificate retention rates, 15.8 per 
cent for Hebei and 18 per cent for Shaanxi.
The study by Cooney e t al. (1991) based on more recent survey data  showed 
th a t in Hebei, the initial acceptance ra te  fell to 11.3 per cent during 1984-1988, 
and the proportion of certificate holders violating the certificate by having a second 
child increased by 37 per cent between 1979-1983 and 1984-1988. About 85 per 
cent of all women who had a second child during 1984-1988 had it w ithout 
governm ent perm ission (Cooney et al., 1991: 151-152).
T hat the acceptance ra tes were much lower than  the policy requirem ent 
strongly suggested massive resistance to the one-child b irth  limit, and partly 
explained why the government would adopt a lenient policy five years after the 
initiation of the One-Child Campaign, though the One-Child Policy was not- 
officially w ithdraw n. As presented in C hapter 6, the 1985 IDFS survey showed 
th a t among one-child women in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, over 90 per cent 
desired to have two or more children if the government's One-Child Policy were not 
a consideration. Even in Shanghai municipality, over 64 per cent of one-child 
women wished to have more children than  the policy stipulated. Therefore, it is 
likely th a t if  the policy is fu rther relaxed, more One-Child Certificate holders or 
currently one-child families may try  to have a second or even th ird  child.
5 See the Certificate retention rates in Table 3.2, which were calculated by excluding
from the numerator (initial acceptors) women who had initially accepted the One-Child
Certificate but subsequently had second or more children, while the denominator used was
the same as in calculating the initial acceptance rate.
5 Since the 1985 IDFS survey data did not include information on renouncing the One- 
Child certificate, data on certificate holders who subsequently progressed to second or 
higher-order births were used as a proxy for renunciation.
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Table 3.2 One-Child Certificate acceptance of all women at risk of acceptance 
between 1979 and 1985, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality
Total Urban Rural
Hebei province
Initial acceptance rate (%) 18.3 48.1 11.4
Of all women a t risk,
percentage having second or higher order live births 46.3 29.6 50.2
Of all initial acceptors,
percentage having second or higher order live births 13.8 3.9 23.7
Certificate retention rate (%) 15.8 46.2 8.7
Total number of women (N) 2248 426 1822
Shaanxi province
Initial acceptance rate (%) 20.2 52.3 7.8
Of all women a t risk,
percentage having second or higher order live births 48.3 30.1 54.0
Of all initial acceptors,
percentage having second or higher order live births 11.3 3.7 23.5
Certificate retention rate (%) 18.0 50.4 7.8
Total number of women (N) 1531 365 1166
Shanghai municipality
Initial acceptance rate (%) 88.1 95.6 76.9
Of all women a t risk,
percentage having second or higher order live births 9.5 2.5 19.9
Of all initial acceptors,
percentage having second or higher order live births 0.0 0.0 0.0
Certificate retention rate (%) 88.1 95.6 76.9
Total number of women (N) 2250 1350 900
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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Table 3.3 Percentage distribution of One-Child Certificate acceptors for all women 
who were at risk of acceptance by the number of living children, Hebei and 
Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, 1979-1985
No. of
Total women Urban women Rural women
Did not Did not Did notliving
children Accepted accept Accepted accept Accepted accept
Hebei province
1 86.2 46.4 96.1 46.6 76.3 46.4
2 13.6 44.9 3.9 48.4 23.2 44.4
3 0.2 8.1 0.0 4.5 0.5 8.6
4 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.6
Total No. 412 1836 205 221 207 1615
18.3 81.7 48.1 51.9 11.4 88.6
Shaanxi province
1 88.7 42.3 96.3 40.8 76.5 42.5
2 10.0 47.0 2.6 51.1 21.8 46.3
3 1.3 9.9 1.0 6.9 1.7 10.4
4 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.8
Total No. 310 1221 191 174 119 1047
20.2 79.8 52.3 47.7 10.2 89.8
Shanghai municipality
1 100.0 20.5 100.0 43.3 100.0 13.9
2 0.0 78.4 0.0 55.0 0.0 85.1
3 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.0
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total No. 1982 268 1290 60 692 208
88.1 11.9 95.6 4.4 76.9 23.1
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
59
3.6.2 E conom ic reform  and th e  trad ition a l va lu e  o f ch ild ren
China is a country with several thousand years of civilized history. The traditional 
culture was deeply rooted and strongly connected with the development of the 
social, economic and cultural history. It is impossible to change the traditional 
culture and value of children through a revolution approach; the failure of the 
'Cultural Revolution' provides evidence for this. Apart from the traditional culture 
continuing to exert an influence on childbearing (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8), the 
rural household responsibility system had a great impact on family building in 
many ways; this implies that the peasants' preference for a large family and for 
sons is not merely the Confucian heritage but, to some extent, a rational 
calculation in the changing social and economic environment.
First, as the household again became the basic economic unit under reform, 
land was assigned by household size and adjusted according to any changes in the 
number of household members. Hence, the larger the family size the more land it 
was entitled to use. In the present rural China, land is still the most essential 
means of production for the majority of peasants to support themselves. Simple 
and less technical tools, manual work, and labour-intensive investment are 
currently the dominant pattern of farming in rural China. An increment in 
production mainly relies on simple labour inputs rather than investment in 
technology. Consequently, the labour-rich families were allotted more land and 
were thus likely to be richer.
Secondly, children in China are legally responsible for taking care of their 
aged parents (Article 15, The Marriage Law of the PRC, 1980), so that concerns 
about financial security and physical care in old age created the desire for more 
children and particularly more sons. During the first three decades of socialist 
transformation, there was a growing trend to the socialization of security. In urban
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areas, most employees had been enjoying attractive social welfare benefits, and the 
content of the welfare benefits had also been improving. Peasants in the 
countryside, unlike urban workers, had access to rather small amounts of social 
welfare benefits. Nevertheless, the socialization of the land and agricultural 
production had extended and strengthened the collective welfare and security 
guarantees to peasants who worked in the same collective units, and particularly 
to aged and childless peasants. Ideally, a comprehensive social security scheme 
with adequate retirement pensions and aged people's homes would greatly relieve 
the worries of married couples, though this may only solve their economic problems 
in old age. However, the recent rural economic reforms have greatly undermined 
the socialist principle of pursuing social equality and security, and are conducive to 
the privatization of social security.
Thirdly, a large proportion of the Chinese population consists of rural people 
working and living in the self-supporting or semi-self-supporting economy, which 
results in very low costs for raising children. Economic reform has encouraged the 
development of private farming and small enterprises, and provided many 
opportunities for families to increase their income if the children work and 
contribute to the family unit. These factors encourage couples to bear more 
children. In addition, an increased number of school dropouts and child labourers is 
an unintended side-effect of the reform.
3.6.3 From  an id eo log ica l approach  tow ards a pragm atic approach
For almost three decades under Mao, the Marxist ideology was the first 
consideration in policy formulation. The ideological rationale put forward by CCP's 
top leaders constituted the general expression of the basic policy at any time. Class 
struggle and socialist revolution of the relationships of production was always the 
major theme of the policies. However, since the death of Mao and the overthrow of 
the 'Gang of Four' the policy design has largely been shaped by economic realities,
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and the ideological rationale has been gradually replaced by economic goals. In 
other words, the fundamental changes in policy-making since 1978, after the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP, were the gradual 
shift towards the view that the policies should respond to the needs of both 
immediate and future economic growth. This profound change resulted from the 
corresponding shift of the CCP's central task from class struggle to economic 
construction. Meanwhile, a collective leadership structure is gradually replacing 
the previous system in which a single individual top leader dominated the policy 
direction. More emphasis was placed on specialty bases for personnel recruitment 
into both CCP and state structures (Lampton, 1987: 20).
After the death of Mao and an initial period of uncertainty, the 1980s 
probably were the most stable period of China's politics since the early 1950s, but 
it was also a decade of intense debate within the leadership. The debate covered 
not only some fundamental issues of economic reform and political transformation, 
but also the policy of population control. However, although the debate was going 
on, there was general consensus that China needed to introduce market forces into 
the economy, to plan development according to economic rather than solely political 
principles, to institutionalize politics, and to relax central control. There was a 
tendency in the leadership to move from an ideological rational approach towards a 
pragmatic approach, as it was stated that 'Only social practice can be the criterion 
of tru th’.
In the sphere of population control, the ideal of'opening a small hole’ (i.e., 
making exceptions to the one-child limitation according to local conditions) in the 
birth-control policy was raised in 1984 by Wang Wei, then head of the State Family 
Planning Commission, and approved by the top leaders. This signalled the 
departure from the strident One-Child Policy. This relaxation of the policy resulted 
in an additional increase in births. The widespread international media reports on 
the failure of the One-Child Policy, and the internal disagreement on Wang's
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strategic adjustment, caused Wang Wei to be replaced by Madame Pen Peiyun; 
this change was considered an indicator of renewed emphasis on strong birth 
control (Greenhalgh, 1988: 245). Unlike the State Council Family Planning 
Leading Group reorganized in 1978, of which, apart from some medical 
professional specialists, none of the leaders and members were demographers or 
population specialists, the National Population Advisory Committee established in 
December 1987 includes many population specialists, sociologists, psychologists 
and lawyers from institutes of higher learning and from research centres all over 
the country. Some of them have received formal training in demography from well- 
known demographic programs in US, UK, Netherlands, and Japan. Others have 
experience of short-term visits to and research in Western countries. They have 
gained a good knowledge of scientific demographic approaches, and of the social 
economic regimes operating outside China, which are different from the current 
Chinese system. They are aware of the local reality and the dynamics of the 
implementation of the population policy, and many of them support the less 
stringent modification of the One-Child Policy initiated by Wang Wei (Zeng, 1989: 
334).
Therefore, lessons from the past decades and the realities of recent 
development encouraged decision-makers to adopt the modified conditional two- 
children policy for rural couples. This step of allowing rural only-daughter families 
to have a second birth was initiated in 1984 in limited areas, and was officially 
extended to all rural areas of the country in 1989, ten years after the 
announcement of the One-Child Policy. By February 1989, the policy of allowing 
two children plus spacing (regardless of the sex of the first child) was also carried 
out in the rural areas of six provinces (Zeng, 1989: 335-336). The transition from 
the strict One-Child Policy to the conditional two-children policy is a big step in 
relaxation of the policy, though most rural couples had at least two children before 
the policy modification. This modification implies that the policy-makers admitted
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and accepted the fact that most women in rural areas have had and would 
continue to have at least two children before they would really stop childbearing, 
and that it is impossible to reach the one-child target among rural couples in the 
current social, economic and cultural settings.
3.6.4 The material interests and the strength of the mass movement
The post-Mao regime, from the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, 
had unambiguously rejected Mao's mass campaign approach, particularly the 
approaches of the 'Great Leap Forward’ and the 'Great Cultural Revolution'. 
Ironically, the mass movement approach was still applied in carrying out the One- 
Child Policy. Presumably, then, it is the only approach available for ensuring the 
rapid exposure of the vast number of peasants to fertility-control education and 
adoption of contraceptive methods (White, 1987: 315). However, leaders soon 
became aware that the campaign approach could no longer effectively mobilize the 
masses and the resources.
The immediate benefits of family limitation are important incentives to 
mobilize the masses to practise fertility control. The early campaigns of birth 
control were able to mobilize 'mass consciousness’ by making fairly explicit appeals 
to material interests. This campaign propaganda directly linked birth control with 
the well-being of individual couples and their children, so that most of the 
acceptances were based on voluntary decisions, though there were also peer-group 
pressures. However, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the government’s population 
target was manifested in the country's long-term collective interests; consequently 
the extent to which those benefits could be perceived by individual couples was 
unclear. Rather, the One-Child Policy directly threatened the current benefits and 
the perceived future interests of the young generation, particularly the peasants 
who made up most of China's population. The government itself was aware that 
this was the sacrifice that the Chinese younger generations would have to pay both
64
for the past mistakes in ignoring birth control for almost two decades since 1949, 
and for the future common interests of all Chinese people. Is it reasonable for the 
government to stipulate the number of children a couple could have in the name of 
collective well-being and the presumed interest of future generations? Can the 
collective and future benefits justify the demands made on individual couples? 
Would the young generation willingly sacrifice themselves?
The tremendous progress in market reform provided new careers and many 
opportunities for social mobility to persons outside the established CCP and 
administrative systems. It also undermined the norms and values derived from 
communist or socialist ideology, such as 'selflessness', 'serving the people's 
interests' and so on. Ideological inhibitions to self-interested activities seemingly 
diminished, and individual entrepreneurs were encouraged with the slogan 'to get 
rich is glorious’. The young people have become increasingly pragmatic and 
materialistic and are paying less attention to ideological and political activities. It 
is unlikely that such a young generation, particularly young peasants to whom 
children are a crucial means to economic and social security for their old age, 
would willingly accept the selfless norm to sacrifice themselves when national and 
individual interests are clashing, unless administrative measures forced them to 
submit.
Since the early 1980s, as mentioned previously, what the peasants are 
facing is the new economic balance of childbearing that has been reshaped by 
economic decentralization. The Chinese peasants, including those cadres at the 
local level, had been displaying greater autonomy and had created a great number 
and variety of strategies and tactics either to resist or to modify the strident policy 
(Greenhalgh, 1990b, c, d). Under these circumstances, the government not only 
relied on community pressure to implement population policies, but also introduced 
the system of rewards and penalties in birth control, hoping to manipulate the 
costs and benefits of having children through the incentive and disincentive
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measures, and thus make birth control 'seem [to be]--or indeed truly [be]- 
advantageous to individuals and families’ (Caldwell, 1993: 311).
3.6.5 P rob lem s o f th e  im p lem en ta tion  o f p op u la tion  p o licy
Some important features of the policy formulation and implementation created 
many unintended consequences (Lampton, 1987: 7-8). First, under Mao, almost all 
political, social, and economic policies were made by the central CCP and its state 
apparatus, and the central leaders were indeed overloaded in monitoring so many 
aspects of policies. Therefore, the top leaders could only announce summary policy 
guidelines and adopt simplistic performance indicators in a nation with a billion 
people and enormous diversities among the regions in terms of social, economic and 
cultural settings. Secondly, the top apparatus had, as mentioned previously, to 
rely on mass movement to enforce the policy goals. However, the simplistic policy 
directions and the complexity of the social environment often produced local 
variations and unanticipated or unwanted consequences. Thirdly, since the CCP 
central leaders exercised a monopoly in shaping the policy directions and limited 
the inputs into the design of policy, the policies were often formulated without a 
sound evaluation of the status quo and particularly with a lack of special 
knowledge of experts.
Fourthly, the central leaders welcomed only local conformity to the policy 
guidelines, but not critical or opposing comments. Hence, the subordinates were 
hesitant to speak out on the problems in the policies, and they usually waited until 
failure was acknowledged by the top leaders themselves. Fifthly, the Cultural 
Revolution had greatly weakened the central political and administrative system. 
It was the first time that the masses were aware of the intensive internal struggle 
among top CCP leaders. After observing a series of purges since the early 1950s, 
including the purge of Lin Biao and the 'Gang of Four1, and frequent changes in 
the leadership and policy instructions, the local cadres and people found it very
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difficult to adjust to and follow the central guidelines. Hence, they often delayed 
the introduction of new policy instructions that they believed would be difficult to 
enforce or would probably be changed after a brief trial.
The CCP and central government introduced the universal One-Child Policy 
which, to some extent, was the result of the ideology of centralized control to a 
nation with a billion people and enormous regional heterogeneity and complexity. 
Contradictorily, the central leaders left ample room for the provincial authorities to 
decide local accompanying regulations and measures to enforce the one-child 
model. Initially, it was unclear how to control the second birth, and the regulations 
were by no means uniform throughout China. The One-Child Policy was designed 
and enforced in haste without sound research on social dimensions, and totally 
ignored the long-term feasibility of enforcing compliance. The central apparatus 
had a very limited capacity to oversee how population policy was being carried out 
at the community level, or to assess the full range of its consequences in time. 
Often simplistic indicators, such as the one-child rate, the late-marriage rate, the 
contraceptive use rate, were used to judge local performance. Consequently, the 
local level information was frequently distorted when it went through the 
hierarchical administrative system.
Hence, it is important to distinguish the policy statements of the central 
government from the local implementation of the policy, and to evaluate the policy 
and its impact during different time periods, at least, to separate the periods into 
before or after the economic reform. Great deviations were created by the local 
cadres between the policy statement and actual implementation. One deviation 
was that some local cadres, particularly at the village level, executed an even 
tougher approach to the population target. Understanding the gap between 
couples' fertility preferences and government policy, they thought that the 
population control target could not be reached unless a coercive approach was 
applied. By doing this, they thought they could gain recognition and praise from
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their superiors. This deviation happened in a major way before the major thrust of 
the economic reform and, particularly, before the ending of the collective commune 
system in rural areas.
Another deviation was the soft de facto policy created by local cadres, who 
were aware of the conflicts between government policy targets and the individual 
demand for children, and who may have shared the peasants' aspirations for 
children. This kind of convergence of interest between cadres and peasants 
diminished the effectiveness of the birth control policy (White, 1987). The cadres 
thought that it was impossible to reach an overly ambitious population goal. Local 
cadres were persuaded or pressured by their superiors to implement the One-Child 
Policy, but they undertook this only half-heartedly (Greenhalgh, 1990c: 20) 
Therefore, they either created a soft and modified version of the policy that was 
more practical or acceptable at the village level, or turned a blind eye to those 
couples who violated the birth-control regulations (Greenhalgh, 1990d). In the field 
study in Shaanxi villages, Greenhalgh found that the de facto policy was that all 
couples could have two children, and two-daughter families could try again for a 
boy (Greenhalgh, 1990c: 21). This mainly occurred along with the decentralization 
of the administration and economic system.
Furthermore, before the rural economic privatization, cadres at village 
levels drew their salaries from the collective units. However, privatization had 
greatly reduced the collective funds. Village cadres also got their contract land and 
only received a portion of their salaries from the funds collected from individual 
households. Therefore, lower-level cadres tended to neglect administrative duties, 
including family planning work, and to make more efforts in their assigned plots of 
land to gain more income.
Under the changing ideology, many CCP members and cadres did not take 
the lead in practising family planning but rather in bearing over-plan babies. This
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became one of the main causes of the 'backward' performance of family planning in 
about one-third of the regions of China. It was estimated that among some family 
planning backward areas, about 30 to 40 per cent of disciplinary action within the 
CCP was for cases of violating the birth control policy. Currently, of all the CCP 
members who were punished by party discipline, violation of the birth control 
policy was the third most common reason for being punished, exceeded only by 
economic and sex crimes (Chen, 1990: 10).
Another major problem that diminished the efficiency of the population 
policy was the contradiction among different policies and goals. Practice of family 
planning is a fundamental policy of the state, and the principle of the policy is to 
control the size and raise the quality of population. Thus, it requires a 
comprehensive matched set of population and socio-economic policies and measures 
to facilitate the policy. Unfortunately, the concrete policy packages and measures 
were often contradictory rather than matching and mutually reinforcing in 
pursuing the general goals.
The interactive effect of the rural economic reform and the birth control 
program was one of the most important examples of contradiction. As discussed 
previously, since rural reform, peasants have been encouraged to make individual 
decisions in their household economic plans while in their family-building process 
they have no choice but have been required to comply with the One-Child Policy.
As far as the birth control policy is concerned, for instance, under the one- 
child limitation, urban populations were strictly limited, while vast numbers of the 
rural population were not well controlled. This created a tendency to a changing 
population composition with a relative shrinkage in the urban population 
component but an expansion in the rural population component. Moreover, one of 
the special conditions set for bearing the second child applied if the first child 
suffered from a non-hereditary deformity. However, many couples who had
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congenital diseases also got permission to have the second child. In these cases, the 
probabilities of having a second child suffering from deformity are particularly high 
among those couples with congenital diseases. These results were obviously in 
contradiction to the guiding principle of population policy that aimed to have 
'eugenic' births and to raise the quality of population (Long and Chen, 1990: 54).
The material rewards to couples who married late and had only one child 
stimulated married couples to have a baby as soon as possible after they were 
married, to gain all the benefits of the one-child family, though, logically, more 
material rewards should go to those couples who postponed both their marriages 
and their first births. Consequently, the shortened first-birth interval substantially 
offset the effect of delayed marriage on fertility.
3.6.6 From  b irth  con tro l cam p aign  tow ards p op u la tion  leg is la tio n
Although population affairs remain one of the top concerns in the national agenda, 
and the One-Child Policy continues in effect, the proportions of first births were 
almost consistently a little over 50 per cent of all births in the years since 1982 
(Table 3.4); this may be partly because of the relaxation of the one-child limit in 
the rural areas under special conditions since 1984. Indeed, the proportion of 
second births has been increasing since that year. In addition, the proportion of 
third and higher-order births has been steady at more than 15 per cent of the total 
births in the 1980s, and so the births that occurred outside the national population 
plans have been substantial. It is clear that to control the second births and to stop 
the higher-order births and the births outside the plans are crucial tasks for 
further fertility decline and for fulfilling the national population target. The key 
question is what approach can accomplish these tasks?
Since the initiation of the One-Child Policy, many delegates to the National 
People's Congress, members of the Political Consultative Conference, and a great 
number of executive cadres at all levels have strongly appealed to the government
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to enact laws on birth control (Zou, 1991: 115-116). The increasing pressure on the 
government for adopting legislation on birth control was attributable to many 
factors. First, the economic reform has greatly reduced the function of the 
centralized system on population control. In rural China, peasants resumed the 
rights to plan their family economy on an individual-household scale. They were no 
longer confined in single collective units that had strong political and economic 
control functions, and that had exerted vigorous group or community pressures on 
individual peasants.
Table 3.4 Proportions of the births by parity, 1973-1991, China
Y ear
F ir st
p a r ity
S econ d
p a r ity
T h ird  an d  h ig h e r  
p a r ity
1973 2 0 .6 2 0 .9 58 .5
1974 21 .9 22 .3 5 5 .9
1975 23 .8 22 .6 53 .6
1976 26 .3 23 .1 50 .6
1977 28 .8 24 .7 46 .5
1978 32 .4 2 5 .1 42 .5
1979 3 3 .9 26 .3 39 .8
1980 37 .8 27 .2 35 .0
1981 4 3 .6 26 .7 29 .7
1982 50 .1 2 5 .3 24 .7
1983 56 .4 24 .6 19 .0
1984 55 .5 25 .0 19.5
1985 50 .2 30 .1 19.7
1986 51 .2 31 .5 17.3
1987 51 .7 31 .5 16.8
1988 52 .2 32 .4 15.4
1989 51 .9 32 .5 15.6
1990 52 .8 33 .7 13.5
1991 53 .4 33 .8 12.8
Source: Figures for 1973-1987, Greenhalgh, S., 1989: 11; figures for 1988-1991, 
China Population Today, 1992, 9, 3: 8.
Secondly, in the new economic system, the state, collectives and individuals 
all have their own specific interests. The differences in the interests among the
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three were widening, and the conflicts of interests between each were becoming 
sharper. In particular, the individual couple's desire for children clashed with the 
national population goals. Since the Sixth National People's Congress, more than 
60 per cent of motions in each Congress have been appeals on birth control 
legislation (Peng, 1987: 37). These motions reflected the strong demands of both 
cadres at grassroots level and the masses. Being confronted with massive 
resistance to the rigid policy, the local cadres became aware that it was no longer 
adequate to rely solely on population policy in birth control; to apply strong 
legislation was imperative. Among the masses, many hoped that population 
legislation could legally protect them from cadres' abuse and over-zealous 
application of birth regulations.
Thirdly, the central leaders had to abandon the mass-movement approach 
in pursuing the birth control targets, and the mass movement virtually lost its 
momentum. The leaders admitted that family planning was encountering great 
difficulties, and that tremendous efforts had to be made. Peng Peiyun, the head of 
the State Family Planning Commission, commented: 'the implementation of family 
planning is now at the stage of assaulting [a] fortified position'; therefore, it was 
imperative to establish a family planning law, which could be a basis for a stable, 
coherent and efficient population policy (Peng, 1990: 1-3).
3.6.7 The cau ses o f  the delay  o f a n ation a l law  on  fam ily  p lan n in g
From early 1978, China began to end the lawlessness exemplified in the cruelty 
and abuses of the Cultural Revolution period. The central leaders stressed that 
China's legal system must be restored, strengthened and perfected in order to 
provide an orderly environment for the ambitious goal of modernization. Efforts 
were directed to the reorganization of legal institutions, enactment of legislation, 
restoration of a defence lawyer system, legal research and education, all aimed at
72
the establishment of a stable legal system (Chiu, 1985). The entire climate was 
quite favourable to population legislation.
For the first time since the founding of PRC, birth control was approved in 
legal form in the 1978 new Constitution, followed in 1980 by the new marriage 
law, which explicitly stipulated that family planning is one of the basic duties of 
married couples. During 1979-1980, immediately after the announcement of the 
One-Child Policy, a draft of a family planning law and several revisions were 
considered for submission to the National People's Congress, but they failed to be 
ratified. Although there was no immediate consensus on a national law of family 
planning, the regional legislation had already begun in the early 1980s. The 
Guangdong Provincial People's Congress promulgated the Family Planning 
Regulations of Guangdong Province in 1980, which was the first regional family 
planning regulation (Feng and Hao, 1992: 28). Regional family planning legislation 
has developed steadily since the mid-1980s. Many provinces took action to draw up 
and promulgate their own regulations that were based on the draft of the national 
regulations. Provincial governments emphasized that their birth control 
regulations derived legitimacy from the new national Constitution’s requirement 
that every married couple should practise family planning (Banister, 1987: 201). 
During the 1980s, the Central CCP issued a series of directives on the family 
planning legislation. By these directives, the State Family Planning Commission 
worked out 12 drafts of a family planning law and nine drafts of family planning 
regulations. Up to 1992, all the provinces in mainland China, with the exception of 
Xizang (Tibet) and Xingjiang, whose regulations were announced by the central 
government, had promulgated their local birth control regulations (Feng and Hao, 
1992: 28). Nevertheless, there is as yet no established national family planning law 
nor are there regulations applicable to the entire country. In 1990, the central 
government concluded that it was impossible to form concrete national regulations, 
and that it was also very difficult to take the realities of different regions into
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account. Therefore, it was decided to defer the consideration of national family 
planning legislation until some lessons had been learned from the implementation 
of the regional regulations for a certain period (Feng and Hao, 1992: 28). Why did 
the passage of the national law of family planning have to be delayed?
A number of factors may be responsible for deferring national legislation on 
family planning, factors which are also problems in carrying out the policy of birth 
control. An important consideration was the feasibility of law enforcement. Birth 
limitation is the core of the population policy and apparently will be the key 
component of the national law or regulations of family planning. The government 
had specified the one-child family model to the entire country with widely differing 
socio-economic development, cultural variations, and even demographic 
characteristics. The regional differentials in fertility trends and social development 
have even been widening since the economic reform (Peng, 1989). Empirical 
evidence shows that although the decentralized approach allows provincial 
governments to form their own concrete regulations, the actual fertility levels were 
much higher than the targeted levels that were legislated in regional birth 
regulations. According to the current regional stipulations, the average number of 
children allowed among women of childbearing age, at the national level, was 
1.62.' In fact, the national total fertility rates were around 2.31 to 2.59 between 
1986 and 1990, and were higher than the fertility levels required by the policy by 
about 43 per cent to 60 per cent (Feng and Hao, 1992: 32). For instance, of the 23 
million births which occurred in 1990, eight million were extra-quota births, 
including early births, and unplanned second and higher-order births. More than 
80 per cent of rural couples had had second births (Peng, 1990: 1). These figures 
implied that the regional regulations were far from well enforced. The most
 ^ This figure was estimated on the basis of different regional regulations of birth policy, 
proportions of rural population and minority nationalities. The value of this figure varies 
annually. However, the variations were trivial, so 1.62 was assumed to be the constant 
annual figure (Feng and Hao, 1992: 32).
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important reason for the failure in implementation of the regulations was the 
conflict between the government's birth control target and the masses' desire for 
more children.
The negative comments about the consequences of implementing regional 
regulations were another main cause for delaying the national law. Rewards and 
penalties are basic measures in family planning management. According to one of 
the 'four stresses' of the family planning program, the emphasis should be on 
rewards rather than penalties (Wang, 1991: 57). However, the costs of the 
incentive approach were very high and most of the funds for rewards had to be 
generated from local resources. In the countryside, the bulk of the rewards for the 
one-child family had to be financed by the rural collectives, and have had to be 
collected from individual peasants since the economic decentralization. In less 
developed areas, the financial constraints made local administrative units simply 
unable to meet the requirement of giving rewards and benefits to the single-child 
families. They could not even afford to pay the most elementary single-child 
health-care fee, which was only a few Yuan monthly, not to mention fulfilling other 
benefits and rewards. Consequently there was a tendency towards emphasizing 
penalties rather than rewards (Feng and Hao, 1992: 33). The initial purpose of 
imposing fines for births outside the plan was to eliminate such births. From this 
stance, it should be that the fewer the fines levied, the better. However, funds 
collected from fines on births outside the plan had virtually become a major source 
to support the family planning program. The regions that had great achievements 
in birth control found it increasingly difficult to get financial resources to maintain 
the program. On the contrary, some backward areas could generate substantial 
financial resources from the fees charged for the unplanned births (Chen, 1990: 
ID.
Concerning the imposition of fines, 'couples either in economically developed 
areas or poor and backward areas are not afraid of the levying of a fine1. In
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developed areas, rich couples who had outside-planning births can afford to 'buy' 
sons no matter how large the fine, while couples in poor areas cannot pay at all no 
matter how small the fine (Peng, 1990: 2). Moreover, although the out-of-plan 
births are violations of the family planning regulations, those births seemed to 
become legitimized, once fines were levied. Since the local villages were entitled to 
keep most of the funds collected from the fines on unplanned births, most village 
cadres deliberately underreported the number of the unplanned births. By doing 
so, they could both collect more fines and fulfil the birth control quotas assigned by 
the authorities. That was why some village cadres even thought that ' the more 
the unplanned births the better’ for them to gain additional funds. Under these 
circumstances, it was very difficult to control the unplanned births, because the 
couples who had the unplanned births felt at ease and justified after they had paid 
the fine; meanwhile, the village cadres were happy to collect the reasonable fines, 
so that the convergence of interest was to the satisfaction of all (Zhang, 1990: 59).
Still another main cause for deferring a national law of family planning is 
that the critics continued to be concerned about the socio-economic consequences of 
imposition of the One-Child Policy. Obviously, the socio-economic consequences on 
the age structure of the population had not been fully considered when the policy 
was designed. A decade after the initiation of the policy, the 'emerging issues of the 
aging population’ were raised (China National Committee on Aging, 1989). The 
process of population aging in China will be faster than that of Western developed 
countries and approximate to that of Japan. By the end of the century, Chinese 
people aged 60 and over will increase to 130 million and account for 10 per cent of 
the total population, and those aged 65 and over will account for 7 per cent. 
Currently, some larger metropolitan areas or coastal provinces such as Shanghai 
and Beijing municipalities and Jiangsu province have already become regions with 
relatively old population structures. Labour productivity remains very low in 
China. A general social insurance system for the rural aged people has not yet been
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established and the traditional function of the family to take care of the aged will 
weaken with an increasing trend toward nuclear families and single-child families. 
Given that China is still a developing country with a restricted economic capacity, 
it will encounter great difficulties in solving the problems of an aging population 
that are common in developed countries.
The dispute over the social cost of the One-Child Policy also referred to some 
other problems: the 'marriage squeeze* problem resulting from the sharp decline in 
birth rates in the 1970s (see Chapter 5); the availability of the labour force 
relative to the dependants in the next century and the sufficiency of males of 
military age (Tien, 1991: 199); the intriguing demographic consequences such as 
the rising sex ratios at birth (see Chapter 8), and the discrimination against 
'nonauthorized* children.
3.7 D iscu ssion  and con clu sion
In summary, the fertility decline in mainland China could be decomposed into two 
broad components: the gradual decline component that was attributable to the 
long-term changes in social institutions, socio-economic and cultural environment; 
and the acceleration component that was attributable to the implementation of the 
strong population policy. The unique centralized political system enables China's 
regime to enforce the rigid population policy. This strong system was dominated by 
a single super party formally organized on Marxist-Maoist ideology. Under this 
system top leaders exercised enormous power within the hierarchical power 
structure, to a large extent in the absence of the rule of law and with few if any 
institutional checks.
The integration of ideology of leaders and CCP members from the top to the 
bottom was an important monitoring mechanism in policy enforcement. It was also 
facilitated by the central control system. The several dozen millions of CCP 
members were the most active components of the political and administrative
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control network. Mass movement was the effective vehicle to ensure the 
population policy enforcement at the grassroots levels. The highly centrally 
controlled system made it possible for the government to mobilize China's very 
limited resources to concentrate on the family planning program.
Besides the centralized political control, China's family planning program 
was built as an integral part of the whole political and administrative structure 
that combined horizontal integration of all government functions at local levels, 
with vertical control from the centre top. The contraception delivery services have 
been built into the three-tier integrated health-service system that has provided 
contraceptive and abortion services to China's vast rural population. However, 
although providing contraception and other birth control services did achieve 
remarkable results in the speed of fertility decline (see Chapter 4), it cannot 
initiate reproductive change; changes in reproductive behaviour could only be 
initiated by sound social and economic development or strong government policy 
pressure. In the three study areas, metropolitan Shanghai is in the former category 
while the two agriculture-oriented provinces belong to the latter.
The adoption of the One-Child Policy could be partly explained by the 
urgent desire of the new leadership to control population growth and by their 
strong ambitions to greatly improve the material well-being of the Chinese people 
in a short period of time. The One-Child Policy was designed and enforced in haste 
without sound empirical and theoretical social research, and totally ignoring issues 
of feasibility. As the empirical data showed, the policy had a dramatic effect in 
reducing second births only in metropolitan areas or cities such as Shanghai, while 
the policy had great impact on depressing the third and higher-order births in 
peasant-dominated regions such as Hebei and Shaanxi. However, even under the 
high pressure of the official population policy, more than 50 per cent of couples in 
the two agriculture-oriented provinces wanted and had at least two children (also
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see Chapter 6). The very low acceptance rates of the One-Child Certificate in the 
two provinces strongly reflected the massive resistance to the one-child birth limit.
Unlike the early campaigns of birth control that made fairly explicit links 
between immediate benefits and family limitation, the One-Child Policy directly 
threatened the current benefits and the perceived future interests of young 
couples, particularly the majority of China's rural population who still live in a self- 
supporting or semi-self-supporting economy. The several decades of ideological 
education about collectivism were challenged by full-scale economic and 
administrative decentralization. The social control function of the basic work units, 
particularly the rural production teams, diminished or even disappeared in many 
aspects of rural life, including that of birth planning. The reform also undermined 
the norms and values promoted by the communist or socialist ideology. The people, 
particularly the younger generations became increasingly pragmatic and 
materialistic. The rural economic reform had a great impact on childbearing in 
many ways, and this suggested that young couples' preference for more children 
and sons than the policy stipulated is not merely Confucian heritage, but a rational 
calculation in the changing social and economic environment. It is unlikely that 
young couples, especially young farmers, to whom children are crucial means to 
economic and social security for their old ages, would willingly accept the selfless 
norm to sacrifice themselves for the whole nation's prosperity, unless the political 
and administrative pressures forced them to do so.
The role of the One-Child Policy in the 1980s was greatly limited; it could 
only prevent fertility from increasing, not bring about further substantial fertility 
decline. Although the policy was not officially withdrawn, the modified version of 
the conditional two-children policy implies acceptance of the fact that most rural 
women wanted at least two children, and the one-child target is impossible among 
rural couples in current circumstances. The relaxation of the stringent birth
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control policy and the abolition of the late-marriage regulations consequently 
resulted in a marriage surge (see Chapter 5) and a rebound in birth rates.
Since the economic reform, ideological changes have occurred among the 
leaders at all levels and the masses, with the latter undergoing a far greater 
deviation from classic communist orthodoxy. The central leaders no longer have the 
confidence and ability to integrate the ideology in the society from the top to the 
bottom; they have been switching from an ideological to a pragmatic approach. 
The mass movement strategy lost its momentum and the central leaders had to 
abandon the mass-movement approach in pursuing birth control targets.
The family planning administrators became aware that it was no longer 
adequate to rely solely on population policy in birth control; to apply legislative 
means was imperative, and a national family planning law might be a sound basis 
for an efficient population policy. Although regional family planning legislation 
has been developed steadily since the 1980s, there is as yet no established national 
family planning law or regulations applicable to the entire nation. There are a 
number of reasons for deferring the national legislation of family planning, which 
are more generally problems in implementation of the One-Child Policy. An 
important consideration is the feasibility of the law enforcement, particularly the 
one-child limit, in a nation with substantial regional differences that have been 
widening since the economic reform. Even the regional regulations are far from 
being well enforced; the actual fertility levels are much higher than the targeted 
levels that were legislated in regional birth regulations. Failure to implement the 
regional regulations is the result of conflict between the government's birth control 
targets and the masses' desire for children. Adverse reactions to the regional 
regulations and the continuing criticism of the One-Child Policy are also causes for 
deferring the national law of family planning.
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There has been remarkable economic growth and impressive improvement 
in people's standards of living since China's economy move towards a market 
oriented system, while the population size is almost double that of the 1950s and 
1960s, when the centrally controlled system dominated the economy. These facts 
suggest that it was not the huge population but the central planning collective 
system that was the major obstacle to China's economic growth and modernization, 
though the progress might have been faster if China had begun to control its 
population in the late 1950s.
At present, although economic reform is well under way, reform of the 
political and administrative systems is far from comparable. Given that a 
nationally applicable family planning law is not achievable in the short run but 
that all the regional regulations were formulated on the basis of the national policy 
guidelines, application of narrowly framed population policies have had in the 
past, and will continue to have a crucial impact on fertility dynamics and 
population change in China.
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C hapter 4 F ertility  d eclin e and th e im pact o f fam ily  
p lan n in g  program s
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the impact on fertility of China's vigorous family planning 
program that implemented the mandatory population policy. China's fertility 
decline greatly differed from the classic pattern of fertility transition. Moreover, it 
displayed a unique pattern of fertility control. The typical pattern of fertility 
control in the Western developed setting, such as Britain, US and France, is 
generally high contraceptive effectiveness, low fertility with only a small amount of 
unwanted childbearing, and low incidence of abortion. By contrast, in China the 
dramatic fertility transition was accompanied by a distinct fertility control pattern, 
with low fertility, but relatively low contraceptive effectiveness and high incidence 
of induced abortion.
What was the role played by the family planning program in shaping 
fertility towards replacement level? What kinds of factors may explain the unique 
fertility control pattern? The evidence discussed in this chapter will throw light on 
these speculations, that are relevant to understanding the fertility decline in 
China. The first section documents the dramatic fertility decline in the three study 
areas by estimating changes in both period and cohort fertility. The second section 
examines the transition in family planning practices; this is followed by the third 
section that explores the special role of induced abortion in reducing fertility and 
keeping fertility at an achieved low level.
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4.2 Fertility decline 1970-85
This section estimates fertility levels and trends in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces 
and Shanghai municipality by measures of fertility derived from the birth histories 
of individual respondents. There are several limitations in analysing fertility 
trends from a cross-sectional survey of ever-married women aged under 50 years 
(Alam and Cleland, 1981: 23). First, the major limitation is the truncation of the 
data. In a cohort analysis, experience is successively less complete for younger 
cohorts; when survey data are classified by age or duration at the time of event, 
information becomes successively less complete at higher ages and durations as the 
period before the survey lengthens. Hence, this analysis is limited to the 15 years 
preceding the survey, which coincides with the period in which fertility has 
declined dramatically in the three areas. Secondly, fertility levels based on the 
birth histories of surviving women are likely to be under- or overestimated if adult 
mortality is high. In the three regions, adult mortality levels were fairly low, about 
6-9 per thousand during the 1970s and 1980s (Wang et al., 1987: 135; Hu et al., 
1987: 112; Zhu et al., 1988: 124), and so the fertility rates of the three regions 
should be relatively free of this bias. Thirdly, since single women were not sampled 
in the individual interviews of the 1985 IDFS survey, computing the fertility rates 
from samples of ever-married women assumes that there was little ex-nuptial 
fertility, or that most ex-nuptial births were followed by marriage (Hanenberg, 
1980: 11). In China, however, the attitudes towards sexual activity have changed 
and the restrictions and penalties for ex-nuptial sexual relations have been greatly 
relaxed since the 'Open-door 'policy was adopted. This might result in an increase 
in ex-nuptial births, and so the fertility rates computed from a sample of ever- 
married women may be slightly underestimated.
The most commonly used fertility measure, age-specific fertility rates 
(ASFR) were computed. The rate is defined as the 'fertility rate with the number of 
live births during a year as the numerator and the number of woman-years lived in
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the population as the denominator' (Grebenik and Hill, 1974: 8). The use of 
samples of ever-m arried women requires estim ation of proportions ever-married 
from the household survey to adjust the figures indexed by age (Goldman and 
Hobcraft, 1982: 9). Hence, the num ber of ever-m arried woman is inflated by 
dividing by the proportion of ever-m arried women in th a t age group.
In addition to the conventional ASFR, cohort-period specific fertility rates 
were also computed, a method which has been recommended by several 
demographers (e. g. Brass, 1978; Verma, 1980; Hobcraft, Goldman and 
Chidam baram , 1982). 'Cohort' refers to survey women born in the same five year 
period, and thus in the same age group a t the time of the survey. To be consistent 
with the definition of cohorts, births were allocated to time reference periods 
defined in term s of years before interview date ra th e r than  calendar year of 
occurrence (Goldman and Hobcraft, 1982: 10). The basic fertility ra tes have also 
been cum ulated by cohort and by period and have been converted into the ratios of 
cohort and period cumulative fertility ra tes th a t  are commonly known as P/F ratios 
(Brass, 1964; Brass and Coale, 1968), in order to facilitate analyses of fertility 
levels and trends, and the evaluation of data quality .*
4.2.1 R ecen t fer tility  trends
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 display the trends in total fertility ra tes for the three 
regions and China from 1970 to 1987.^ As expected, although the levels of fertility
1 The P/F ratios method, one of the most frequently used indirect techniques for 
estimating recent fertility for the year preceding a census or survey, was originally 
developed by Brass and refined by several demographers. This approach is used to 
estimate recent fertility by combining data on number of children ever-born (P) with 
estimates of cumulative age-specific fertility (F) for the recent past, derived from survey 
data on the date of the last live birth or on the number of births occurring during the last 
year. This approach has also been frequently used to evaluate the quality of data on 
reported birth histories (Hobcraft et al., 1982: 291). Unlike the conventional P/F ratios, the 
P/F ratios converted from the cohort-period fertility rates in this study were obtained by 
simple division of the corresponding P and F values (Goldman and Hobcraft, 1982: 11).
2 The rates for China are based on an analysis by Coale and Chen (1987) of data from the 
1982 One-per-Thousand Fertility Survey; the rates for the three regions from 1985 to 1987 
are based on an analysis by Li ( 1990) of data from the 1988 Two-per-Thousand Fertility 
Survey.
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were different, particularly between Shanghai and the other areas, the general 
trends and patterns were quite similar, when the whole nation is compared with 
the three subregions. Although the total fertility rates for the early 1970s may be 
underestimated because of data censoring of the 1985 IDFS survey, the general 
trends indicate that the massive declines in total fertility rates were 
unprecedentedly fast, compared with the tempo of fertility transition in many other 
developing nations.
The 1970s were a decade of a sustained fertility decline when Chinese 
women underwent a transition in reproductive behaviour from non-controlled or 
partly controlled to highly controlled. However, the pace of fertility decline 
decelerated in the late 1970s and virtually stalled in the 1980s, when total fertility 
rates reached a plateau and fluctuated around 2.5. This was a relatively low level 
but not yet attaining the government’s target: a population replacement level of 2.2 
or even lower. A rebound in total fertility rates was evident in the late 1980s.
Although changes in the age structure of the entire population had a 
substantial impact on the rebound in the crude birth rates, the fluctuations in the 
total fertility rates over the last decade were mainly due to shifts and adjustments 
in marriage regulations and population policies (see Chapter 3). Coale (1984: 4) 
stated that about one-third of the reduction in the total fertility rate during the 
1970s was attributable to the rise in age at marriage. This was mainly due the 
government's late-marriage campaign (see Chapter 5). The trough of the curves of 
the total fertility rates in 1980 clearly resulted from the enforcement of the One- 
Child Policy that was announced in early 1979. However, the implementation of 
the new marriage law in 1981 demolished the higher minimum age at marriage 
that was stipulated by the late-marriage regulations. A sharp rise in the total 
fertility rate in 1981 and 1982 was due almost entirely to a sharp rise in first 
births, which was caused by the marriage boom (Coale and Chen, 1987; Feeney 
and Yu, 1987). The explanations for the marriage boom were the increasing
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number of young people entering the marriage market and a decline in the average 
female age at marriage of almost half a year between 1980 and 1982 (Caldwell and 
Srinivasan, 1984: 79). It was also noted that the marriage upsurge could be partly 
because of the occurrence of marriages which had been postponed by the previous 
stringent regulations, or because of the delayed registration of de facto marriages 
among persons who were under age according to early stipulations (Tien, 1991: 39). 
The lack of effective birth control at the rural local level, triggered by the 
decentralization of the economy, made it impossible to enforce the stringent one- 
child limit among rural couples. Hence, the rebound of total fertility rates in the 
late 1980s was mainly a response to the adjustment or relaxation of the population 
policy in the mid-1980s, particularly the conditional two-child policy for rural 
couples.
Table 4.1 Total fertility rates for Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1970-1987
Year China Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
1970 5.75 4.06 4.19 1.93
1971 5.40 3.86 4.27 1.77
1972 4.92 3.77 4.38 1.55
1973 4.51 3.22 4.19 1.34
1974 4.15 2.97 3.70 1.19
1975 3.58 2.34 3.32 1.07
1976 3.25 2.47 2.96 1.32
1977 2.87 2.25 2.69 1.17
1978 2.75 2.53 2.48 1.22
1979 2.80 2.52 2.76 1.25
1980 2.32 2.44 2.11 1.10
1981 2.71 2.81 2.48 1.40
1982 2.62 2.85 2.52 1.61
1983 2.42 2.27 2.33 1.40
1984 2.35 2.21 2.71 1.13
1985 2.20 2.36 2.64 1.00
1986 2.42 2.48 2.96 1.36
1987 2.59 2.81 2.97 1.48
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: Figures for China 1970-82 are from Coale and Chen, 1987; figures 
for the three regions 1985-87 are from Li, 1990.
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A recent study (Zeng et al., 1991: 452) found that changing age structure 
and declining age at marriage contributed more than did changing marital fertility 
to the increase in the crude birth rate between 1981 and 1987 for China as a whole 
and in most provinces. The same study shows that although between 1981 and 
1987 the decline in the age at marriage contributed most to the increase in crude 
birth rate in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces (Table 4.2), the contribution of the 
marriage pattern to relative change was less in 1984-87 than for the whole seven- 
year period. In Hebei 46 per cent of the relative change between 1984 and 1987 is 
attributable to an increase in marital fertility, as contrasted with about 9 per cent 
for the relative changes in age structure and marriage pattern. This suggests that 
during the early period of the 1980s, the new marriage law had evoked the sudden 
drop in the age at marriage, while during the latter period, the decrease in age at 
marriage levelled off and increasing marital fertility became important. In Shaanxi 
province, during 1984-87, the positive change in marriage pattern (a decline in age 
at marriage) and in the increase in marital fertility was less, while the positive 
change in age structure (an increase in the number of women of childbearing age) 
was more, than those of the whole seven-year period. A unique decomposition 
pattern was demonstrated in Shanghai municipality, with a decrease in the crude 
birth rate over the whole seven-year period; this was mainly attributable to the 
remarkable decline in marital fertility and the decline in the proportion of young 
women, though there was a surprising upsurge in marriage. However, the 
increment in the crude birth rate during 1984-1987 was mainly due to the 
substantial positive change in the marriage pattern and an increase in marital 
fertility.
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4.2.2 Cohort and period fertility
Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 present the cohort-period fertility rates for each of the 
provinces. The rates were defined by cohorts of five-year age groups at the survey 
for successive five-year periods before the survey, and values were cumulated by 
age cohorts and by periods. The cross-tabulation of all births by cohort and by 
reference time period is shown in Panel A , and the cohort-period fertility rates are 
shown in Panel B. Note that rates for a given period are located within a column, 
rates for a cohort along a diagonal and rates for different cohorts at the same age- 
group across a row.
A dramatic fertility decline in the three regions is well demonstrated by 
examining both period changes and cohort changes in fertility rates. As is indicated 
by the cohort-period fertility rates in Panel B, the decline over time was most 
profound in age group 30-34 in Hebei and Shaanxi. The rates dropped from 0.260 
and 0.249 in 1965-69 to 0.135 and 0.104 in the most recent period 1980-84 in 
Hebei and Shaanxi, respectively. This remarkable drop in fertility rates over the 
decade before the survey, particularly in the late 1970s, strongly indicates the 
impact of the powerful family planning program, which was initiated in the early 
1970s and intensified since the late 1970s.
The birth-control program was introduced earlier in large cities such as 
Shanghai than in the two peasant-dominated provinces. Moreover, the onset of 
fertility decline in Shanghai preceded the major thrust of Shanghai's vigorous 
family planning program, with the result that fertility in Shanghai had already 
dropped to a relatively low level in the 1960s. However, during these decades 
under discussion, fertility declined still further in Shanghai; there is no doubt that 
its more powerful birth control program contributed to sustaining its fertility at a 
lower level than those of other Chinese provinces such as Hebei and Shaanxi.
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Period changes in fertility rates can also be observed from the cumulative 
fertility in Panel D. The cumulative fertility through age group 30-34 declined from 
3.42, 3.86 and 2.06 to 2.11, 2.12 and 1.26 during the same comparison period in 
Hebei, Shaanxi and Shanghai, respectively. The total fertility rates for 1980-1984 
were 2.44 for Hebei, 2.35 for Shaanxi, and 1.35 for Shanghai.
The drastic fertility decline is also evident in an examination of P/F ratios. 
As can be seen in panel E, a steadily rising trend in P/F ratios with increasing age 
appears to indicate the decreasing trend in fertility. It is noteworthy that the 
pattern of rises in P/F ratios was observable in the late 1970s and the early 1980s 
in the two provinces, the period when the strong birth control program was 
implemented. However, this decline can be traced back to the early 1960s in 
Shanghai, which confirms the earlier onset of its fertility decline. The slightly lower 
values of P/F ratios in age groups 45-49 than those in younger age groups in the 
two provinces during the period 1960-64 to 1970-74 for Hebei, and 1965-1969 to 
1970-74 for Shaanxi, suggest omission of births in the more distant past by the 
oldest group of women.
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Table 4.3 Cohort-period fertility rates, cumulative rates by cohort and period, and 
P/F ratios, by age group, Hebei province, China
Age
group
No. of Reference period
women 1980-84 1975-79 1970-74 1965-69 1960-64 1955-59 1950-54
A Number of births
15-19 1528 12
20-24 1194 371 5
25-29 1182 1317 334 16
30-34 1279 866 1317 601 43
35-39 907 232 704 1146 553 37
40-44 607 37 187 676 895 504 42
45-49 573 5 67 439 744 797 451 58
B Cohort-period fertility rates
15-19 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.014 0.020
20-24 0.062 0.057 0.094 0.122 0.166 0.157
25-29 0.223 0.206 0.253 0.295 0.278
30-34 0.135 0.155 0.223 0.260
35-39 0.051 0.062 0.153
40-44 0.012 0.023
45-49 0.002
C Cumulative fertility of cohorts at end of period (P)
15-19 0.008 0.004 0.014 0.034 0.041 0.069 0.101
20-24 0.315 0.296 0.504 0.650 0.900 0.888
25-29 1.410 1.533 1.914 2.374 2.279
30-34 2.210 2.690 3.488 3.578
35-39 2.946 3.796 4.344
40-44 3.857 4.461
45-49 4.469
D Cumulative fertility within periods (F)
15-19 0.008 0.004 0.014 0.034 0.041 0.069 0.101
20-24 0.319 0.287 0.483 0.643 0.871 0.856
25-29 1.433 1.316 1.747 2.118 2.262
30-34 2.110 2.093 2.861 3.416
35-39 2.366 2.401 3.627
40-44 2.427 2.518
45-49 2.435
E P/F ratios
15-19 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
20-24 0.988 1.033 1.042 1.011 1.033 1.037
25-29 0.984 1.165 1.096 1.121 1.008
30-34 1.048 1.286 1.219 1.047
35-39 1.245 1.581 1.198
40-44 1.589 1.772
45-49 1.835
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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Table 4.4 Cohort-period fertility rates, cumulative rates by cohort and period, and 
P/F ratios, by age group, Shaanxi province, China
Age
group
No. of Reference period
women 1980-84 1975-79 1970-74 1965-69 1960-64 1955-59 1950-54
A Number of births
15-19 1303 14
20-24 1006 440 11
25-29 883 1014 381 31
30-34 858 446 975 615 55
35-39 682 106 501 1014 701 80
40-44 588 28 203 697 895 637 69
45-49 512 14 92 401 637 754 515 112
B Cohort-period fertility rates
15-19 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.013 0.023 0.023 0.044
20-24 0.087 0.086 0.143 0.206 0.217 0.201
25-29 0.230 0.227 0.297 0.304 0.295
30-34 0.104 0.147 0.237 0.249
35-39 0.031 0.069 0.157
40-44 0.010 0.036
45-49 0.005
C Cumulative fertility of cohorts at end of period (P)
15-19 0.011 0.011 0.035 0.064 0.117 0.117 0.219
20-24 0.448 0.467 0.781 1.145 1.201 1.225
25-29 1.615 1.917 2.632 2.723 2.697
30-34 2.437 3.367 3.908 3.941
35-39 3.522 4.253 4.725
40-44 4.301 4.904
45-49 4.932
D Cumulative fertility within periods (F)
15-19 0.011 0.011 0.035 0.064 0.117 0.117 0.219
20-24 0.448 0.442 0.752 1.092 1.201 1.123
25-29 1.596 1.579 2.239 2.614 2.673
30-34 2.116 2.313 3.424 3.858
35-39 2.272 2.659 4.207
40-44 2.319 2.838
45-49 2.347
E P/F ratios
15-19 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
20-24 1.000 1.055 1.039 1.049 1.000 1.090
25-29 1.012 1.214 1.176 1.042 1.009
30-34 1.152 1.455 1.141 1.022
35-39 1.550 1.600 1.123
40-44 1.854 1.728
45-49 2.102
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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Table 4.5 Cohort-period fertility rates, cumulative rates by cohort and period, and 
P/F ratios, by age group, Shanghai municipality, China
Age
group
No. of Reference period
women 1980-84 1975-79 1970-74 1965-69 1960-64 1955-59 1950-54
A Number of births
15-19 687 0
20-24 1014 121 0
25-29 1290 842 80 0
30-34 1086 528 654 118 8
35-39 829 71 386 626 274 12
40-44 554 4 46 273 589 318 26
45-49 508 0 6 62 332 613 350 42
B Cohort-period fertility rates
15-19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.017
20-24 0.024 0.012 0.022 0.066 0.115 0.138
25-29 0.131 0.120 0.151 0.213 0.241
30-34 0.097 0.093 0.099 0.131
35-39 0.017 0.017 0.024
40-44 0.001 0.002
45-49 0.000
C Cumulative fertility of cohorts at end of period (P)
15-19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.014 0.047 0.083
20-24 0.119 0.062 0.116 0.345 0.621 0.772
25-29 0.715 0.718 1.100 1.684 1.978
30-34 1.204 1.566 2.177 2.632
35-39 1.651 2.260 2.754
40-44 2.267 2.766
45-49 2.766
D Cumulative fertility within periods (F)
15-19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.014 0.047 0.083
20-24 0.119 0.062 0.109 0.338 0.588 0.736
25-29 0.772 0.664 0.864 1.401 1.795
30-34 1.258 1.130 1.357 2.055
35-39 1.344 1.213 1.479
40-44 1.351 1.225
45-49 1.351
E P/F ratios
15-19 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
20-24 1.000 1.000 1.068 1.021 1.055 1.049
25-29 0.926 1.081 1.274 1.202 1.102
30-34 0.957 1.386 1.605 1.281
35-39 1.229 1.863 1.863
40-44 1.678 2.258
45-49 2.047
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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4.3 The proximate determinants of fertility decline
Following the pioneering work of Davis and Blake (1956), Bongaarts (1978) 
developed the extensively used proximate-determinant model which incorporated 
four biological and behaviour variables, marriage, contraception (including 
sterilization), abortion, and postpartum infecundability, through which population 
policies and socio-economic or cultural factors must operate to affect fertility. 3
Gao, Chen and Gu (1989) adopted the Bongaarts model to quantify the
contributions of the proximate determining components in reduction of total
fertility in Hebei, Shaanxi and Shanghai, on the basis of the 1985 IDFS survey
data, with special reference to 1984. Table 4.6 shows that of the four indices in the
three regions, the contraception index was the lowest, constituting the first major
biological factor that affects fertility. Marriage was the second most important
factor in Hebei and Shaanxi in the reduction of total fertility, but the third in
Shanghai because of the role of abortion. Abortion was the second major factor in
Shanghai, and its role was impressively different from those in Hebei and Shaanxi
where abortion was the least significant factor of the four intermediate variables.
In Hebei and Shaanxi the postpartum infertility indices were lower, indicating
stronger influences than in Shanghai. Lactation is the main cause for the longer
postpartum infertility period in the two provinces. The 1985 IDFS survey data
shows that the duration of breastfeeding has increased in Hebei and Shaanxi with
an average of 20 months, while it has declined in Shanghai municipality with an
average of 12 months (SSB, 1986: 87). Tu (1990: 64-68) argued that the increase in
the length of subsequent birth intervals could partly cause the increase in the
duration of breastfeeding for the higher-parity child, especially if the child is a son.
However, the increases in the birth intervals resulted from the vigorous family
3 In the Bongaarts model, the impact of the four proximate determinants is measured by 
four indexes, each ranging from 0 to 1. When a proximate determinant has no fertility- 
inhibiting effect, the value of the corresponding index equals 1; if the fertility inhibition is 
complete, the value of the index equals zero. In other words, the lower the value of the 
index, the stronger the effect it has.
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planning program in the relative absence of profound socio-economic changes in 
Shaanxi, especially in the rural areas.
Table 4.6 Indices of proximate determinants, China, 1981; Hebei and Shaanxi 
provinces and Shanghai municipality, 1984.
1981 1984 1984
-------------------------------------  Average of
China Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai three regions
Marriage 0.566 0.647 0.617 0.544 0.603
Contraception 0.367 0.338 0.398 0.317 0.351
Abortion 0.832 0.825 0.884 0.499 0.744
Postpartum infecundability 0.852 0.819 0.814 0.905 0.846
Source: Indices of 1984 for three regions are from Gao et al., 1989: 338; indices of 1981 
for China are from Chen and Rajulton, 1992: 22.
A comparison by Chen and Rajulton (1992) of the national indices derived 
from the 1982 One-per-Thousand Fertility Survey and the indices attained by Gao 
et al. (1989) suggested that there was good overall agreement in the order of 
importance of the four proximate determinants with regard to the averages of the 
three regions, except for the unique role of induced abortion in Shanghai (Table 
4.6).
In brief, these estimates suggest that a major role was played by the family 
planning program under the guidance of the government's population policy during 
the rapid fertility transition, with the figures for Shanghai indicating a particularly 
strong and widely accepted program, as contrasted with those in either of the two 
provinces.
4.4 Transition in family planning practice
The above section ascertained the component contribution of four proximate 
determinants in fertility decline only in the most recent period before the 1985
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IDFS survey. Chapter 5 presents a detailed discussion of nuptiality preference and 
marriage behaviour of women in the regions; the following section focuses on the 
role of two birth control practices, namely contraception and induced abortion, in 
fertility decline from the 1960s.
Time trends in family planning practice were examined by analysing 
changes across marriage cohorts that were associated with periods of different 
strength in the family planning program and changes over different stages of the 
family-building process. The levels of first-use of family planning and first-use of 
particular methods (contraception, abortion) were studied, drawing chiefly on the 
pregnancy and family planning histories gathered from the 1985 IDFS survey.
Ever-married women of reproductive age in the survey were subdivided into 
three large marriage cohorts. To ensure statistical reliability, each cohort consists 
of more than one thousand women. The reasons (Foreit, 1982: 228) for using 
marriage cohorts rather than birth cohorts are: firstly, that study in this section 
focuses on the adoption of family planning to control marital fertility; secondly, in 
China the family planning program does not provide any contraceptive means to 
never-married persons; thirdly, if both cohorts were used, the interpretation would 
be difficult, because it would be confounded with factors that affect age at 
marriage. This is discussed in Chapter 5.
Comparison of the pregnancy and contraceptive histories of the three 
marriage cohorts made it possible to assess the role of the family planning 
program, which was launched in 1970, in producing changes in the practice of birth 
control. The first cohort includes all women married before 1970. Most of these 
women married in the 1960s, and though they were exposed to the birth control 
program at different durations after marriage, most had already gone through 
their reproductive peak ages by 1970. The second cohort is women who were 
married during 1970-78, and who thus were fully exposed to a powerful family
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planning program right after marriage. The third cohort is women who were 
married between 1979 and 1985 (up to the survey date). These were the women 
most exposed to the One-Child Campaign, the most vigorous period of birth control.
Life-table procedures are the principal approach in this analysis (see 
Appendix for Chapter 4), since the cross-sectional survey data only pertain to the 
experience up to the date of the survey of cohorts of women who were still in the 
childbearing ages. In such survey data, the analysis is faced with a set of 
incomplete birth histories, for all but the oldest cohorts. Life table techniques have 
been specially devised to give proper consideration to incomplete exposure and to 
reduce the bias caused by censoring (Rodriguez and Hobcraft, 1980: 8).
The timing of first use of birth control during the women's reproductive 
period is important because it affects the subsequent patterns of both birth control 
and fertility. The cumulative probability of first use of contraception and induced 
abortion is the main measure of family planning practice; these were obtained 
from the pregnancy histories using life table analysis. The life tables were 
computed with number of pregnancy as the interval, which described the pattern of 
first-use birth control. The actual calculation of the life table involved a series of 
steps that are described in the Appendix for Chapter 4.
4.4.1 F irst-u se o f con tracep tion  and in d u ced  abortion
Life-table cumulative probabilities of first-use of contraception and induced 
abortion are shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 and Figures 4.2 and 4.3. The first-use 
curves were drawn only to the last reliable data points (standard deviation < 0.05). 
First-use of contraception includes women who had used either modern or 
traditional methods, or sterilization, or whose husbands had used contraception or 
sterilization. Induced abortion was not included in contraception.
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The curves of first-use of contraception in Figure 4.2 approach saturation 
levels (over 90 per cent), which reflects the contraception saturation pattern among 
ever-married and fecund women in the three provinces, since most of them were 
married during the 1960s or after, and were exposed to the family planning 
program in different life stages. However, differentials are evident in the slopes of 
the curves, with Shanghai increasing markedly and relatively gradual increase in 
Hebei and then Shaanxi. As can also be seen in Table 4.7, 42 per cent of Shanghai 
women started birth control after the first pregnancy, 74 per cent had initiated 
contraception before a third pregnancy, and the probability reached the saturation 
level after the third pregnancies. However, 55 per cent of Hebei women and 42 per 
cent of Shaanxi women started to use contraception after their second pregnancy 
and reached saturation level only after five pregnancies in Hebei and six 
pregnancies in Shaanxi. The pattern appears to mirror the different strengths of 
the family planning programs as well as the acceptance of family planning in the 
three regions.
Table 4.7 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1985
Hebei province Shaanxi province Shanghai municipality
Number ----------------------------  ---------------------------  -----------------------------
of
pregnancies
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
0 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 0.27 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.42 0.01
2 0.55 0.01 0.42 0.01 0.74 0.01
3 0.74 0.01 0.61 0.01 0.90 0.02
4 0.86 0.02 0.75 0.01 0.97 0.03
5 0.93 0.02 0.85 0.02 0.99 0.04
6 0.97 0.03 0.92 0.02
7 0.99 0.05 0.96 0.03
8 0.98 0.05
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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Table 4.8 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1985
Number
of
pregnancies
Hebei province Shaanxi province Shanghai municipality
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.45 0.01
2 0.21 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.69 0.01
3 0.30 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.85 0.03
4 0.41 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.92 0.05
5 0.49 0.02 0.40 0.02
6 0.60 0.04 0.48 0.02
7 0.54 0.03
8 0.59 0.04
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Figure 4.2 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number 
of pregnancies before first use, Hebei, Shaanxi and Shanghai
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Figure 4.3 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by 
number of pregnancies before first use, Hebei, Shaanxi and Shanghai
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A striking contrast in first-use of induced abortion between Shanghai and 
the other two provinces is shown in Figure 4.3. The curve for Shanghai increases 
sharply and is close to saturation level after three pregnancies, while the curves for 
Hebei and Shaanxi increase slowly and never reach saturation levels, with 
consistently higher rates in Hebei than those in Shaanxi.
The comparisons of first-use of contraception and induced abortions within 
the three provincial areas (Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6) display a similar pattern in 
Hebei and Shaanxi, with consistently higher rates of contraception and lower rates 
of induced abortion. The gap between the levels of contraception and induced 
abortion in each of the two provinces increased at higher order of pregnancies. A 
distinct pattern (Figure 4.6) was found in Shanghai where the rates of 
contraception and induced abortion were virtually the same, with even a slightly 
higher abortion rate in the first pregnancy interval, between marriage and first 
pregnancy. In addition, the induced abortion rates increased almost as sharply as 
the contraception rates.
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Figure 4.4 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception and 
induced abortion by number of pregnancies before first use, Hebei
province
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Figure 4.5 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception and 
induced abortion by number of pregnancies before first use, Shaanxi
province
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Figure 4.6 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception and 
induced abortion by number of pregnancies before first use, Shanghai
municipality
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4.4.2 Marriage cohort differences in first-use of contraception and 
induced abortion
So far the general patterns of initiation of family planning practice in different 
stages of family building have been discussed with the whole samples of the three 
regions. The first-uses of contraception and induced abortion by three marriage 
cohorts are shown in Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11, and Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9. First- 
use of contraception and induced abortion increased monotonically across marriage 
cohorts. The family planning program and particularly the strength of the program 
appear to be the major determinant of the increasing levels of initiation of birth
control across cohorts.
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In the two peasant-dominated provinces, a sharp jump in the rates of the 
1970-78 marriage cohorts seems to indicate the impact of the introduction and the 
rapid spread of the family planning program in the 1970s, which urged Hebei 
women in this cohort to start contraception universally after three pregnancies and 
drove most Shaanxi women to practise contraception after three pregnancies 
rather than after five pregnancies, in terms of the overall level of the whole 
sample. The further marked increases among the 1979-85 marriage cohorts 
suggest the influence of the most powerful birth control program: the One-Child 
Campaign. Consequently, the level of initiation of contraception in this cohort 
reached saturation in Hebei and close to saturation in Shaanxi after only the 
second pregnancy. The increment of first use of contraception between the 1950-69 
and 1970-78 cohorts was considerably larger than the increase between the 1970- 
78 and 1979-85 cohorts. The level of first-use of induced abortion was constantly 
lower than contraception, except for the 1979-85 cohort in Shanghai, and it never 
approached saturation. Meanwhile, the increment of first-use of induced abortion 
was even greater for Hebei and Shaanxi, but Shanghai showed a larger increase 
first and then a small increase, as for the pattern of first-use of contraception.
Although a similar trend of initiation of birth control across marriage 
cohorts was observable in Shanghai, the levels were consistently higher than those 
of the two provinces in each cohort and at every stage of the pregnancy history. It 
is more interesting that the relative popularity of abortion increased across 
marriage cohorts among Shanghai women. For the women who married before 
1970, contraception and induced abortion are almost equally important in the 
choices of methods for starting birth control. However, induced abortion took over 
from contraception as the more common method in the 1970-78 marriage cohort. 
More surprisingly, of women who married after 1979, the cumulative probability of 
first-use of induced abortion reached 80 per cent, compared with the corresponding 
probability of about 60 per cent of women who chose contraception.
Table 4.9 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception and induced 
abortion by num ber of pregnancies before first use by m arriage cohort, Hebei 
province China, 1985
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1950-69 1970-78 1979-85
Number of 
pregnancies
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
First use of contraception
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 0.06 0.01 0.33 0.01 0.56 0.02
2 0.22 0.01 0.72 0.02 0.90 0.02
3 0.47 0.01 0.93 0.02 0.98 0.05
4 0.69 0.02 0.98 0.04
5 0.84 0.02
6 0.93 0.03
7 0.97 0.05
First use of induced abortion
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.32 0.02
2 0.09 0.01 0.30 0.02 0.48 0.05
3 0.17 0.01 0.51 0.03
4 0.30 0.01
5 0.39 0.02
6 0.52 0.04
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Table 4.10 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception and induced 
abortion by num ber of pregnancies before first use by m arriage cohort, Shaanxi 
province, China, 1985
1947-69 1970-78 1979-85
Number of 
pregnancies
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
First use of contraception
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
1 0.04 0.00 0.29 0.01 0.44 0.02
2 0.15 0.01 0.64 0.02 0.84 0.03
3 0.35 0.01 0.87 0.03
4 0.55 0.01 0.97 0.04
5 0.73 0.02
6 0.86 0.02
7 0.92 0.03
8 0.96 0.05
First use of induced abortion
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.20 0.02
2 0.08 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.38 0.05
3 0.15 0.01 0.36 0.03
4 0.24 0.01
5 0.34 0.02
6 0.43 0.02
7 0.49 0.03
8 0.55 0.04
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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Table 4.11 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception and induced 
abortion by number of pregnancies before first use by marriage cohort, Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1985
1951-69 1970-78 1979-85
Number of 
pregnancies
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use
Standard
deviation
First use of contraception
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
1 0.18 0.01 0.48 0.02 0.61 0.01
2 0.48 0.02 0.84 0.02 0.94 0.02
3 0.76 0.02 0.96 0.03 0.99 0.04
4 0.91 0.03
5 0.97 0.05
First use of induced abortion
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
1 0.17 0.01 0.59 0.02 0.78 0.02
2 0.47 0.02 0.87 0.03
3 0.72 0.03
4 0.86 0.05
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
o-a
Cumulative probability
o o o o o o o o o o
Tl
<5 '
c
(D
O
-  i  
<Q I  
g E
D <  
O <D
<D TJ
CT &  
IE. D 
2 2!
I f
2. 2.
C
öS
(D i f
CJ cV»
<D<3
Q
o'
CQ
(D
O
O
O
O
OD
Q
O
(D
O3. o
3X
<D
CJ
<D
Q D
a
■ö a
1 1  
5‘ o 
o 3  
<D CJ
<
3
s
N
um
ber of pregnancies
o
00
Cumulative probability
p p p p p p p p p p
3 1
<QC
<D
bo
T3
O
(O
3
Q
3
o
Oc
3c
Q
O
8 T3
O’ O 
<D CJ 
O Ü
S 5
S'
O Q 
O O IT <D 
O TJ 
3 . =r.
co
3*
Q
Ü
3X
■O
o<
3'
o
<D
O
3
Q
3
a
Q
U
o
3.
o'
3
O"<
3c
3
a-
a>■n
o
N
um
ber of pregnancies
Cumulative probability
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  —
o —' rocoii.crib'^o0D<)Q 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T3
■ n(D
<D
3
Q3O
31
i d  c—n<i>
<>
O c
3c
Q
S §■
<D Q  
=ft O'
If
(D - *
S fI 69 ®
o
o
3
QO
a>
109
110
4.5 C ontraception , in du ced  abortion  and fertility  d eclin e  
4.5.1 Induced abortion trends
The above description suggested that besides contraception, induced abortion has 
been an important means of achieving the goals of China's birth-control program, 
particularly in Shanghai municipality. A summary of the abortion experience of the 
respondents reveals that 20.6 per cent of women in Hebei, 19.2 per cent in Shaanxi 
and 53.8 per cent in Shanghai reported having undergone at least one induced 
abortion; 5.4 per cent, 5.6 per cent and 17.5 per cent respectively, reported having 
undergone repeat abortions. Although induced abortion has been a legal procedure 
in China since 1957, it was not until the 1970s that it became a significant 
'remedial method’ to control fertility.
The abortion data, as shown in Table 4.12, confirm the general national 
pattern (Tien, 1991: 178). Induced abortion ratios had been increasing in the three 
regions over the past ten years before the 1985 IDFS survey, despite some annual 
fluctuations. The ratios were about 100 or less per thousand live births before the 
start of the vigorous population program in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces. The first 
substantial jump in abortion ratios occurred from 1979 to 1980, which was 
associated with the strengthened program, particularly the launching of the One- 
Child Campaign: the 1980 abortion ratios in Hebei and Shaanxi were almost 
double the ratios before the campaign. Another marked increase in abortion ratios 
occurred from 1982 to 1983, with the highest induced abortion ratios on record. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the first family planning propaganda month was 
conducted in January 1983, immediately following the 1982 national census. The 
Party central leaders clearly instructed that the propaganda should bring about 
practical results in birth control; in addition to insertion of IUDs and sterilization 
for women who had already had one or more children, women with unplanned 
pregnancies must adopt remedial measures as soon as possible.
I l l
Consequently, a great surge in the acceptance of IUDs and sterilization was 
accompanied by an unprecedented rise in the number of recipients of induced 
abortion.
In Shanghai municipality, although a similar pattern of abortion ratios is 
observed during the same period, the ratios were already at least four times as 
high as those ratios in the two provinces before the inauguration of the One-Child 
Campaign. Since 1983, the pattern shows that there were even more births 
aborted than there were live births in the outcomes of pregnancy among Shanghai 
women.
The induced abortion trends were also evident in the pattern of pregnancy 
outcomes (Table 4.13). All pregnancies of women aged 15-39 that occurred 
between 1975 and 1984 were classified according to parity. This breakdown was 
also performed by a comparison of two time periods, 1975-1978 and 1979-1984, 
which were separated by the date of the launching of the One-Child Policy in early' 
1979. In Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, the proportion of induced abortions during 
the One-Child Campaign was approximately twice that for the period 1975-1978. 
In Shanghai municipality, the proportion of induced abortions increased by about 
ten percentage points, despite abortions having already accounted for one-third of 
pregnancies in the earlier period. Close examination shows that this increase was 
mainly due to the dramatic rise in the proportions of women who already had one 
or more live births, which clearly implies that induced abortion had played a very 
important role in pursuing the one-child family goal.
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Table 4.12 Induced abortion ratios and spontaneous abortion ratios (per 1,000 live 
births), Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China
No. of No. of Ratios of Ratios of 
No. of induced spont. induced spont. 
Year live births abortions abortions abortion abortion
Hebei province
1975 402 44 14 109.5 34.8
1976 450 36 18 80.0 40.0
1977 417 38 13 91.1 31.2
1978 513 48 18 93.6 35.1
1979 554 74 30 133.6 54.2
1980 562 103 27 183.3 48.0
1981 648 87 23 134.3 35.5
1982 640 178 22 278.1 34.4
1983 517 197 43 381.0 83.2
1984 497 107 32 215.3 64.4
Shaanxi province
1975 388 30 18 77.3 46.4
1976 382 32 24 83.8 62.8
1977 356 40 20 112.4 56.2
1978 356 34 27 95.5 75.8
1979 425 51 36 120.0 84.7
1980 344 69 26 200.6 75.6
1981 410 69 33 168.3 80.5
1982 407 85 31 208.8 76.2
1983 398 106 39 266.3 98.0
1984 478 72 30 150.6 62.8
Shanghai municipality
1975 172 89 8 517.4 46.5
1976 228 99 14 434.2 61.4
1977 210 113 16 538.1 76.2
1978 222 142 13 639.6 58.6
1979 261 167 15 639.8 57.5
1980 239 190 21 795.0 87.9
1981 330 229 30 693.9 90.9
1982 384 258 36 671.9 93.8
1983 334 373 26 1116.8 77.8
1984 272 325 21 1194.9 77.2
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: Selected women who were aged 40 or under on the interview date.
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Table 4.13 Percentage distribution of pregnancy outcomes according to pregnancy 
order, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, and Shanghai municipality, China, 1975-84
Hebei province Shaanxi province Shanghai municipality
Pregnancy
order Live birth
Induced
abortion
Spont.
abortion Live b irth
Induced
abortion
Spont.
abortion Live birth
Induced
abortion
Spont.
abortion
Total pregnancies of period 1975-84
1 94.6 0.9 4.4 92.2 1.3 6.5 84.4 8.9 6.7
2 79.6 17.2 3.2 80.3 13.4 6.4 34.7 63.4 1.9
3 72.8 23.7 3.5 78.9 17.2 3.9 32.3 65.6 2.1
4 65.1 31.2 3.6 75.1 19.2 5.6 18.8 78.1 3.1
5+ 63.2 32.5 4.3 66.0 27.4 6.5 12.9 85.1 2.0
Total 82.0 14.2 3.8 82.2 11.9 5.9 55.2 40.6 4.1
Pregnancies of period 1975-78
1 95.5 0.8 3.7 95.0 0.4 4.6 85.2 8.9 5.9
2 90.5 6.7 3.0 86.5 7.0 6.5 46.7 51.5 1.8
3 81.7 15.8 2.5 85.5 10.3 4.2 52.1 44.5 3.3
4 76.4 20.5 3.1 83.5 10.8 5.6 30.5 67.1 2.2
5+ 74.6 23.5 2.8 76.4 18.4 5.2 40.0 60.0 0.0
Total 88.8 8.0 3.2 87.3 7.5 5.2 63.7 32.4 3.9
Pregnancies of period 1979-84
1 94.3 1.0 4.7 91.0 1.6 7.4 84.1 8.9 7.0
2 74.6 22.0 3.3 77.3 16.5 6.2 30.5 67.6 1.9
3 68.3 27.7 4.0 75.0 21.3 3.7 23.8 74.5 1.6
4 60.2 36.0 3.8 68.0 26.5 5.5 14.1 82.5 3.4
5+ 59.3 35.9 4.8 59.0 33.6 7.4 6.2 91.4 2.5
Total 78.9 17.0 4.1 79.5 14.3 6.2 52.1 43.6 4.2
Source: China 1985IDFS survey data  tape.
Note: Selected the pregnancies of women who were aged less than  40 on the interview date to 
reduce the age selecting bias.
Pregnancies of currently pregnant women were excluded.
4.5.2 The ro le  o f  con tracep tion  and in d u ced  abortion
There is no doubt that contraception played the first major role in the reduction of 
Chinese fertility, given that China's family planning program stressed preventive
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contraception. Acceptors of contraception have been increasing rapidly and use 
effectiveness has been improved, though it is still much lower than desired.
Requena (see Moore, 1971) proposed a diagram to describe the three 
necessary stages through which a population may pass in the process of fertility 
decline along with socio-economic and cultural development. The transition pattern 
features initially a stage of little birth control, then a stage of concurrent increase 
in contraception and induced abortion, and a final stage of even higher level of 
contraceptive prevalence but a decline in the incidence of abortion. When women 
first want to control their births and have yet to adopt effective contraception, 
declines in fertility are often associated with increased abortion incidence. Over 
time, women substitute effective contraception for induced abortion (Foreit and 
Nortman, 1992: 127). In many more developed Western countries, Japan and some 
Eastern European countries where use of contraception is extensive and highly 
effective, the incidence of abortion has declined (Frejka, 1985 : 128).
Unfortunately, the inverse relationship between abortion and contraception 
has not yet occurred in China, and on the contrary, both contraception and 
abortion prevalence increased concurrently, even when the total fertility rate was 
close to population replacement level. Certainly, China is not the only case. A 
similar pattern was also found in South Korea during the early years of family 
planning. The two populations shared some common experiences. Both countries 
have government-supported family-planning programs and their fertility declined 
remarkably within a short period. Nevertheless, some differences are worth 
pointing out. In Korea induced abortion was strictly prohibited until 1962 when the 
government adopted family planning as a national program (Hong, 1988 : 310), 
while in China abortion was officially accepted as the means to end an unwanted 
pregnancy in the early 1950s, far earlier than the major thrust of the full-scale 
family-planning program. In Korea, there was a sharp increase in both induced 
abortion and contraception immediately after the initiation of the national family
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planning program; both contraception and induced abortion were considered to be 
basic means of fertility control. Korean women used abortion earlier in their family 
building process and favoured contraception and sterilization later in their 
reproductive careers; and induced abortion was undergone voluntarily. Hence 
their fertility control pattern was heavily dependent on induced abortions. 
However, the marriage duration at which contraception began to overtake abortion 
as the initial birth control method has decreased with each subsequent marriage 
cohort (Foreit, 1982).
At first glance, China's family planning program stressed contraception 
rather than induced abortion, and the latter was repeatedly described as a 
'remedial measure'. However, the role of abortion in fertility control has undergone 
some unique changes in China since 1974 when a birth quota system was 
introduced into the birth control program. Chinese women are forbidden to have a 
pregnancy without a birth quota (Tuan, 1988 : 101). Although a major effort of the 
family planning program was directed towards educational propaganda to 
persuade individual couples to comply with the birth quota system, there was still 
a substantial number of couples who wanted more children than the birth quota 
permitted. The contradictions between the government’s population target and 
couples' family building-aspirations were increased with the initiation of the One- 
Child Policy. On the one hand, a great number of women got pregnant without a 
birth quota, and many of them, particularly rural women, attempted to hide their 
unauthorized pregnancies until they were discovered and 'persuaded' to undergo 
an abortion (Yan, Becker and Chow, 1991 : 39). On the other hand, the relatively 
high failure rates in contraception resulted in many unwanted pregnancies. Under 
these circumstances, abortion virtually became an important solution to 
accomplish the target birth quota. It was estimated that the family planning 
program averted about 56 million births between 1970 and 1979. During the same 
decade, approximately 47 million pregnancies ended in abortions, which may have
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averted about 19 million live births, or 34 per cent of the official estimate of births 
averted during the 1970s (Tien et al., 1992: 13-14)4
Shanghai municipality recorded the highest in both abortion incidence and 
ratios of induced abortion in China (Tien, 1991 : 181). Several factors may explain 
the differences in abortion incidence between the advanced municipality and the 
two less-developed provinces. First, the differences in the trends and ratios of 
abortion reflect the variations in the initiative, the timing and the strength of the 
population control policy, particularly the One-Child Policy, as was discussed in 
Chapter 3. In Shanghai, unplanned pregnancies are much more likely to have 
ended in induced abortion than in Hebei and Shaanxi.
Secondly, abortion was more widespread among contraceptive users than
among women who either did not practise family planning or practised it less
frequently, since women who used contraception did not want to become pregnant,
and were more likely than non-users to terminate a pregnancy (Donaldson, Nichols
and Choe, 1982: 229). As was illustrated in Table 4.14, when the outcome of the
last pregnancy was examined, the proportions of abortion recipients among
contraceptors were considerable higher than those among non-contraceptors. The
differences between contraceptive users and non-users were 54 percentage points
in Shanghai, and 26 and 18 percentage points in Hebei and Shaanxi, respectively.
It is noteworthy that among either contraceptive users or non-users, the
proportions of induced abortion were highest in Shanghai, followed by Hebei and
then Shaanxi. This pattern may indicate different strengths of the family planning
programs among the regions that caused the regional variations, particularly
between Shanghai and the two provinces, in abortion acceptance of both
contraceptive users and non-users. Consequently, the higher proportion of
contraceptors in Shanghai results in higher ratios of induced abortion there than in
4 Because a woman can have more than one pregnancy aborted in the time it takes to 
carry a pregnancy to term, each abortion does not necessarily prevent one live birth (Tien 
et al., 1992: 13-14).
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Hebei and Shaanxi. Table 4.15 shows that among women whose last pregnancy 
ended in induced abortion, the contraceptive non-users were 65 per cent in 
Shaanxi, followed by Hebei (58 per cent), while the levels were lowest in Shanghai 
(43 per cent).
Table 4.14 A comparison of induced abortion recipients in the last pregnancy 
among contraceptive non-users and among users who became pregnant while 
using, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Pattern of use Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
(A) Number of abortions of non-users 424 323 803
(B) Number of contraceptive non-users
(C) Proportion of abortion recipients
3661 3049 2479
(C)=(A)/(B) 11.6 10.6 32.4
(D) Number of abortions of users who
became pregnancy while using 238 128 880
(E) Number of contraceptive users
(F) Proportion of abortion recipients
639 456 1017
(F)=(D)/(E) 37.2 28.1 86.5
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: Women who reported non-use of contraception because of illness, not being currently 
married or some other reasons were excluded.
The proportions of abortion in contraceptive non-users increased as the 
number of live births increased, with Shaanxi reaching 74 per cent of non-users 
among women who had four or more live births. This pattern is consistent with the 
findings about family planning practices in previous sections. The higher 
proportions of non-users in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces implied that those women 
might initially have wanted more children, but were persuaded to stop the 
pregnancy by induced abortion. As Table 4.16 shows, among women who have had 
at least one induced abortion, more than 84 per cent in the two provinces did not 
accept the government's One-Child Policy; even in metropolitan Shanghai, nearly 
half the women did not pledge to have only one child. Furthermore, part of the
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large increase in abortion ratios was a function of the accelerated decline in births 
caused by other contraceptive methods (Tien, 1991: 178).
Table 4.15 Percentage distribution of last pregnancy ending in induced abortion 
by pattern of contraceptive use in last pregnant interval, by number of live births, 
Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Pattern of use 0
Number of live births 
1 2 3 4 Total
Not used 100.0 52.7
Hebei province 
54.5 61.9 64.6 57.5
Not willing to use 0.0 1.3 0.9 0.8 3.4 1.5
Illness 0.0 2.1 3.1 2.4 2.7 2.6
Not currently married 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other reasons 0.0 5.5 3.6 2.4 3.4 3.9
To become pregnant 0.0 2.5 3.1 3.2 0.0 2.3
Pregnant while using 0.0 35.9 34.8 29.4 25.9 32.2
Total number of abortions 4 237 224 126 147 738
Pattern of use 
Not used 50.0 51.7
Shaanxi province 
64.5 67.6 73.5 65.0
Not willing to use 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.0
Illness 0.0 4.2 5.6 3.9 6.0 5.0
Not currently married 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other reasons 0.0 2.5 1.9 1.0 0.6 1.4
To become pregnant 0.0 3.4 0.9 2.0 1.2 1.8
Pregnant while using 50.0 35.6 27.1 25.5 17.5 25.8
Total number of abortions 4 118 107 102 166 497
Pattern of use 
Not used 91.7 41.7
Shanghai municipality 
38.8 49.1 64.5 42.8
Not willing to use 0.0 3.8 4.5 0.6 1.6 3.6
Illness 0.0 1.3 4.7 3.1 4.8 2.6
Not currently married 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Other reasons 0.0 3.0 4.5 1.9 3.2 3.3
To become pregnant 0.0 0.9 0.4 0.0 1.6 0.7
Pregnant while using 8.3 49.3 47.1 45.3 24.2 46.9
Total number of abortions 24 1078 552 159 62 1875
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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Table 4.16 Percentage distribution of women who have had at least one induced 
abortion by acceptance of one-child policy, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and 
Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
Signed one-child certificate 15.9 15.7 52.4
Did not sign 84.1 84.3 47.6
Total number of women 1044 783 2228
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Table 4.17 illustrates a striking contrast between the trends of live births 
and induced abortions. The mean numbers of pregnancies and live births declined 
sharply for younger women as compared with older women, while the mean 
number of induced abortions maintained relatively steady levels, and the ratios of 
induced abortions increased among younger women in the three regions.5 6
Thirdly, contraceptive effectiveness in Shanghai (0.850) was considerably 
lower than in Hebei (0.936) and Shaanxi (0.920) (Gao et al., 1989: 340).  ^ Table 
4.15 indicates that, although among women whose last pregnancy ended in 
induced abortion the lowest proportion of contraceptive non-users was in Shanghai, 
approximately 47 per cent of the Shanghai respondents claimed to have been using 
a contraceptive method in the last pregnancy interval when they became pregnant, 
which was much higher than in Hebei and Shaanxi. If these reported levels were
5 The two youngest age groups (15-19 and 20-24) were excluded from this comparison, 
because women in these age groups had relatively incomplete pregnancy histories on the 
interview date, as compared with women in older age groups.
6 One of the four basic indices in the Bongaarts model of proximate determinants is the 
contraception coefficient, which is affected by both the contraceptive rates and 
contraceptive effectiveness. These contraceptive effectiveness figures were estimated from 
the contraception data concerning the period of 1980-1985, in the 1985 China IDFS survey 
(Gao et al., 1989: 334).
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true, then the contraceptive failure rates were markedly higher in Shanghai than 
in Hebei and Shaanxi. What was the main factor that guaranteed the relatively 
high effectiveness in Hebei and Shaanxi? Evidence in Table 4.18 suggests that it 
was the predominant role of sterilization. More than half of the contraceptive 
users in Hebei were sterilized, and of the contraceptive users in Shaanxi, 40 per 
cent were sterilization recipients. Therefore, it may be argued that if the 
government's family planning program did not greatly emphasize sterilization, if 
the health services for undertaking abortion in the two peasant-dominated 
provinces were equally available as in metropolitan Shanghai, and if the birth 
control programs among the three regions were equally strong, then the induced 
abortion ratios in the two provinces would be substantially higher than the 
current levels.
Fourthly, the motivation for control of family size was stronger among 
Shanghai women than among women in the two provinces. Table 4.14 shows that 
of women who became pregnant while using contraception in the last pregnancy 
intervals, the proportion of abortion recipients in Shanghai was higher than Hebei 
and Shaanxi by 49 and 58 percentage points, respectively. This was also evident in 
the sharp rise in the first use of induced abortion for lower-order pregnancies. 
Meanwhile, as can be seen in Table 4.13, the pattern of pregnancy outcomes was 
markedly different between the two provinces and Shanghai. In the two higher- 
fertility provinces, more than 80 per cent of pregnancies resulted in a live birth, 
compared to only 55 per cent in Shanghai. The difference was almost fully 
explained by the difference in the proportions of induced abortion, a result of the 
government's population policy being much more strictly implemented in 
Shanghai.
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Table 4.17 Mean number of pregnancies, live births, abortions and abortion ratios 
(per 1,000 live births) per ever married woman, by age groups, Hebei and Shaanxi 
provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Age
groups Preg.
Ratios of
Live induced Number
births Abortions abortion of women
Hebei province
15-19 0.43 0.32 0.00 0.0 37
20-24 0.94 0.70 0.07 9.8 536
25-29 1.81 1.46 0.23 16.1 1145
30-34 2.61 2.22 0.32 14.2 1275
35-39 3.37 2.95 0.32 10.7 907
40-44 4.26 3.86 0.33 8.6 607
45-49 4.91 4.47 0.32 7.1 573
Shaanxi province
15-19 0.41 0.29 0.00 0.0 49
20-24 1.06 0.82 0.03 4.0 552
25-29 2.06 1.68 0.19 11.4 850
30-34 2.92 2.45 0.31 12.7 855
35-39 4.05 3.53 0.34 9.7 680
40-44 4.84 4.31 0.37 8.6 587
45-49 5.54 4.94 0.35 7.1 511
Shanghai municipality
15-19 1.00 0.00 1.00 100.0 1
20-24 1.31 0.68 0.45 66.1 179
25-29 1.57 0.89 0.54 60.2 1033
30-34 2.13 1.24 0.81 65.1 1053
35-39 2.68 1.67 0.93 55.6 820
40-44 3.29 2.28 0.92 40.3 550
45-49 3.70 2.77 0.77 27.7 507
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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Table 4.18 Percentage distribution of current use of specific contraceptive 
methods, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Methods Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
Female sterilization 48.6 36.0 16.0
Male sterilization 4.4 4.4 2.8
IUD 39.5 53.1 55.3
Pill 4.7 2.0 10.6
Condom and others 2.7 4.4 15.3
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Fifthly, the increment of first pregnancy abortion may be partly due to an 
increase in premarital conception, particularly in Shanghai. A recent pilot study 
conducted in five sample areas in Shanghai estimated that abortion rates among 
single women in 1988 were 56 per thousand for women aged 15-19 and 159 per 
thousand for women aged 20-24 (Wu et al., 1992).
Finally, the level of socio-economic development must be taken into account. 
On the one hand, the greater availability of abortion facilities and professional 
personnel surely supported Shanghai women’s desire to have an abortion for 
unwanted or unauthorized pregnancies. On the other hand, women who accepted 
induced abortion in China were financially rewarded by the family planning 
program. The advanced metropolis of Shanghai has more economic ability to afford 
the additional cost in the family planning program than the less developed Hebei 
and Shaanxi provinces; this would affect both the supply of and demand for 
specific birth control methods, especially induced abortion.
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4.6 Conclusion
Taken as a whole, evidence from the changes in fertility trends and practices of 
family planning indicates that the demographic transition occurred in China with 
dramatic suddenness, particularly in less developed regions, though in some 
advanced areas such as Shanghai the onset of fertility decline preceded the 
implementation of the strong family planning program and explicit population 
policy. The remarkable change in family planning practice across marriage cohorts 
suggests that the radical fertility decline was triggered by the rapid spread of the 
family planning program.
The comparisons of indices of proximate determinants and the transition of 
family planning practice among the three regions indicated a more powerful 
fertility constraint in metropolitan Shanghai than in the two provinces. Thus, it 
mirrored the regional variations in both the strength and the acceptance of the 
family planning programs. There is no doubt that the more powerful birth control 
program in Shanghai contributed to sustaining its fertility at a lower level than 
those of other regions such as Hebei and Shaanxi provinces.
Besides contraception, the fertility control pattern is heavily dependent on 
induced abortion. Evidence yielded from the proximate determinants model showed 
that in Shanghai municipality induced abortion became an important fertility- 
inhibiting factor, second only to contraception. It is interesting that the relative 
popularity of abortion increased in each more recently married cohort among 
Shanghai women. Although for women who married before 1970, contraception 
and induced abortion were almost equally important in the choices of methods for 
starting birth control, induced abortion took over from contraception as the more 
common method among the women who married since the 1970s. As was similar 
to the national general trend, induced abortion ratios have been increasing in the 
three regions since the early 1970s and the first substantial jump in the ratios
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occurred in 1980, associated with the strengthened program, particularly the 
initiation of the One-Child Campaign. The 1980 abortion ratios in Hebei and 
Shaanxi were almost double the ratios before the campaign. A close examination of 
the pregnancy outcome data showed that the increase in induced abortion was 
mainly due to the dramatic rise in abortion incidence for women who already had 
one or more live births, which clearly indicated that induced abortion played a very 
important role in limiting the growth of established families.
In China, there is not yet any sign of an inverse relationship between 
induced abortion and contraception. The prevalence of both contraception and 
induced abortion increased concurrently, while the total fertility rate was close to 
population replacement level. Induced abortion had a particular role in 
maintaining the low fertility levels, especially in advanced urban areas such as 
Shanghai where contraceptive effectiveness was relatively low. In less developed 
regions, such as Hebei and Shaanxi, increasing induced abortion ratios were driven 
by the birth quota system in the intensified birth control program. The high 
proportions (57 per cent for Hebei and 65 per cent for Shaanxi) of contraceptive 
non-users among women whose last pregnancy ended in induced abortion indicate 
that substantial proportions of couples might not want to control their fertility in 
line with the birth quota permitted, and, to some extent, these induced abortions 
were not the result of couples' voluntary decisions. The 1985 IDFS survey found 
that among the women who had at least one induced abortion, more than 84 per 
cent in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces did not sign the One-Child Certificate. Even 
in metropolitan Shanghai, nearly half the women did not pledge to have only one 
child.
The predominant role of sterilization in contraceptive practice guaranteed 
the much higher contraceptive effectiveness in Hebei and Shaanxi than in 
Shanghai. Hence, it may be argued that if contraceptive methods in the peasant-
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dominated provinces had not relied heavily on sterilization, the induced abortion 
ratios would be substantially higher than the current levels in the two provinces.
Therefore, the expected induced abortion trend in the near future may 
depend on the extent of the government's commitment to increase contraceptive 
education and to improve the use-effectiveness, and whether the relaxation of the 
stringent birth control policy will allow more exceptions for couples to have more 
children than the policy quota permits.
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C hapter 5 N u p tia lity  p referen ce and th e accep tan ce of 
la te m arriage
5.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the nuptiality preferences and behaviour of women over 
the past decades, particularly during the period of rapid fertility decline, and under 
the changing marriage regulations and population control programs, as well as 
changing socio-economic circumstances. The national population target in the 
1990s is no more than 1.294 billion persons by the year 2000. This would be 
achieved by maintaining the rate of natural increase under 12.5 per thousand and 
reducing the average number of children per woman to two by the end of the 
century (Pen, 1992: 5). However, an increase in the proportion of young women in 
the age structure, and earlier marriage in the 1980s, seem to be obstacles to this 
goal. Therefore, promoting late marriage and late childbearing may contribute 
substantially to a reduction in the population growth to desired target levels in 
China (Zeng et al., 1991). Delay in the age at first marriage can reduce the crude 
birth rate and population growth at least during the transition stage, even if 
completed family size is not reduced. It is therefore important to enquire whether 
the increase in age at marriage is a transitional phenomenon coming from the 
temporary postponement of marriage through the influence of the later marriage 
campaign, or whether it indicates a substantial long-term trend in the propensity 
to marry late. Why did the increase in age at marriage in the 1970s level off and 
even decrease slightly during the 1980s? Would it be possible for the government 
to increase the age at marriage again? What is the individual choice for the ideal 
age at marriage? What factors encourage females and males to comply or
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discourage them from complying with the government's legal or target minimum 
ages at marriage?
The analysis of this chapter focuses on the differences between the 
government policy targets and individual decisions in marriage behaviour and 
their implications. The first section reviews briefly the late marriage campaign 
which induced a dramatic increase in age at marriage, and the second section looks 
at the overall cohort differences in timing of marriage. The third section describes 
the trends in proportions of women married earlier than the legal minimum age at 
marriage and of women married after reaching the target age of late marriage, and 
the fourth section examines the determinants of age at first marriage. The final 
section broadly discusses the obstacles to the acceptance of the government's late 
marriage regulations.
5.2 The la te  m arriage cam paign
The first marriage law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted in 1950 and 
set a legal minimum age of 18 for females and 20 for males, a two-year increase for 
both sexes compared with the Civil Code of the Republic of China (see Table 5.1). 
The main purposes of the marriage law were to protect women and children by 
prohibiting child marriage; eradicating feudal customs such as arranged marriage, 
purchase marriage, and concubinage; and to underscore the free choice of partners 
and equal rights for both sexes. Hence, little demographic concern on linkage 
between late marriage and fertility control can be observed in the first marriage 
law and official publicity related thereto. China's marriage registration system was 
established in 1955, which made it possible to administratively enforce the 
marriage law. Not until 1957 was the promotion of late marriage officially 
recognized as a way to reduce fertility (Banister, 1987: 152; Tien, 1991: 25).
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The Chinese government established the State Council Family Planning 
Leading Group in July 1973. Late marriage became one of the leading components 
of China's population control program when the Wan, Xi, Shao (late marriage, 
birth spacing, few children) Campaign was launched in December 1973 ( Shi, 1988: 
165). It was generally stipulated that young persons were not permitted to register 
their marriage until age 23 for women and 25 for men, five years later than the 
legal marriageable age in the 1950 marriage law. During the Wan, Xi, Shao 
Campaign, the implementation of the target minimum marriage ages varied by 
regions. In some provinces higher minimum ages were set, such as 25 for females 
and 28 for males or a combined age of 50 for the two partners. The regulations 
were strictly enforced in larger cities, while the target ages were used only as 
guidelines and were compromised or ignored in a variety of ways in many rural 
areas (Banister, 1987: 154).
Table 5.1 Changes in the marriage laws and regulations, China
Legal minimum age for marriage
Laws and regulations Males Females
Civil Code of the Republic of China 18 16
1950 first marriage law of PRC 20 18
1973 late marriage campaign regulations 25 23
1980 new marriage law (took effect in 1981) 22 20
Source: see the Chapter context.
A new marriage law was promulgated in 1980 and took effect in 1981. 
Although the law explicitly stipulates that 'Husband and wife are in duty bound to 
practise family planning’ (Article 12), it increased the legal minimum age for 
marriage by only two years, to 20 for women and 22 for men, ages far lower than
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the level required by the marriage regulations in the late-marriage drive, and even 
lower than the levels that had been reached in the late 1970s. This was partly 
because after the 'Cultural Revolution’, the government intended to re-establish 
the rule of law and the legal system, and stipulated legal minimum marriage ages 
that were reasonable and enforceable on a national basis rather than the targeted 
ages of late-marriage regulations. About 50 per cent of women as a national 
average had not accepted the late marriage age even during the intensive late- 
marriage campaign, and a considerable number of couples still married under age 
18 (Wen and Wei, 1984). The restriction on marriage registration created many 
unregistered marriages, particularly in rural areas. Some couples held their early 
social marriage or simply lived together and then registered their marriages after 
they reached the stipulated ages. Another reason for the relatively low minimum 
age in the 1980 marriage law was that the launching of the One-Child Campaign 
had shifted the emphasis from late marriage to the explicit restrictions on second 
and higher-order births. The administrators believed that as long as birth control 
was practised, late marriage was no longer crucial in attaining the national goals 
of population control (Banister, 1987: 161). Not surprisingly, the modification of the 
marriage law and the relaxation of regulations were accompanied by a surge in 
marriages from 1981.
5.3 Cohort trends in the age at marriage
The trends in age at first marriage before 1985 can be observed from the 
retrospective data on age at marriage collected in the IDFS survey. Table 5.2 
shows the age by which 25 per cent, 50 per cent and 75 per cent of ever married 
birth-year cohorts had first married. The age at first marriage gradually increased 
from the earlier cohorts through successive cohorts up to the 1955-1959 cohort for 
Hebei and Shaanxi, and the 1950-54 cohort for Shanghai. This was accompanied 
by a widening in the age ranges within which marriages were concentrated up to
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Table 5.2 Quartiles, interquartile range of birth cohort-specific age at first 
marriage among ever married women, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1985
Birth
cohort
Age 
in 1985
No. of 
women
1st
quartile Median
3rd
quartile
In ter­
quartile
range Mean
Hebei province
1935-39 45-49 473 17.5 19.2 21.4 3.9 19.6
1940-44 40-44 612 17.8 19.5 21.7 3.9 20.1
1945-49 35-39 825 18.8 20.8 22.8 4.0 20.9
1950-54 30-34 1230 19.4 21.8 24.3 4.9 21.8
1955-59 25-29 1240 21.3 22.8 24.1 2.8 22.6
1960-64* 20-24 628 19.9 21.0 22.2 2.3 21.0
1965-69* 15-19 72 18.0 18.9 19.6 1.6 18.6
Total 5080 19.2 21.3 23.3 4.1 21.3
Shaanxi province
1935-39 45-49 434 16.5 17.8 19.4 2.9 18.1
1940-44 40-44 562 16.8 18.3 19.8 3.0 18.5
1945-49 35-39 664 17.1 18.7 20.5 3.4 19.0
1950-54 30-34 829 18.2 19.8 22.3 4.1 20.3
1955-59 25-29 878 20.0 22.1 23.7 3.7 21.8
1960-64* 20-24 602 19.7 20.8 21.9 2.2 20.7
1965-69* 15-19 115 17.8 18.8 19.5 1.7 18.6
Total 4084 17.9 19.7 21.9 4.0 19.9
Shanghai municipality
1935-39 45-49 425 18.2 20.3 23.3 5.1 20.9
1940-44 40-44 537 18.9 21.5 24.6 5.7 21.8
1945-49 35-39 732 21.2 23.2 25.5 4.3 23.5
1950-54 30-34 1004 23.0 25.2 27.3 4.3 25.1
1955-59 25-29 1158 23.3 24.8 26.2 2.9 24.7
1960-64* 20-24 286 20.8 21.9 23.2 2.4 21.9
1965-69* 15-19 1 16.8 16.8
Total 4143 21.5 23.7 25.8 4.3 23.6
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey.
Note: * Women born in 1960-64 and 1965-69 were very young at the time of the
survey, so their mean ages at marriage did not represent the ages at marriage 
of women who had already married or would eventually marry ; the 1965-69 
cohort, particularly, should be excluded in interpretation of the results.
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the 1950-54 cohort in Hebei and Shaanxi, and a narrowing in the age ranges in 
Shanghai over all the birth cohorts. The rise in age at marriage was more 
substantial among the cohorts born later than the earlier cohorts. In Hebei and 
Shaanxi, a jump in the inter-quartile age range occurred from the 1945-49 to the 
1950-54 birth cohort, which clearly reflected the delaying marriage effect of the 
Wan, Xi, Shao Campaign when women in this cohort entered the fertile age. The 
campaign apparently had its greatest effect upon the third quartile, with almost a 
two-year age gap between the 1950-54 cohort and the previous ones. This is 
consistent with findings elsewhere (Ye, 1992: 65) on the basis of China's One-per- 
Thousand Fertility Survey, suggesting that the late-marriage policy significantly 
affected the distribution of age at marriage through both raising the mean age at 
marriage and enlarging the deviations from the means. The median age at 
marriage reached a top level of 22 years in the 1955-59 birth cohort of the two 
provinces and a level of 25 in the 1950-54 birth cohort in Shanghai, and then 
started to decline, accompanied by a narrowing in the inter-quartile age ranges: 
However the decline in age at marriage is biased downward because of the 
selection of only married women in the younger cohorts.
When the analysis is confined to cohorts aged 25 and over and to marriages 
occurring before age 25, the general upward trend in mean age at first marriage 
across age cohorts is also evident (Table 5.3). Of women currently aged 45-49, more 
than 30 per cent in Hebei and Shaanxi, and about 23 per cent in Shanghai, entered 
their first marriage before the minimum legal age for marriage, while only 1.8 per 
cent in Hebei, 7.6 per cent in Shaanxi, and 0.6 per cent in Shanghai did so among 
women currently aged 25-29. On the other hand, of those aged 25-29, about 58 per 
cent in Hebei and 48 per cent in Shaanxi, and 81 per cent in Shanghai were 
married at 22-24 years of age, compared with 17 per cent, 6 per cent, and 31 per 
cent of those aged 45 years and over in Hebei, Shaanxi and Shanghai, 
respectively.
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Table 5.3 Percentage distribution of age at first marriage of women aged 25-49 
who married before 25 years of age, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1985
Current
age
Age at first marriage
<15 15-17 18-19 20-21 22-24 Median Mean
Hebei Province
25-29 0.4 1.8 9.4 30.1 58.3 22.4 22.2
30-34 0.5 10.7 21.9 24.8 42.1 21.3 21.2
35-39 0.2 16.3 26.6 28.9 28.0 20.4 20.4
40-44 0.7 28.5 30.8 22.8 17.2 19.3 19.5
45-49 3.7 29.2 31.7 18.8 16.6 19.0 19.2
25-49 0.9 14.5 22.1 25.9 36.5 21.0 20.8
Shaanxi province
25-29 0.6 7.6 16.2 27.6 48.0 21.9 21.4
30-34 1.0 20.3 32.6 21.3 24.9 19.7 20.0
35-39 2.1 32.9 34.4 20.5 10.2 18.8 18.9
40-44 2.9 43.7 32.0 12.3 9.2 18.2 18.4
45-49 10.4 45.2 26.2 12.0 6.2 17.8 17.9
25-49 2.9 27.7 28.0 19.6 21.8 19.3 19.5
Shanghai municipality
25-29 0.6 2.1 16.5 80.8 23.3 23.1
30-34 2.3 7.7 15.9 74.1 23.1 22.7
35-39 4.6 13.7 31.9 49.9 21.9 21.8
40-44 0.7 14.9 28.9 20.4 35.1 20.7 20.6
45-49 1.1 22.2 27.1 19.0 30.5 19.9 20.1
25-49 0.3 8.0 14.6 20.8 56.3 22.3 21.8
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey.
However, this comparison of the truncated marriage experiences of cohorts 
aged 25-49 may be somewhat misleading for the late-marriage region of Shanghai 
where many marriages occurred after age 25. Indeed, the estimated total mean age
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at marriage for Shanghai was substantially biased down, compared with the 
corresponding figure derived from the whole sample in Table 5.2, since the 
estimation was based on only 60 per cent of the survey respondents in Shanghai, 
but about 80 per cent in Hebei and Shaanxi. Moreover, the estimation excluded 
women younger than age 25, whose marriage experiences are more interesting to 
investigate to ascertain the recent trends.
In brief, the cohort trends in age at marriage derived from the 1985 IDFS 
survey clearly demonstrated a marked increment in the 1970s, as a consequence of 
the radical postponement of marriage. However, a declining mean age at marriage 
is also somewhat observable in the 1980s from the data of the 1985 IDFS survey, 
though it is only suggestive evidence, because the age censoring inherent in 
collecting the information on recent marriages prevents us from reaching a firm 
conclusion. However, on the basis of China's large national surveys in the late 
1980s and the 1990 census, Zeng (1992: 6-7) found that the decline in mean age at 
marriage initiated in the early 1980s had continued throughout the whole decade; 
the mean age at marriage had dropped from 22.84 in 1980 to 22.00 in 1990 (Table 
5.4). This result confirmed the suggestive evidence of decline in mean age at 
marriage from the 1985 IDFS survey, which reflected the influence of the 1980 
new marriage law that had abolished the late marriage regulations. Furthermore, 
there was an increasing number of people who had married early and a decline in 
the proportions of women marrying late, which are discussed in the rest of this 
chapter.
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Table 5.4 Changes in mean age at first marriage, China, 1950-1990
Year
Age at 
marriage Year
Age at 
marriage
1950 18.68 1970 20.19
1951 18.69 1971 20.29
1952 18.94 1972 20.56
1953 18.94 1973 20.95
1954 19.00 1974 21.38
1955 19.07 1975 21.74
1956 19.19 1976 22.30
1957 19.23 1977 22.57
1958 19.15 1978 22.83
1959 19.35 1979 23.12
1960 19.57 1980 22.84
1961 19.70 1981 22.67
1962 19.61 1982 22.41
1963 19.58 1983 22.35
1964 19.55 1984 22.28
1965 19.74 1985 22.24
1966 19.86 1986 22.13
1967 20.03 1987 22.16
1968 20.17 1984-87 22.20
1969 20.29 1987-90 22.00
Source: 1950-1979, Zhao and Yu, 1983: 124; 
1980-1990, Zeng, 1992: 7.
Note: Figures for 1980-1990 are singulate mean ages 
at marriage. This is not strictly comparable to 
the age of women married in the same years.
5.4 T rends in  fem ales' early  and la te  m arriage rates  
5.4.1 Proportion of early marriages
Early marriage was the prevailing practice in China until the 1950s, and the 
practice has continued since then in some inland and remote rural regions. After 
the founding of the PRC, early marriage was gradually reduced by implementation 
of the marriage laws and the associated publicity, and particularly the Wan Xi 
Shao Campaign. However, the 1987 one-per-cent population survey revealed that
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4.2 per cent of Chinese women aged 15-19 had married before attaining the legal 
minimum age for marriage (Shen and Zhang, 1989)
The 1950 marriage law stipulates that the minimum age requirement is 18 
for females and 20 for males, and women who married under age 18 are regarded 
as having married early. The proportion of early marriage is the proportion of early 
married women to the total of the first married. As is shown in Table 5.5, of this 
sample cohort, most of those women who married during the early and middle 
1950s were married under age 18. Although the first marriage law of PRC was 
promulgated in 1950, the overwhelming pattern was that the proportions of early 
marriage in all the three regions did not start to drop until 1954, after the vigorous 
propaganda campaign in 1953 (Shi, 1988: 115) and the establishment of the 
marriage registration system in 1955. From 1955 in Shanghai and 1956 in Hebei, 
the proportions drop to under 50 per cent. However, during the whole of the 1950s, 
more than half of the women who married for the first time in Shaanxi were under 
18. A continuing decline in the proportion of early marriage occurred in Shanghai 
in the 1960s; the decline was faster in Hebei than in Shaanxi. From 1970 on, most 
women in metropolitan Shanghai married after they reached the minimum legal 
age limit. The great efforts in the Wan, Xi, Shao Campaign resulted in early- 
marriage proportions in Hebei of less than 5 per cent and less than 10 per cent in 
Shaanxi during the 1970s.
The 1980 new marriage law had raised the minimum legal age of marriage 
to 20 years for females; however, a considerable number of women1 in the two 
peasant-dominated provinces seemed to be unwilling to accept the stipulation. As 
can been seen in Table 5.5, about one quarter of women in Shaanxi ignored the 
legal requirement and married under the age of 20, except in 1981, the year of the 
new marriage law, when presumably some women hesitated to break the law in its
1 In the case of parent-controlled marriages, this should be regarded as parents, or both 
parents and women, unwilling to accept or ignoring the legal stipulations.
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Table 5.5 Trends in proportions of women married early and late, Hebei and 
Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China
Proportions of early marriages Proportions of late marriages
Year Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai China Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai China
Before 1950 100.0 49.3 0.0 6.6
1950 100.0 100.0 48.3 0.0 0.0 7.2
1951 100.0 100.0 100.0 48.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8
1952 100.0 100.0 100.0 42.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6
1953 100.0 94.9 100.0 42.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0
1954 84.6 82.7 65.6 42.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6
1955 60.3 73.7 45.8 37.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.6
1956 33.8 59.8 32.4 36.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.2
1957 22.5 54.4 25.0 35.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0
1958 39.8 58.3 27.1 38.0 1.1 0.0 1.4 8.0
1959 35.3 51.8 17.8 35.0 4.9 0.9 9.6 9.3
1960 26.9 45.3 15.1 32.0 7.7 0.0 19.2 11.0
1961 30.2 44.0 10.8 29.4 5.7 3.7 25.7 11.5
1962 31.8 47.2 7.9 29.9 10.9 4.7 29.2 10.7
1963 19.5 41.9 8.5 31.5 15.4 5.1 29.8 10.4
1964 19.8 41.4 7.6 30.3 11.9 5.4 30.3 10.4
1965 25.9 40.6 6.2 28.5 16.5 5.9 35.4 12.0
1966 20.2 35.6 2.7 25.8 16.0 9.6 46.6 12.2
1967 14.0 22.8 1.1 21.5 13.2 4.0 43.0 12.6
1968 12.4 26.5 2.7 20.3 12.4 8.8 36.3 13.2
1969 16.1 31.7 4.4 19.0 18.2 5.5 44.4 14.1
1970 10.7 19.7 0.7 18.6 20.5 8.0 45.2 13.8
1971 10.5 18.0 1.1 17.4 17.0 4.1 58.4 14.0
1972 6.1 19.3 0.0 14.4 21.2 5.5 55.2 16.3
1973 6.6 16.7 0.0 11.1 25.2 6.9 69.7 20.1
1974 3.0 9.2 1.7 8.8 33.6 12.2 72.5 24.5
1975 2.1 9.6 0.7 7.8 36.5 16.5 74.6 31.0
1976 0.6 5.0 0.6 4.2 46.0 23.5 70.8 38.9
1977 0.5 6.6 0.0 3.6 50.5 27.9 77.6 42.2
1978 0.0 6.5 0.0 3.7 56.3 37.4 77.7 48.0
1979 1.4 2.4 0.0 3.6 49.7 38.3 82.6 52.9
1980 2.0 4.8 1.1 5.2 53.9 35.6 80.3 52.8
1981 3.0(11.9) 2.0(13.8) 0.0 (1.7) 4.5 47.8 44.3 77.7 50.9
1982 3.0(14.9) 3.4(23.0) 0.0 (2.2) 3.8 52.3 36.8 80.3 47.8
1983 2.3(18.7) 3.7 (26.8) 0.4 (2.5) 42.9 31.1 80.4
1984 1.1(13.8) 3.4(23.6) 0.0 (0.5) 31.9 23.0 86.8
1985 2.4(15.4) 5.3 (24.6) 0.0 (0.0) 27.8 24.0 89.6
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey; rates for whole China 1949-82, are from Wen and Wei, 1984. 
Note: figures in brackets were calculated according to the new legal minimum age of marriage 
for females, 20 years old, instead of 18 years old.
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first year of implementation. In Hebei, the proportions of marriage under 20 were 
maintained around 15 per cent in the early 1980s. Mention should be made of the 
existence of inaccuracies due to digit preferences and age-misreporting. Since the 
successive changes in the legal minimum marriageable ages in China, women may 
report higher ages at marriage than the actual ones in order to conform to the 
marriage laws and regulations; so the actual proportion of early marriages may be 
higher than reported in the survey. Although the extent of this problem is 
unknown, taking this problem into consideration may strengthen the argument 
that among some women, there is a gap between the preferred age at marriage and 
the minimum marriageable age set by the marriage laws.
5.4.2 P rop ortion  o f  la te  m arriages
The proportion of late marriage is the proportion of all women married during the 
year who had reached the target minimum age.^ No women in the survey 
samples of the three regions married at age 23 or older until the late 1950s. From 
the early 1960s, the proportions of late marriage started to increase gradually. The 
gap in the proportions of late marriage among the regions widened with a 
remarkable jump in the proportion for Shanghai in the 1960s, and with a moderate 
increase in Hebei, and a very slow increase in Shaanxi. As is indicated in Table 5.5, 
the proportion for Shanghai women increased from under 20 per cent in 1960 to 
more than 40 per cent in 1969; while the proportion for Hebei women increased 
from under 10 per cent to more than 15 per cent, and the proportion for Shaanxi 
women remained under 10 per cent until the Wan, Xi, Shao Campaign began.
From the 1970s to the 1980s, the proportion increased steadily in Shanghai, 
and more than 85 per cent of women married in the middle 1980s were aged 23 or 
over. During the campaign, the proportion in Hebei jumped to around 50 per cent
2 Although the target ages at marriage varied by regions, age 23 was used in this study in 
order to facilitate the comparisons among the regions.
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in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The proportion in Shaanxi passed 10 per cent 
under the effects of the campaign, and rose to 44 per cent in 1981.
The new marriage law promulgated in 1980 had an opposite effect on the 
trend to late marriage. The trend of a decline shown in Table 5.5 for the two 
provinces seems to reflect the fact that the late-marriage norm set by official 
regulation had not yet been accepted by most of the women in the two provinces; 
substantial components of the increase in the proportion of late marriage were the 
results of pressure from the campaign and administrative regulation, and the 
pressure was released by the new marriage law. Although women had no choice 
about the minimum legal age of marriage unless they deliberately broke the law, 
they did have more choices, between getting married as soon as they reached the 
minimum legal age, and delaying the marriage until age 23, to meet the later 
marriage requirement.
5.5 A cceptance o f lega l and target m inim um  age at m arriage
A few studies have examined the non-demographic factors affecting the timing of 
marriage in China. Apart from the effect of education and urban-rural differences, 
few generalizations are available on the social-cultural factors that affect marriage 
norms and practices. The marriage decision is clearly not affected by socio­
economic factors alone; some cultural customs interact with socio-economic 
variables to exert their impact on marriage behaviour. Of particular interest is, to 
what extent do the socio-economic and particularly the cultural factors still exert 
their influence on age at marriage under the population-control campaign?
This section examines a number of factors, particularly some cultural 
factors of marriage formation, assumed to be associated with the choices of early or 
late marriage. This attempt to better understand the determinants of changing 
marriage behaviour among Chinese women is guided by the conceptual framework
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developed by the United Nations (1988). The differences in acceptance of both legal 
minimum and target minimum age at marriage are expected to be affected by 
socio-economic factors such as residence, education, occupation, and also by the 
cultural factors with which they interacted, such as marriage matching, and 
whether or not the couple was betrothed before marriage.
Logistic regression models were used to examine the effects of selected socio­
economic and cultural factors which are available in the 1985 IDFS survey data. 
As mentioned above, in China the most important factors in the radical change of 
age at marriage are the marriage laws and regulations. The first model tests the 
significant impact of those factors on the acceptance of legal minimum age at 
marriage. The model uses a dichotomous dependent variable that takes the value 1 
if a woman had accepted the minimum legal age for marriage, that is, married at 
age 18 or older, and 0 if she married before reaching age 18. The minimum age 18 
for females was set by the 1950 marriage law; however, the 1980 new marriage 
law, which took effect in 1981, increased the age limit by two years for females. 
Since most of the respondents in the sample were first married before 1981, age 18 
is taken as the standard for acceptance of the legal minimum age limit and women 
are selected whose first marriage occurred before 1981. In the second model, of all 
the respondents, those who married in 1974 or after were selected to test the 
probability of women accepting the requirement of the later marriage regulation, 
which set 23 as the minimum marriage age for females since December, 1973. 
Hence, the dependent variable takes value 1 if a woman accepted the target 
minimum age at marriage, that is, married at age 23 or older, and 0 if she married 
before age 23.
The following selected characteristics of first married women were used as 
explanatory variables: date of first marriage; whether or not a woman was
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betrothed before her first marriage; whether or not the marriage was arranged^; 
place of residence; woman's education; woman's most recent occupation; and 
interactions between those explanatory variables. Initially the model was to 
include ideal age at marriage stated by women as an explanatory variable. 
However, many women responded 'Don't know', which indicated that they had 
probably never thought about it before the interview. Hence, this variable was not 
included in the final model. Nevertheless, the cross-tabulation data show that, of 
those women whose responses were 'Don't know' or 'Not stated’ to the question of 
ideal age at marriage, 87 per cent in Shaanxi province, 76 per cent in Hebei 
province and 50 per cent in Shanghai municipality married before age 23; a 
considerable number of these were women who also married before age 18.
The proportions of women who accepted the legal minimum age stipulation 
and the target minimum age requirement on a univariate basis in each category 
are shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 present the estimated odds 
for the selected characteristics, derived from the logistic regression analysis. For 
example in Hebei province, if a woman's marriage was not arranged, the odds of 
accepting the legal minimum age at marriage are raised by a factor of 1.43 relative 
to the odds of a woman whose marriage was arranged (Table 5.8).
The empirical test of the first model (Table 5.8) reinforces the impression
gained from the univariate based Table 5.6 that the most striking contrast in the
acceptance of legal age limit occurs between the marriage cohorts, and particularly
between the 1970-80 cohorts and the previous ones. Table 5.8 shows that in the
two provinces, the odds of marriage at 18 or over for the 1970-80 cohorts are about
20 times those of women married before 1960. In Shanghai, the corresponding odds
for women married during the 1970s are extremely high, 73 times as high as for
3 In the questionnaire, persons who arranged the marriages refer to parents, siblings, 
other relatives, matchmakers and other persons. Of the persons who arranged the 
marriages, about 90 per cent in Hebei and Shaanxi and 80 per cent in Shanghai were 
parents. Hence, in the models, persons who arranged the marriages were regrouped as one 
category that included all persons who arranged the marriages.
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those women married before 1960. Indeed, the differences in the date of marriage 
also mirrored the changing socio-economic environment and particularly the 
marriage laws and regulations.
Table 5.6 Percentage of women whose first marriage occurred at age 18 or older 
by selected characteristics, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1985
Characteristic Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
Date of marriage 
Before 1959 
1960-69 
1970-80
Betrothed before marriage 
Yes 
No
Marriage type 
Arranged marriage 
Not arranged
Residence
Rural
Urban
Education 
No schooling 
Primary school 
Secondary or higher
Occupation 
Agriculture 
Non-agriculture
Total percentage
Total number of women
52.8 [13.6] 33.9
80.7 [31.2] 63.5
96.9 [55.2] 90.7
87.7 [73.5] 70.7
80.7 [26.5] 67.9
68.7 [11.1] 55.5
88.0 [88.9] 75.3
85.6 [82.1] 67.3
87.0 [17.9] 79.4
81.5 [44.0] 62.2
86.3 [38.9] 68.8
95.8 [17.1] 90.4
85.1 [87.8] 68.1
90.9 [12.2] 79.0
85.8 69.8
4142 3261
[19.8] 63.3 [12.6]
[35.4] 94.0 [31.4]
[44.8] 99.5 [56.0]
[69.8] 91.7 [32.0]
[30.2] 93.9 [68.0]
[27.5] 72.4 [7.3]
[72.5] 94.8 [92.7]
[79..2] 91.8 [50.1]
[20.8] 94.6 [49.9]
[47.4] 79.2 [13.7]
[33.4] 91.2 [34.9]
[19.2] 98.3 [51.4]
[84.1] 88.4 [22.9]
[15.9] 94.6 [77.1]
93.2
2940
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey.
Note: Selected first marriage occurred before 1981. 
Figures in brackets are sample proportions.
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Table 5.7 Percentage of women whose first marriage occurred at age 23 or older 
by selected characteristics, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1985
Characteristic Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
Date of marriage 
1974-80 49.1 [63.6] 31.6 [54.6] 77.7 [50.8]
1981-85 40.1 [36.4] 30.4 [45.4] 81.5 [49.2]
Betrothed before marriage
Yes 43.0 [82.1] 24.2 [76.0] 54.2 [27.5]
No 59.1 [17.9] 52.6 [24.0] 89.2 [72.5]
Marriage type
Arranged marriage 38.5 [4.7] 14.3 [15.4] 52.3 [1.8]
Not arranged 46.2 [95.3] 34.1 [84.6] 80.1 [98.2]
Residence
Rural 41.5 [81.5] 21.7 [75.9] 55.8 [40.3]
Urban 64.9 [18.5] 60.3 [24.1] 95.6 [59..7]
Education
No schooling 42.2 [33.5] 16.6 [29.7] 52.2 [2.8]
Primary school 48.5 [29.8] 20.5 [25.6] 68.0 [19.5]
Secondary or higher 47.0 [36.8] 46.6 [44.8] 83.5 [77.6]
Occupation
Agriculture 42.2 [85.6] 23.5 [81.4] 52.7 [14.3]
Non-agriculture 67.4 [14.4] 64.3 [18.6] 84.1 [85.7]
Total percentage 45.8 31.0 79.6
Total number of women 2576 1811 1947
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey.
Note: Selected first marriage occurred in 1974 or after. 
Figures in brackets are sample proportions.
Table 5.8 Logistic regression analysis of acceptance of legal minimum age for 
marriage, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Odds
Variables Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
Marriage cohort
Before 1959 1.00 1.00 1.00
1960-69 3.22*** 3.19*** 7.04***
1970-80 22.70*** 17.30*** 73.00***
Marriage type
Arranged marriage 1.00 1.00
Not arranged 1.43** 2.21***
Interactions
Arranged and rural n.a.
Arranged and urban n.a.
Not arranged and rural n.a.
Not arranged and urban 2.23***
Arranged and no schooling n.a. n.a.
Arranged and primary school n.a. n.a.
Arranged and secondary or higher n.a. n.a.
Not arranged and no schooling n.a. n.a.
Not arranged and primary school 1.27* 1.28*
Not arranged and secondary or higher 3.13*** 3.17***
Arranged and agriculture n.a.
Not arranged and agricultrue n.a.
Arranged and non-agriculture n.a.
Not arranged and non-agriculture 1.60*
Rural and no schooling n.a.
Rural and primary school n.a.
Rural and secondary or hinger n.a.
Urban and no schooling n.a.
Urban and primary school 1.19
Urban and secondary school or higher 3.66***
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey.
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. n.a. not applicable.
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Table 5.9 Logistic regression analysis of acceptance of target minimum age for 
marriage, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Odds
Variables
Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
Marriage cohort
1974-80 1.00 1.00
1981-85 0.63*** 0.67***
Residence
Rural 1.00 1.00 1.00
Urban 1.60*** 2.30*** 13.13***
Interactions
Arranged and no schooling n.a.
Arranged and primary school n.a.
Arranged and secondary or higher n.a.
Not arranged and no schooling n.a.
Not arranged and primary school 1.34
Not arranged and secondary or higher 2.90***
Arranged and agriculture n.a.
Not arranged and agricultrue n.a.
Arranged and non-agriculture n.a.
Not arranged and non-agriculture 1.46*
Betrothed and agriculture n.a. n.a.
Betrothed and non-agriculture n.a. n.a.
Not-betrothed and agriculture n.a. n.a.
Not-betrothed and non-agriculture 2.00* 4.63***
Betrothed and no schooling n.a.
Bethrothed and primary school n.a.
Betrothed and secondary or higher n.a.
Not betrothed and no schooling n.a.
Not betrothed and primary school 1.17
Not betrothed and secondary or higher 2.14***
Agriculture and no schooling n.a.
Agriculture and primary school n.a.
Agriculture and secondary or higher n.a.
Non-agriculture and no schooling n.a.
Non-agriculture and primary school 1.17
Non-agriculture and secondary or higher 2.16***
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey.
Note: * p<0.05, * * p<0.01, *** p<0.001. n.a. not applicable.
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However, drastic changes are to be noted in the prominent influences of 
marriage cohort factors from the outcome of the second model (Table 5.9). This 
impact of year of marriage on acceptance of late marriage disappeared in Shanghai 
municipality and it turned in a negative direction in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces 
when the 1981-85 cohorts are compared with the 1974-80 cohorts. This sudden 
change coincided with the promulgation of the 1980 new marriage law that 
invalidated the regulations set by the late-marriage campaign.
The traditional marriage norms that favoured early marriages for girls and 
the practice of adolescent marriage and arranged marriage for girls have remained, 
to some extent, in the two provinces, while there has been a considerable and 
general shift away from early marriage and parental control over marriage. 
Parental intervention in arranging marriage in the three study areas ranged from 
only 1.7 per cent to 15.4 per cent of the total first marriages between 1974 and 
1985 as against 7.3 per cent to 27.5 per cent of the total first marriages which 
occurred before 1981 (Tables 5.6 and 5.7).
The models indicate that the custom of arranged marriage is an important 
determinant of both early and late marriages. As can be seen in Tables 5.8 and 5.9, 
in Hebei and Shaanxi arranged marriage either has its main effect on the 
acceptance of the legal and target age limit or has a stronger indirect effect 
through factors such as residence, education and the type of occupation. In 
Shanghai the arranged marriage strongly affects only the acceptance of legal age of 
marriage.
Despite the government's propaganda to discourage betrothal before 
marriage and although betrothed couples cannot receive any protection from the 
marriage law, it continues to function as an important social institution and as a 
widespread custom particularly in rural China (Croll, 1981). Of all married women 
in the samples, 74.8 per cent in Hebei, 71.3 per cent in Shaanxi and 28.7 per cent
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in Shanghai were betrothed before their marriage. As can be seen in Table 5.10, 
among the women who were betrothed, the percentage distributions of age at 
betrothal in Shanghai and Hebei are quite similar with percentages increasing up 
to ages 20-22. For about 60 per cent of betrothed women the betrothal occurred at 
ages 18-22. A striking contrast is exhibited in Shaanxi province by an inverse 
pattern between percentage betrothed and age at betrothal, in which nearly 60 per 
cent of women were betrothed below age 17 and 34 per cent under age 16.
Table 5.10 Percentage distribution of age at betrothal and duration of betrothal, 
Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
Category % N % N % N
Age at betrothal
(Age)
< 16 9.9 375 33.9 988 10.9 130
16-17 18.6 709 24.4 710 19.2 229
18-19 26.6 1012 21.2 617 27.7 330
20-22 30.8 1171 16.2 472 33.5 399
23+ 14.1 535 4.3 124 8.6 102
Duration of betrothal
(Years)
0-4 95.3 3553 80.9 2355 83.0 988
5-9 5.8 220 13.9 405 15.0 178
10+ 0.8 29 5.2 151 2.0 24
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey.
Note: The number of cases in this table included only women who were 
betrothed before marriage.
The percentage distribution of duration of betrothal was highly 
concentrated within 0-4 years in the three regions, with more women betrothed 
five years or longer in Shaanxi than in Hebei. Of the betrothed women in
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Shanghai, although 17 per cent had been betrothed five years or longer, all 
betrothals occurred among only 28.7 per cent of married women in the sample. 
The above general patterns seem to suggest that betrothal during the teens is still 
prevalent in Shaanxi, the inland province, while it is less so in the coastal province 
Hebei and the metropolitan Shanghai.
The results yielded from the first model seem to show that the betrothal 
custom did not significantly affect the acceptance of legal age limits for marriage, 
largely because a considerable number of women were betrothed at age 18 or older. 
However, the custom significantly influenced the acceptance of late marriage 
(Table 5.9), although the effect of betrothal custom was mainly interacting with the 
type of occupation or education.
The crude figures in the univariate analysis (Tables 5.6 and 5.7) also 
suggest that there is a positive association between the level of education and the 
acceptance of legal minimum age at marriage or delayed marriage. The findings 
from the multivariate models confirm the results. However, education appears to 
affect the timing of marriage indirectly through the interrelations between other 
factors such as marriage matching, betrothal before marriage and residence 
difference. The fact that there is a larger proportion of women with no schooling in 
the two provinces (Tables 5.6 and 5.7) suggests that the endeavour to strengthen 
mass education and particularly to increase enrolment of girls will increase the 
women's autonomy, weaken parental control over marriage behaviour and modify 
the traditional values towards arranged and early marriage (Caldwell, 1980).
The univariate cross-tabulation data also suggest that women involved in non- 
agricultural occupations are more likely to accept the legal minimum age at 
marriage and, particularly, the late-marriage policy norm than are those women 
engaged in traditional agricultural work. The empirical testing of these two models
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also seems to stress the impact of the interrelation between occupation and other 
related factors.
The results from the second model support the expectation (United Nations, 
1988) that the more urbanized and modernized women are likely to delay marriage 
more. This is because improved economic conditions are associated with changes in 
marriage norms, changes that tend to favour later marriage. Apart from marriage 
date, current urban-rural residence is the factor with the main effect on late 
marriage in all the three study regions. The proportions of women who accepted 
late marriage norms among urban women are significantly higher than those 
among rural women in all the three regions. The difference is much more 
substantial in Shanghai, the metropolitan area with higher levels of 
modernization, than in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces. The odds for urban women in 
Shanghai are 13.1 times those for rural women.
5.6 The ob stacles to accep tan ce o f la te  m arriage
So far the discussion of the effect on early or late marriage behaviour has been 
mainly focused on available variables in the 1985 IDFS survey. In this section the 
discussion is extended to a wide range of factors, particularly including the 
appearance of new phenomena in recent years.
First, there is an increasing number of people who had married early. Of the 
4.47 million people who were married and under the legal minimum age at the 
time of the 1982 census, 2.69 million were females aged 15-19, while the 1990 
census reveals that 8.55 million people were married and younger than the legally 
stipulated age at marriage, of whom 2.76 million were females (Li, 1992: 9). 
According to the 1987 One-per-Cent Population Sample Survey, 7.35 million people 
were married and under the legal minimum age for marriage in 1987, an 
increment of 20.5 per cent from 1986, and 2.63 million of them were females; in
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1987, 35.45 million people were married and younger than the target late- 
marriage age (23 for females and 25 for males), of whom 15.72 million were 
females (Wu and Chen, 1988: 52). The 1988 Shaanxi survey that covered 100 
rural households with births outside the local plan reveals that 38 per cent of 
females or 35 per cent of couples had married before reaching the legal minimum 
ages for marriage (Wang, 1989). The first children of those couples were all births 
outside the plan, and so they were not registered. They had their second and even 
third births within short intervals. The survey detected that 72 per cent of children 
were not registered and became 'black children’, and some of them were reaching 
school age. Instances of young people cohabiting before marriage, and of premarital 
births, are common. The national figures (Li, 1992: 12) show that, from 1981 to 
1989, the average age at commencing childbearing dropped 0.84 years; the number 
of children born to married women aged 15-19 in 1989 was 3.6 times the number 
in 1981; of these, there were six times as many second births, and ten times as 
many third or higher-order births.
Secondly, one of the consequences of the decentralization of the rural 
economy has been a reinforcement of traditional patriarchal family values, a 
decline in the proportion of girls in rural schools and a higher value placed upon 
male labour and men in general (Hillier, 1988: 101). Arranged marriages and 
purchase marriages, and the practice of betrothal in the teens or even infancy are 
spreading in some areas. A survey of several counties in Shaanxi provinces by the 
Provincial Women's Association found that among some rural communities, 82.3 
per cent of the total primary school children were betrothed; and about 11.7 per 
cent of pre-school aged children were already betrothed (Wu and Chen, 1988: 52). 
Another survey of two villages in Hebei province found that 7.4 per cent of 
marriages in 1984-86 were of 'exchange brides' 4 (Wu and Chen, 1988: 52).
4 In some poor areas, if two families each have both a son and a daughter, and they 
cannot afford to pay the prices of brides for their sons to marry, then they exchange their 
daughters as brides for their sons.
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Thirdly, the attitudes of the younger generation towards sexual activity 
have changed and the restrictions and penalties for premarital sexual relations 
have been greatly relaxed since the 'Open-door' policy was adopted. Moreover, the 
improved health and nutritional status of adolescents in China have accelerated 
sexual maturity, as evidenced by a considerable decline in the age of menarche 
among girls (Wu et al. 1992: 53). The earlier physical maturation and socialization 
of the young cohorts and the influence of Western culture has resulted in an 
increasing tendency to early courtship and premarital sex relations among 
adolescents. A study of induced abortion among unmarried women in three urban 
districts and two rural counties of Shanghai municipality found that the proportion 
of induced abortions obtained by unmarried women increased considerably during 
1982-1988; of the total abortions obtained by women aged 15-19, abortions among 
unmarried women aged 18-19 accounted for 83 per cent in urban and 97 per cent in 
rural areas (Wu et al., 1992: 52). This evidence suggests that a considerable 
number of women, particularly in rural areas and even in the most advanced 
region of China, are not willing to delay sexual activities until after reaching the 
minimum marriageable age of 20. A study by Zheng, Jiang and Shen (1992) of 
1202 cases of induced abortion of unmarried women in Shanghai reveals that 40 
per cent of abortions in rural areas were because the users had not reached the 
legal marriage age and 30 per cent were because they got pregnant earlier than 
the target later marriage age permitted; the corresponding figures for urban areas 
are 19 per cent and 17 per cent. Following the early-marriage tradition, rural 
unmarried couples cohabited openly when they were betrothed, though they had 
not yet attained the legal age of marriage. However, given that the present social 
norms in Chinese society are still generally against premarital sex and 
cohabitation without wedlock, sexual desire is one of the driving forces for the 
young cohorts to marry as early as possible in order to legitimize their sexual 
relations, and this tendency obviously has a negative impact on acceptance of the 
later-marriage requirement.
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Fourthly, a massive transformation and reshaping of the economic system 
had occurred since the beginning of the reform process. The rural production 
responsibility system introduced private initiative by making the household the 
basic economic unit instead of the formal collective production team. Given the 
facts that the labour-intensive production pattern is currently a dominant pattern 
and that private capital investment in the household is limited, the amount of 
private labour investment has become a major determinant of household income. 
Moreover, the distribution of cultivated land is on the basis of the number of 
persons and the size of the household, and marriage plays an important role in the 
establishment of the household. Therefore, the need to strengthen the production 
potential of the household has certainly resulted in a stronger desire for early 
marriage and early childbearing. Peasants have been better off since the economic 
reform: they have shorter waiting periods than ever before to save enough money 
for housing, furniture and the marriage ceremony. On the other hand, the costs of 
marriage are rising steeply because of the higher inflation rates, and the fears of' 
further increases in costs push young people to marry earlier.
Fifthly, the contradictions within the administrative system created room 
for some couples' early marriage. Marriage registration is handled by civil 
administration sections. The administrators in these sections insisted that the 
marriage law was part of the new system of laws devised after the 'Cultural 
Revolution', and the law should be respected and enforceable. Hence, a couple 
should be allowed to register their marriage as long as they had reached the legal 
minimum age. However, late marriage is still required by the family planning 
program and is even encouraged by the new marriage law, although it would not 
be compelled by administrative regulations.
Sixthly, population dynamics, particularly the sharp decline in birth rates in 
the 1970s, causes a 'marriage squeeze’: a scarcity of young marriageable females 
relative to the number of slightly older young males in the population. Part of the
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upsurge of marriage in early 1980s can be explained by the fact that many of the 
men bom in 1955-1959 were caught up in a marriage squeeze because of the sharp 
drop in births during 1959-61, the famine period (Tien, 1991: 42). The 1990 Census 
shows that the deficits in the balance of females relative to males who were three 
to four years older could be as great as several million in some cohorts born during 
the 1970s (Population Census Office and SSB, 1991: 93). In current Chinese 
society, universal marriage and men marrying women who are three or four years 
younger persist as part of the traditional cultural pattern. Consequently, the 
marriage squeeze will force men to find their mates among younger female cohorts 
and even among teenagers, and this could result in early or teenage marriage.
5.7 D iscu ssion  and con clu sion
This chapter has addressed the trends and the determinants of early and late 
marriage, as well as the effects of the late-marriage campaign and the population- 
control program. The discussion laid emphasis on the gap between the preference 
for age at marriage that was reflected in the respondents' marriage behaviour and 
the stipulation of the marriage laws and regulations. Factors affecting the 
acceptance of legal and target minimum ages at marriage were explored.
Although the general trends in the proportions of early and late marriage 
are the results of the same marriage laws, policies and guidelines that were issued 
by the central government, there are regional differentials in the proportions and 
in the grand mean ages at first marriage, which are mainly attributable to the 
macro-level of socio-economic development and the extent of changes in the 
traditional culture and customs. Also the institutional efforts in the marriage 
regulations, to a large extent, operated on the base of the two former factors. The 
micro socio-economic background factors examined in this chapter suggest that 
women's individual socio-economic characteristics and marriage matching process 
can explain part of the discrepancies in age at first marriage within the regions.
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The remarkable increase in the age at marriage during the 1970s and the decline 
in the 1980s mainly reflects the radical changes in the marriage laws and the 
administrative regulations.
As regards future population trends, to simply lower fertility through 
tightening the population policy on births would not in itself be sufficient to achieve 
a reduction in population growth to the government's target levels, since the 
average family size has already dropped to close to replacement level. And nothing 
can be done to change the fact that increasing numbers of young persons will enter 
the marriage market in the coming years. In current China, particularly in rural 
areas, almost no couple uses contraception immediately after marriage, and early 
marriage usually results in early child-bearing. Hence, there would have to be a 
rise in the age at marriage in order to reduce fertility. In Chinese society, 
procreation is almost entirely within marriage, therefore, any upward or downward 
trend in age at marriage would directly influence fertility.
Is it feasible to further increase the proportion of late marriages through 
making more effort to promote late marriage and giving more economic incentives 
to encourage it and to discourage early marriage? Empirical estimation shows that 
even during the late 1970s, the period of the most vigorous family planning 
program, about half the women still married earlier than the strongly urged target 
later age for marriage, though the number of women who married below the legal 
minimum age decreased. However, the current situation is that the proportion of 
late marriages has been substantially decreasing; it dropped more than 20 
percentage points in Hebei and more than 10 percentage points in Shaanxi by the 
year 1985, while it has stabilized at a high level in Shanghai municipality. 
Furthermore, according to the China 1985 IDFS survey, there were still about 15 
per cent of married women in Hebei and more than 20 per cent in Shaanxi who had 
married before age 20, the legal minimum age limit.
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The empirical study in this chapter seems to signal both that the socio­
economic conditions in the peasant-dominated regions have not yet developed to 
the stage when most women would willingly accept the late marriage requirement, 
and also that the rapid decentralization of both the administrative system and the 
economic system has greatly weakened the efforts of the programs that operated 
successfully in the previous highly centralized system. The contradiction between 
the legal minimum marriageable ages and the target marriageable ages created 
more difficulties for family planning workers in promoting the late marriage 
stipulation. The 1980 new marriage law superseded the marriage age regulations 
of the 1970s and diminished the incentive and disincentive measures enforced over 
that period. In the long term, a further increase in age at marriage could result 
from fundamental changes in socio-economic circumstances and a departure from 
the deeply rooted traditional cultural patterns.
However, in the current situation, as depicted in the multivariate empirical 
test, the traditional culture and customs still significantly affect people's marriage 
behaviour, though they interacted with other socio-economic factors. The 
elimination of the practice of arranged marriage has been identified as one of the 
most difficult tasks of social and cultural reform in China (Croll, 1981), particularly 
in those inland and less developed regions such as Shaanxi province.
The current pressing solutions are to further increase the acceptance of 
contraceptive practices among newlyweds (Tien, 1992); and to increase the first 
birth interval that has shortened since the rapid fertility decline, since the effect of 
delayed marriage on fertility was more or less offset by the shortened first birth 
interval (Ye, 1992). In the meantime, it is necessary to improve the quality and 
variety of contraceptive methods, particularly in rural areas. The most popular 
available means of contraception are IUD and sterilization in rural areas, and 
almost no couples use contraception before the first birth. Therefore, to encourage
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couples to use the pill or condom before their first birth is a challenge for the family 
planning program in terms of knowledge, education and better supply of services.
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C hapter 6 P references for fam ily size and th e sex  o f  
ch ildren
6.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the preferences for family size and the sex of children, and 
the desire to stop childbearing among women in the three regions. The analysis 
directly links fertility preferences with current fertility, and particularly 
emphasizes the relevance of the population policy and the family planning 
program. This is accomplished by comparing the number of children desired with 
the number already born on an aggregate level. Although the data do not permit 
profound understanding of the origins of the preferences, possible reasons for the 
stated desire for a given family size and the sex of children are suggested, and the 
implications of the gap between desired and current fertility are discussed with, 
special reference to the unique situation in China. Three preference variables were 
used in this chapter: (1) desired family size, (2) whether additional children are 
wanted, and (3) preferred sex of the next child.
6.2 Basic preference variables for family size 
6.2.1 Desired family size
The first preference variable is based on the responses to the question: 'If the 
present government population policy had not existed, how many children would 
you personally like to have, in your whole life?' All the respondents in the three 
provincial areas gave numerical answers except for two women in Shaanxi who did 
not answer this question, so these two women were excluded from the analysis. 
Throughout the analysis, respondents who reported wanting more than five 
children were recoded as wanting five, in order to avoid small numbers of cases in
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the cells of cross-tabulations. Number of living children and age of mother were 
the main demographic controls in this analysis. Other demographic variables, such 
as age at first marriage and the duration of the marriage, are not introduced in 
this chapter, since these factors are closely associated with both current age and 
the number of living children, and tend to show the same relationship with desired 
family size.
Measuring desired family size has been a politically sensitive topic and a 
special challenge in Chinese fertility surveys, because the respondents were under 
the pressure of the government's strict population policy. Hermalin and Liu (1990) 
ascertained that in the China 1985 In-Depth Fertility Survey (IDFS), the reported 
desired family size among women in Shanghai, from responses to a direct question 
about number of children desired, was generally biased downward; and 
particularly less educated, higher-fertility women were more likely to underreport 
the number of children they ultimately wanted in face-to-face interviews (Hermalin 
and Liu, 1990: 352). From a study of women's desired family size in Shifang 
county, Sichuan province, China, it was estimated that the number of children 
'truly' desired was on average half a child greater than the number reported; 
however, larger proportions of urban, educated, and younger women hid their real 
aspirations and reported one child as their desired number of children (Wang, 
1990).
Some other limitations of this preference variable should be noted: first, the 
data set referred to only one point in the life cycle of women, although there were 
questions on the desired number of children both at the time of marriage and at 
the time of the survey. The data referring to the preference at the time of 
marriage were collected using the retrospective method, and thus are subject to the 
problems of response errors. Hence, only the preference at the time of the survey 
was used in this analysis. Secondly, the data for fertility preference related to 
women only; however, husbands and wives may have different preferences, and
158
these differences may have im portant im plications for the trend  in the level of 
fertility (United Nations, 1987: 51). Thirdly, the d a ta  provided only a conventional 
single-valued statem ent of num ber of children w anted and no paired choice 
questions*. Finally, the questions mixed up size and sex preferences.* 2 In spite of 
these deficiencies, im portant information on the preferences of respondents can 
still be obtained from the question on desired family size (UN, 1987: 52). The data 
lim itations mentioned above, however, are not unique to China except for the 
influence of the population policy; they were also found in the World Fertility 
Survey and some other fertility preference surveys. In view of all these 
considerations, the data  analysis and in terpreta tions were approached with 
caution.
6.2.2 D esire  for m ore ch ild ren
The second preference variable is derived from the query to currently married,
fecund women. The respondents were asked: 'Do you w ant to have another child
some time, in addition to the one you are expecting (to pregnant women)?' Women
who themselves or whose husbands had been sterilized for contraceptive purposes
were also asked, but, irrespective of their answ ers, they were categorized as
w anting no more. Self-reported infecund women were excluded from the analysis.
A small minority of women (about two per cent in Shanghai and three per cent in
Hebei and Shaanxi provinces) gave 'undecided' responses. The present analysis
followed previous practice (Lightboume, 1984) and treated  women who were
undecided as w anting more children. Lightbourne (1984: 10) mentioned the usual
* Coombs (1974, 1979) argued that the underlying preferences are not entirely reflected in 
single answers to questions on number of children desired. She suggested a technique of 
measurement to investigate preference for number of children, which is a series of paired 
comparisons ranking successive sets of alternative numbers of children. However, very few 
applications of this technique have been made.
2 The question in the IDFS survey asked only the number of children wanted, which did 
not specifically refer to desired sex composition of children. However, the reported 
preference for the number of children was strongly influenced by the existing sex 
compositions of the family. Women with undesirable sex compositions of living children 
were more likely to continue childbearing and thus wanted more children than women 
with desirable sex structures of their families.
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justification that the percentage using contraception among the ’undecided’ is 
much closer to the proportion among women who want more than among women 
who want no more. The result in Table 6.1 verifies the justification. The 
percentages of women using contraception in the categories of 'undecided' are not 
only closer to, but also lower (substantially so in the two provinces) than the 
percentages among women wanting more children. In the case of China, the reason 
for some of the women to give an 'undecided' answer might be the psychological 
pressure of the population policy, which caused some reluctance to report a wish to 
continue childbearing. It should be noted that the current preference is correlated 
with earlier preferences: if a women decided at an earlier point that she wanted no 
more children, then the current response is only a lagged reading of the earlier 
decision (Pullum, 1980: 13).
Table 6.1 Percentages currently using contraception by desire for additional 
children, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Desire for additional children Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
Want more children 54.5 41.8 71.8
Undecided 44.5 27.6 68.1
Want no more 88.6 88.2 88.1
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
6.3 In ternal con sisten cy  b etw een  desired  fam ily size and desire  
for ad d ition al ch ildren
A comparison of the two preference variables provides an indication of their degree 
of consistency. Table 6.2 compares responses to the question on desire for more 
children with a constructed variable which shows whether desired family size is 
less than, equal to, or greater than actual family size. As demonstrated in Table
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6.2, a great majority ( 98 per cent in Hebei and Shanghai, 95 per cent in Shaanxi ) 
of women who wanted more children also reported a desired family size in excess of 
actual. Almost no women who wanted more children stated a desired family size 
less than their number of living children. However, two to five per cent of those 
who want more children reported desired family size equalling the actual number 
of living children. This inconsistent response may be partly due to the question in 
which a current pregnancy is also counted as a living child. Although pregnant 
women were asked 'Do you want to have another child some time, in addition to 
the one you are expecting?’, some of them may have still been confused and not 
counted the current pregnancy as a living child.
However, of those who stated they wanted no more children, a substantial 
proportion reported a desired family size greater than the actual number of living 
children. The proportion is more than a quarter in Shanghai, which is considerably 
higher than the proportions in Hebei and Shaanxi, 15.3 per cent and 15.6 per cent 
(see Table 6.2). However, this type of 'inconsistency' between desired family size 
and desire for additional births is not confined to China, and has occurred in other 
developing countries (Lightboume, 1984: 12). Possibly some respondents
interpreted the question on desired family size as ideal family size, rather than the 
family size at which they wanted to stop childbearing. Many social, economic and 
physical constraints may prevent women from reaching their ideal family size. It is 
also possible that this 'inconsistency' reflects the women's wishes to delay the next 
birth rather than to stop childbearing entirely (Lightbourne, 1984:13).
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Table 6.2 Percentages of fecund women by whether more children wanted, by 
whether desired family size is less than, equal to, or greater than actual family size 
according to number of living children, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1985
More wanted No more wanted
Number Desired Desired Desired Number Desired Desired Desired Number
of living < = > of < = > of
children actual actual actual women actual actual actual women
Hebei province
1 0.8 99.2 1001 44.7 55.3 235
2 11.5 88.5 104 1.6 78.3 20.1 1341
3 100.0 8 21.3 67.1 11.5 970
4 33.3 66.7 3 28.5 68.2 3.3 547
5+ 44.9 55.1 354
Total 1.9 98.1 1116 15.8 68.9 15.3 3447
Shaanxi province
1 0.3 99.7 664 39.0 61.0 141
2 13.4 86.6 202 1.3 74.5 24.2 756
3 2.0 18.4 79.6 49 38.7 45.8 15.5 755
4 33.3 66.7 6 62.5 34.2 3.3 549
5+ 100.0 2 83.8 16.2 389
Total 0.1 4.6 95.3 923 37.5 46.9 15.6 2590
Shanghai municipality
1 2.3 97.7 606 0.1 48.2 51.7 1585
2 20.0 80.0 5 8.2 85.8 6.0 1105
3 66.2 31.2 2.6 385
4 84.9 15.1 86
5+ 88.9 11.1 9
Total 2.5 97.5 611 13.5 58.2 28.3 3170
Source : China 1985 IDFS data tape.
Note: A current pregnancy is counted as a living child.
In the unique situation of China, the major constraint is the pressure 
exerted by the population policy and the family planning program. The sharp 
distinction in the responses between women with one child and women who have 
had more than one child is shown in Table 6.2. Of women who had only one child,
162
more than half in Hebei and Shanghai and 61 per cent in Shaanxi stated they 
wanted no more children, but their desired family sizes were greater than one 
child. For two-child families, these proportions decrease to 20 per cent in Hebei and 
24 per cent in Shaanxi. In Shanghai the picture is clearly influenced by the one- 
child family margin. Probably, this type of response is a normative answer to the 
interviewer, since women thought they should not have more than one or two 
children according to the population policy, though they desired more than one or 
two children. This suggests the unpopularity of the one child policy and potential 
conflicts between the one child norm and women's real aspirations for children, 
with a desire for at least two children.
Logically, the proportion of women whose actual number of children is equal 
to or greater than their desired number should be the same as the proportion of 
women who want no more children. Table 6.3 compares the responses to the 
preference for additional births with the constructed variable at an aggregate level. 
Figures of the constructed variable in columns 2 to 6 are based on responses to the 
question on desired family size, in which the respondents were asked to assume 
that the government population policy did not exist. However, figures in column 7 
are the responses to the question on wanting additional children, under the current 
circumstances. A higher degree of consistency between columns 6 and 7 was shown 
among women with four and more children in the two provinces, and among 
women with two or more children in Shanghai. The lowest degrees of consistency 
were shown among women with only one child in Shanghai and among women 
with two children in the two peasant-dominated provinces. As mentioned above, 
this probably does not simply reflect the problems of validity and reliability of the 
data, but the effect of the strong population policy that allows only one child per 
couple in urban areas and up to two children under certain conditions in rural 
areas. This pattern of 'inconsistency' suggests that if the government relaxed the 
limits on family size, more than 60 per cent (=100-35.5) of one-child families in
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Shanghai would probably go on to have the second child assuming that there are 
no other socio-economic or biological restraints, compared with 28 per cent (=100- 
72.3) who stated that they wanted more; similarly, in Hebei and Shaanxi an 
overwhelming majority of women would have a second child, and 25 per cent in 
Hebei and 37 per cent in Shaanxi would have a third child compared with 7 per 
cent and 21 per cent who stated that they wanted more. A sizable number of 
women in the two provinces would even try for a fourth child (12 per cent and 19 
per cent, respectively).
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Table 6.3 Proportion of women whose desired family size is less than, equal to, or 
greater than actual family size according to number of living children, Hebei and 
Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Number Desired Desired Desired Number Sum
of living < = > of of Wanting
children actual actual actual women [2]&[3] no more
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Hebei province 
1 9.1 90.9 1236 9.1 19.0
2 1.5 73.5 25.0 1445 75.0 92.8
3 21.2 66.6 12.3 978 87.8 99.2
4 28.4 68.0 3.6 550 96.4 99.5
5+ 44.9 55.1 354 100.0 100.0
Total 11.9 52.5 35.6 4563 64.4 75.5
Shaanxi province 
1 7.1 92.9 805 7.1 17.5
2 1.0 61.6 37.4 958 62.6 78.9
3 36.4 44.2 19.4 804 80.6 93.9
4 61.8 34.2 4.0 555 96.0 98.9
5+ 83.4 16.6 391 100.0 99.5
Total 27.7 35.8 36.5 3513 63.5 73.7
Shanghai municipality 
1 0.0 35.5 64.4 2191 35.5 72.3
2 8.2 85.5 6.3 1110 93.7 99.5
3 66.2 31.2 2.6 385 97.4 100.0
4 84.9 15.1 86 100.0 100.0
5+ 88.9 11.1 9 100.0 100.0
Total 11.8 49.5 38.7 3781 61.3 83.8
Source : China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: A current pregnancy is counted as a living child, and infecund 
women were excluded.
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6.4 Mean desired family size
Since the 1985 IDFS survey did not ask women whether the last child was wanted, 
the synthetic cohort estimates of mean desired family size are not introduced in 
this analysis. The conventional average numbers of children desired, if the present 
government population policy did not exist, were 2.64 for Hebei, 2.67 for Shaanxi 
and 1.82 for Shanghai.
Comparison of the three regions with other Asian and Oceanic countries 
shows that China has a unique pattern of distribution of desired family size (UN, 
1987: 53). More than 50 per cent of currently married women in Hebei and 
Shaanxi, and nearly 70 per cent in Shanghai preferred a two-child family; 91 per 
cent in Hebei and 94 per cent in Shaanxi reported a desired family size range from 
two to four (Table 6.4). In no other country in the World Fertility Survey were 
responses concentrated in such a narrow span; the country with the next narrowest 
range was Republic of Korea, where 85 per cent wanted between two and four 
children (UN, 1987:52-53).
The percentage distribution of women by number of children wanted, 
presented in Table 6.4, indicates that an overwhelming majority of women wanted 
at least two children. Almost no women (0.1 per cent) preferred to remain childless 
in any of the three regions, and only three to four per cent of women in Hebei and 
Shaanxi provinces wished to have only one child, while in Shanghai 25 per cent of 
women claimed to prefer one child.
In the analysis of mean desired family size the standardized means, which 
were adjusted for demographic variables, were produced by multivariate 
regression, following the methodology of Little and Perera (1981) and Lightbourne 
(1984). The approach is identical to multiple classification analysis (MCA), except 
that the adjusted mean for each level in the categories is obtained by adding the 
grand mean to the deviation for that particular level, rather than showing the
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deviations from the grand mean in the conventional MCA table. The demographic 
variables adjusted are number of living children (LC), LC-squared, age and age- 
squared. Squared terms were applied to deal with curvilinearities (Lightbourne, 
1984: 14).
Table 6.4 Number of children desired by number of living children, Hebei and 
Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Number of 
living childrer 0 1
Number of children desired 
2 3 4 5+ Total
Hebei province
0 1 45 271 31 11 1 360
1 115 908 176 26 1 1226
2 23 1088 297 68 4 1480
3 1 9 205 670 120 6 1011
4 1 3 112 50 384 23 573
5+ 5 72 48 55 205 385
Total 3 200 2656 1272 664 240 5035
% 0.1 4.0 52.8 25.3 13.2 4.8 100
Shaanxi province
0 1 30 224 61 20 1 337
1 56 550 146 49 7 808
2 1 9 600 301 87 9 1007
3 1 13 292 367 150 17 840
4 3 253 108 201 23 588
5+ 5 138 110 111 71 435
Total 3 116 2057 1093 618 128 4015
% 0.1 2.9 51.2 27.2 15.4 3.2 100
Shanghai municipality
0 2 142 181 1 326
1 1 751 1366 8 1 2127
2 1 94 973 65 4 1 1138
3 27 234 121 10 1 393
4 2 61 15 16 94
5+ 4 4 1 9
Total 4 1016 2819 214 30 4 4087
% 0.1 24.9 69.0 5.2 0.7 0.1 100
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: A current pregnancy is not counted as a living child.
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Empirical studies have found that number of living children is far more 
strongly correlated with desired family size than are any other demographic or 
socio-economic variables; and that three main factors, namely, modernization, 
rationalization, and underreporting, may explain most of the strong correlation 
(Knodel and Prachuabmoh, 1973; Pullum, 1980; Lightbourne and Macdonald, 
1982; lightbourne, 1984).
First, it is hypothesized that younger women have genuinely lower desired 
family size and that they implement this preference in response to social and 
economic changes; this is called the 'modernization effect' (Lightbourne, 1984: 24). 
However, Table 6.5 shows that there was no tendency for younger women to state 
a lower desired family size once number of living children was controlled for. For 
instance, women aged 15-19 or 20-24 in the three areas had adjusted means of 
desired family size even slightly higher than those of the older women 
(disregarding the sole woman in the age group 15-19 in Shanghai). However, Table 
6.6 indicates a large effect of the number of living children and this remains even 
after adjusting for age. On the basis of these findings, it appears that number of 
living children was the dominant factor affecting desired family size. At least these 
data do not support the modernization hypothesis, although this does not totally 
reject the hypothesis, because, to some extent, the number of living children 
reflects choice. The result is consistent with the previous investigations from cross- 
sectional data for other developing countries (Lightbourne and Macdonald, 1982; 
Lightbourne, 1984).
Table 6.5 Mean number of children desired by age of women, standardized for 
number of living children, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1985
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Hebei province Shaanxi province Shanghai m unicipality
Age
Unadj.
m ean
Adj.
m ean
N Unacy.
m ean
Adj.
mean
N Unadj.
m ean
Adj.
mean
N
15-19 2.33 3.13 37 2.41 3.08 49 100* 1.35* 1
20-24 2.16 2.85 535 2.42 2.93 551 1.62 1.83 179
25-29 2.22 2.65 1144 2.44 2.71 848 1.66 1.82 1026
30-34 2.45 2.58 1271 2.59 2.65 851 1.72 1.80 1043
35-39 2.80 2.61 903 2.86 2.66 673 1.85 1.81 813
40-44 3.29 2.68 597 2.94 2.55 572 2.05 1.87 539
45-49 3.46 2.53 548 2.95 2.44 471 2.12 1.82 486
15-49 2.64 2.64 5035 2.67 2.67 4015 1.82 1.82 4087
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey da ta  tape.
Note: S tandardization by regression for num ber ofliving children and num ber ofliving children squared. 
A curren t pregnancy is  not counted as a living child.
* N um ber is  too sm all to calculate a mean.
Table 6.6 Mean number of children desired by number ofliving children, 
standardized for age, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, 
China, 1985
Hebei province Shaanxi province Shanghai m unicipality
N um ber ------------------------------------  -------------------------------------  ----------------------------------
of living 
children
Unadj.
m ean
Adj.
m ean
N Unadj.
mean
Adj.
mean
N Unadj.
m ean
Adj.
mean
N
0 2.03 1.91 360 2.23 2.01 337 1.55 1.54 326
1 2.10 2.03 1226 2.26 2.11 808 1.65 1.65 2127
2 2.29 2.29 1480 2.49 2.46 1007 1.98 1.99 1138
3 2.91 2.95 1011 2.85 2.92 840 2.30 2.31 393
4 3.55 3.62 573 3.01 3.16 588 2.48 2.49 94
5+ 4.22 4.30 385 3.37 3.55 435 2.78 2.79 9
0-5+ 2.64 2.64 5035 2.67 2.67 4015 1.82 1.82 4087
Source: China 1985 IDFS d a ta  tape.
Note: S tandardization by regression for age and age squared. 
A curren t pregnancy is not counted as a living child.
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The second factor is rationalization. In response to the question on desired 
family size some women reported their current number of living children as their 
desired family size, in order to avoid the implication that some of their children 
were unwanted. Such upward revisions in stated desired family size are called 
v rationalization.'
Table 6.4 presents the desired family size by number of living children. 
Quite a few cases occurred below the main diagonal cells, especially among women 
with three or more living children. This pattern is more clearly visible in column 2 
of Table 6.3, which shows by parity the total proportion of women whose desired 
family size was less than their actual family size. A striking contrast between 
women with two or less and three or more children suggests that sizable numbers 
of women stated desired family size less than their number of living children, in 
response to the government’s strong population policy aimed at eliminating high 
order births. This tendency also indicates that those women did not revise their 
desired family size upward to correspond with their number of living children. 
Nevertheless, it is also possible that some women with large families genuinely 
would have liked fewer children.
However, it is also observed that the main diagonal cells in Table 6.4 
contain a considerable number of women. This mainly occurred in Hebei province 
at parities two and above, and in Shaanxi province at parities two to four. This 
pattern suggests that to a certain extent women with two or more children in these 
two provinces were satisfied with the current family size. Therefore, it indicates 
that those women had rationalized or implemented their preference for family size.
The third factor identified is that childless women and those with one or two 
children tend to systematically underestimate the number of children they will 
ultimately desire (Lightbourne and MacDonald 1982). This effect was investigated 
in a way suggested by Lightbourne ( 1984: 26), that is cross-tabulating desired
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family size by number of living children (Table 6.4), then by cumulating the 
frequencies to obtain the proportion desiring more than j children at each parity 
(Table 6.7). The analysis focuses on cumulations in each column of Table 6.7 that 
occur above the main diagonal. This allows us to see the degree to which low-parity 
women tend to underestimate the number of children they will ultimately want 
without any impact from rationalization or implementation, since attention is 
confined to women who have not yet achieved desired family size.
In the two peasant-dominated provinces, Table 6.7 reveals that beginning 
with women wanting three or more children the proportions wanting j  or more 
children increase with each rise in the number of living children. For instance, in 
Hebei the proportion wanting three or more children increases markedly from 17 
per cent at parity 1, to 25 per cent at parity 2; a steeper jump, from 25 per cent at 
parity 1 to 39 per cent at parity 2, is observed in Shaanxi province. The same trend 
starts at women wanting two or more children in Shanghai municipality.
The above examination leads to the conclusion that there was a general 
tendency for women with one or two children in these three regions to understate 
the number of children they ultimately wanted. This is an important factor in 
explaining the increases in desired family size with an increase in actual family 
size. This factor also implies the strong influence of the population policy which 
does not allow rural peasants to have more than two children or urban residents to 
have more than one child. As was evident in Table 6.7, a substantial proportion of 
women with one or two children in the two provinces avoided stating a desire for 
three or more children.
Since the underreporting was not random and seems to have followed no 
particular pattern across socio-economic subgroups, no multivariate analysis of 
socio-economic determinants in desired family size is presented in this chapter. 
However, preliminary analysis showed that mean desired family size is higher
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among women with social-economic characteristics associated with higher current 
fertility.
Table 6.7 Cumulated desired family size distribution, Hebei and Shaanxi 
provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Number of 
living childrer
Cumulative distribution: percentages desiring 
0 or 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or
more more more more more
5 or 
more
Total
women
Hebei province
0 100.0 [ 99.7 87.2 11.9 3.3 0.3 360
1 100.0 100.0 90.6 16.6 2.2 0.1 1226
2 100.0 100.0 98.4 24.9 4.9 0.3 1480
3 100.0 99.9 99.0 78.7 12.5 0.6 1011
4 100.0 99.8 99.3 79.8 71.0 4.0 573
5+ 100.0 100.0 98.7 80.0 67.5 53.2 385
0-5+ 100.0 99.9 96.0 43.2 18.0 4.8 5035
Shaanxi province
0 100.0 99.7 90.8 24.3 6.2 0.3 337
1 100.0 100.0 93.1 25.0 6.9 0.9 808
2 100.0 99.9 99.0 39.4 9.5 0.9 1007
3 100.0 99.9 98.3 63.6 19.9 2.0 840
4 100.0 100.0 99.5 56.5 38.1 3.9 588
5+ 100.0 100.0 98.9 67.1 41.8 16.3 435
0-5+ 100.0
Shanghai municipality
99.9 97.0 45.8 18.6 3.2 4015
0 100.0 | 99.4 55.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 326
1 100.0 100.0 64.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 2127
2 100.0 99.9 91.7 6.2 0.4 0.1 1138
3 100.0 100.0 93.1 33.6 2.8 0.3 393
4 100.0 100.0 97.9 33.0 17.0 0.0 94
5+ 100.0 100.0 100.0 55.6 11.1 11.1 9
0-5+ 100.0 99.9 75.0 6.1 0.8 0.1 4087
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: A current pregnancy is not counted as a living child.
172
6.5 The gap b etw een  actual and d esired  fertility
In order to estimate the extent of excess or deficit fertility, Table 6.8 offers a 
comparison by age between mean number of children living and mean number of 
children desired. All three regions reported deficit fertility in terms of the overall 
means. The deficits mainly came from women under age 35 in the two provinces 
and under 40 in Shanghai municipality, while the excess fertility was concentrated 
among those women who were at the end of their childbearing years. The 
implication of deficit fertility is notable, especially among those women aged 25 to 
34 who have had more than one or two children, considering the underreporting of 
desired family size among women at low parities. It is also noteworthy that of 
women aged 20 to 39 in Hebei and Shanghai and women aged 20 to 34 in Shaanxi, 
the deficit fertility was higher for urban than for rural women. This suggests that 
urban women were exposed to more stringent birth control policy and more 
vigorous family planning program than rural women.
An examination of the variations in excess births by age and parity through 
standardization clearly indicates that actual number of living children is the 
dominant factor that affects the extent of excess births in relation to the 
unadjusted figures. The excess births were estimated by contrasting the actual 
number of living children with desired family size. But as can be seen in the left 
side of Table 6.9, when the cells with fewer than 20 cases are disregarded, age 
makes little difference to the proportion of women who have had excess births in 
Shanghai municipality and Hebei province (except for women aged 45-49 years), 
once the number of living children is controlled for. In Shaanxi province there was 
a tendency of increasing excess births as women get older, which may imply that 
more older women than younger women in this province reported at least one 
excess living child or pregnancy.
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Table 6.8 Mean number of living children and mean number of children desired 
by age and by residence, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, 
China, 1985
Total women U rban women Rural women
Age
Mean
living
children
Mean
desired
children Difference
Mean
living
children
Mean
desired
children Difference
Mean
living
children
Mean
desired
children Difference
Hebei province
15-19 0.30 2.32 -2.02 0.00 1.00 -1.00 0.30 2.36 -2.06
20-24 0.67 2.16 -1.49 0.54 2.08 -1.54 0.70 2.18 -1.48
25-29 1.40 2.22 -0.82 1.14 2.03 -0.89 1.46 2.26 -0.80
30-34 2.14 2.45 -0.31 1.74 2.20 -0.46 2.23 2.51 -0.28
35-39 2.81 2.80 0.01 2.44 2.48 -0.04 2.89 2.87 0.02
40-44 3.57 3.29 0.28 3.19 2.96 0.23 3.66 3.36 0.30
45-49 4.09 3.46 0.63 3.87 2.91 0.96 4.17 3.66 0.51
15-49 2.30 2.64 -0.34 2.13 2.40 -0.27 2.34 2.69 -0.35
Shaanxi province
15-19 0.29 2.41 -2.12 0.00 1.75 -1.75 0.31 2.47 -2.16
20-24 0.79 2.42 -1.63 0.54 2.08 -1.54 0.83 2.47 -1.64
25-29 1.59 2.44 -0.85 1.18 2.10 -0.92 1.74 2.56 -0.82
30-34 2.30 2.59 -0.29 1.77 2.19 -0.42 2.44 2.69 -0.25
35-39 3.18 2.85 0.33 2.65 2.41 0.24 3.29 2.94 0.35
40-44 3.81 2.93 0.88 3.37 2.51 0.86 3.95 3.06 0.89
45-49 4.28 2.95 1.33 3.80 2.24 1.56 4.48 3.25 1.23
15-49 2.51 2.67 -0.16 2.18 2.24 -0.06 2.61 2.78 -0.17
Shanghai m unicipality
15-19 0.00 1.00 -1.00 — __ 0.00 1.00 -1.00
20-24 0.67 1.63 -0.96 0.39 1.45 -1.06 0.73 1.66 -0.93
25-29 0.88 1.67 -0.79 0.76 1.58 -0.82 1.05 1.79 -0.74
30-34 1.20 1.72 -0.52 0.96 1.61 -0.65 1.53 1.88 -0.35
35-39 1.62 1.85 -0.23 1.32 1.72 -0.40 2.00 2.01 -0.01
40-44 2.15 2.06 0.09 1.89 1.91 -0.02 2.49 2.25 0.24
45-49 2.57 2.12 0.45 2.43 2.02 0.41 2.78 2.28 0.50
15-49 1.47 1.82 -0.35 1.28 1.71 -0.43 1.71 1.96 -0.25
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey da ta  tape.
Note: A curren t pregnancy is not counted as a living child.
Table 6.9 Percentages with excess birth or current pregnancy by age, 
standardized for number of living children, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and 
Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
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Age
Ever had excess 
birth or pregnancy 
Unadj. Adj. N
Recent excess 
birth or pregnancy 
(5-years before survey) 
Unadj. Adj. N
Hebei province 
15-19 0 15 14 0* 7* 14
20-24 0 13 377 0 6 375
25-29 2 12 1095 2 5 989
30-34 7 10 1253 9 6 692
35-39 15 11 889 19 8 206
40-44 23 11 589 36 22 33
45-49 36 18 539 40* 9* 5
15-49 12 12 4756 6 6 2314
Shaanxi province 
15-19 0 32 18 0 11 18
20-24 0 28 408 0 9 405
25-29 4 22 809 4 8 733
30-34 16 23 842 19 13 368
35-39 38 28 657 41 17 95
40-44 59 38 560 73 26 26
45-49 66 38 466 46* 7* 13
15-49 28 28 3760 10 10 1658
Shanghai municipality 
15-19
20-24 0 12 146 0 1 146
25-29 0 12 933 1 1 871
30-34 2 10 1008 1 1 503
35-39 10 10 789 2 2 66
40-44 24 10 523 25* 24* 4
45-49
15-49
42
11
13
11
471
3870 1 1 1590
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: Standardization by regression for number of living children and 
number of living children squared.
A current pregnancy is counted as a living child.
* Number is too small to calculate a mean.
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When the proportions with excess births were classified by number of living 
children and the age effect was removed (Table 6.10), a pronounced correlation was 
found between the proportion of excess births and the number of living children in 
Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, and the same relationship was also observed in 
Shanghai municipality. This occurs with both adjusted and unadjusted figures. 
Marked jumps occurred in the proportions of excess fertility between two-child 
families and three-child families in all the three regions, which mirrored the 
critical point of the effect of population policy.
The right sides of Tables 6.9 and 6.10 show that excess fertility has been 
greatly reduced since the early 1980s in the two provinces and was negligible in 
Shanghai municipality. In other words, to some extent, the excess births occurred 
before the implementation of the one-child policy. Tables 6.9 and 6.10 indicate that 
there was a small excess of births in Shanghai five years before the survey, and 
that there was less than one-half the percentage of excess births in Shaanxi, and 
about one-half the excess births in Hebei in the last five years compared with the 
total. This suggests that the existence of excess births does not necessarily mean 
women did not want some of their children at the time they had them; they may 
have wanted them when the children were born, but the social norms about 
desired family size are shifting downward as a result of dramatically declining 
fertility and the strong impact of the population policy. Probably the desired family 
sizes stated by women with three or more children were adjusted to levels closer to 
the social norms. However, it also suggests that the very high level of contraceptive 
practice among those women had reduced their unwanted births since the early
1980s.
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Table 6.10 Percentages with excess birth or current pregnancy by number of 
living children, standardized for age, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1985
Recent excess
Ever had excess birth or pregnancy
Number birth or pregnancy (5 years before survey)
of living -------------------------------------  ---------------------------------
children Unadj. Adj. N Unadj. Adj. N
Hebei province
1 0 0 1258 0 0 1014
2 1 2 1524 2 2 808
3 21 21 1012 23 23 324
4 29 28 577 28 27 129
5+ 46 44 385 33 32 39
1-5+ 12 12 4756 6 6 2314
Shaanxi province
1 0 4 827 0 1 672
2 1 3 1055 1 0 579
3 36 35 852 28 28 255
4 62 59 591 49 47 91
5+ 84 78 435 72 72 61
1-5+ 28 28 3760 10 10 1658
Shanghai
1 0 0 2235 1 1 1447
2 8 8 1139 4 4 140
3 65 65 393 100* 100* 3
4 83 83 94
5+ 88 89 9
1-5+ 11 11 3870 1 1 1590
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: Standardization by regression for age and age squared. 
A current pregnancy is counted as a living child.
*Number is too small to calculate a mean.
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6.6 Proportion of women who want another child
Unlike the question on desired family size, in which the respondents are asked to 
disregard the government population policy, the question on the desire for 
additional children is answered by the respondents in the context of the current 
situation. To some extent, psychological pressure from the population policy 
discouraged the women from stating their real demand for additional children. 
Nevertheless, the responses on this question are not invalid as a means of 
exploring the gap between the national population target and the individual desire.
Table 6.11 shows that age 30 seems to be the turning point at which a 
marked decline in the proportion of women wanting additional children occurred, 
once the number of living children is controlled. Of women aged 20 to 29 years in 
the two provinces, about 40 to 58 per cent wanted another child, while the 
proportion is about 30 per cent in Shanghai. For women beyond age 30, the 
proportion wanting more children seems to be constant at around 20 per cent in 
the two provinces, and to be under 20 with moderate decline in Shanghai. This 
pattern differs from the results on mean desired family size, in which there is no 
consistent age pattern once the effect of living children is removed (Table 6.5). 
Several reasons have been suggested (UN, 1987: 61) to explain this pattern of 
higher proportions of older women wanting no more children once the number of 
living children is controlled: first, women aged 30 or above who still have only two 
children may have wanted only two, while younger women with only two children 
may want more but have not yet had time to achieve their desired number of 
children; secondly, older women may want to avoid births once their children get 
married and bear children themselves; thirdly, older women who have fewer 
children than others are more likely to be aware of the costs of childbearing, even if 
they have not achieved their desired family size. In the case of these three regions 
of China, the substantial drop in the proportion wanting more children among
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women aged 30 or above is probably because most of them have already had one or 
two children, and have reached the limit set by the population policy.
Table 6.11 Percentages wanting more children by age of fecund women, 
standardized for number of living children, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and 
Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Hebei province Shaanxi province Shanghai municipality
Age
Una^j.
mean
Adj.
mean
N Unacy.
mean
Adj.
mean
N Unacy.
mean
Adj.
mean
N
15-19 0.94 0.43 37 0.96 0.53 49 1.00* 0.55* 1
20-24 0.85 0.50 527 0.87 0.58 529 0.47 0.34 177
25-29 0.56 0.41 1088 0.51 0.40 797 0.38 0.28 1003
30-34 0.17 0.20 1238 0.22 0.24 799 0.21 0.18 1038
35-39 0.05 0.19 887 0.08 0.20 649 0.09 0.13 804
40-44 0.01 0.21 584 0.03 0.21 547 0.01 0.12 524
45-49 0.00 0.19 479 0.02 0.19 395 0.00 0.12 439
15-49 0.28 0.28 4840 0.31 0.31 3765 0.19 0.19 3986
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: Standardization by regression for number of living children and number of living children 
squared.
A current pregnancy is  counted as a living child.
* Number is too small to calculate a mean.
The results in Table 6.12 confirm the above proposition. There is a clear 
break in the proportion wanting more children between women with one child and 
women with two children in the two provinces and between women who were 
childless and who had one child in Shanghai municipality. This pattern clearly 
reflects the influence of population policy, which allows peasants to have up to two 
children, and urban people to have only one child. As can be seen in Table 6.12, 
less than one quarter of one-child families in Shanghai claimed to want another 
child, and very few two-child families would like to have another child; although a 
great majority of one-child families in the two provinces wanted an additional 
child, very few women with two or more children in Hebei claimed to want another 
child. In Shaanxi the proportions wanting more among women with two or more
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children also showed a marked decline, while the proportions wanting more in two- 
child families were considerably higher and in three-or-more-child families were 
slightly higher than that in Hebei.
Table 6.12 Percentages wanting more children by number of living children for 
fecund women, standardized for age, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1985
Hebei province Shaanxi province Shanghai municipality
Number --------------------------------------  -----------------------------------
of living  
children
Unacjj.
mean
Adj.
mean
N Unacfö.
mean
Adj.
mean
N Unadj.
mean
Adj.
mean
N
0 0.91 0.78 277 0.91 0.74 252 0.78 0.71 205
1 0.81 0.73 1236 0.83 0.71 805 0.27 0.23 2191
2 0.07 0.07 1445 0.21 0.20 958 0.00 0.06 1110
3 0.01 0.06 978 0.06 0.13 804 0.00 0.09 385
4 0.01 0.08 550 0.01 0.12 555 0.00 0.10 86
5+ 0.01 0.09 354 0.01 0.13 391 0.00* 0.10* 9
0-5+ 0.28 0.28 4840 0.31 0.31 3765 0.19 0.19 3986
Source: China 1985 IDSF data tape.
Note: Standardization by regression for age and age squared. 
A current pregnancy is  counted as a living child.
* Number is too small to calculate a mean.
6.7 P referen ce for th e  sex  o f ch ildren
Although most respondents with one or more children in Shanghai and with two or 
more children in the two provinces stated they wanted no more children under the 
current circumstances, some women did report wanting more. What is the driving 
force behind this aspiration? Naturally many factors other than sex preference 
affect decisions on further childbearing. However, as Chapter 7 shows, during the 
period of the vigorous family planning program, the strong population policy 
overrode or suppressed the influences of some major socio-economic characteristics 
but not the strong son preference influencing women with two children to go on to 
bear a third child. The following section examines son preference and its effect on
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desire for further births based on two preference variables, net of the impacts of 
other social and economic factors.
The first variable is the percentage of currently married and fecund women 
who wanted another child, classified by parity and sex of living children. This is an 
indirect approach to examining the effect of parity and sex composition of existing 
children on the expressed desire to bear additional children. Women who were 
currently pregnant were omitted because of the difficulty of describing the current 
sex composition of their living children.
The second variable is the percentage of women who wanted more children 
by the preferred sex of the next child. This is the direct approach which is based on 
an explicit question on the gender preference for the next child. Women who 
wanted additional children were asked the preferred sex of the next child, with 
possible answers 'boy', 'girl' or 'no preference’. The exclusion of women who wanted 
no more children should be kept in mind, since relatively few women, about 30 per 
cent in the two provinces and 20 per cent in Shanghai municipality, wanted 
additional children. Thus, the base frequencies in the cells of cross-tabulation are 
smaller than the first variable, especially at higher parities. Attention in this 
section was restricted to the range of one to four-child families with different sex 
compositions. Women who had more than four children or were infecund were 
excluded, because few of them said they wished to have additional children.
6.7.1 The proportion  o f w om en w ho w an ted  an oth er child .
The cross-tabulation of intentions for further births by sex composition of living 
children is presented in Table 6.13. The association between sex composition and 
attitude to further childbearing is weak in Shanghai. However, in the two 
provinces, although the proportion of women who wanted another child declines 
sharply from the one-child to the two-child families, the impact of son preference in
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two-child families is clearer and stronger than in single-child families. Further 
analysis, therefore, focuses on the two provinces.
Table 6.13 Cross-classification of intentions to have another child by family size 
and sex composition, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, 
China, 1985
Hebei province Shaanxi province Shanghai municipality
Family size and
Want
more
No
more Total
Want
more
No
more Total
Want
more
N o
m ore T otal
sex composition % % N % % N % % N
One child
Girl 86.1 13.9 468 83.3 16.7 312 27.5 72.5 945
Boy 78.0 22.0 687 80.2 19.8 410 28.0 72 1137
Two children
2 girls 18.9 81.1 217 46.5 53.5 127 0.8 99.2 240
1 girl, 1 boy 3.9 96.1 771 14.7 85.3 517 0.0 100 555
2 boys 3.7 96.3 408 14.2 85.8 253 1.0 99 313
Three children
3 girls 4.9 95.1 81 28.3 71.7 53 0.0 100 55
2 girls, 1 boy 0.8 99.2 379 5.9 94.1 286 0.0 100 138
1 girl, 2 boys 0.3 99.7 393 2.1 97.9 337 0.0 100 146
3 boys 0.0 100.0 120 2.7 97.3 113 0.0 100 46
Four children
4 girls 3.8 96.2 26 0.0 100.0 18 0.0 100 3
3 girls, 1 boy 0.0 100.0 153 3.1 96.9 131 0.0 100 38
2 girls, 2 boys 0.0 100.0 214 0.4 99.6 224 0.0 100 26
1 girl, 3 boys 1.7 98.3 120 0.0 100.0 154 0.0 100 12
4 boys 0.0 100.0 33 0.0 100.0 25 0.0 100 7
Total 25.5 74.6 4070 27.3 72.7 2960 15.9 84.08 3661
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
The cross-tabulation data reveal that there are associations both between 
family size and intentions and between sex composition of family and intentions. 
Since the impact of sex composition is not equally important at each parity, an 
assessment of the effects of family size and sex composition on intentions would be 
facilitated by the use of models which fix the associations among the factors and 
focus on their joint effects on intentions for additional births. Thus, selected log- 
linear models were specified. The models were fitted by using the statistical 
package GLIM 3.77. The keywords in Table 6.14 indicate the variables that were 
fitted in the models. 'Intention' refers to the responses to the question on desire for
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additional children. As was explained above, women who were 'undecided' were 
combined with those who wanted more. In the process of model fitting, women with 
three and four children were recoded as one group, which fitted the data better. 
The sex composition of children was recalculated as families with at least one son 
against those with all daughters.
The model of conditional independence (see Table 6.14: Model 1.1) specifies 
the null hypothesis that intentions (INT) are not associated with family size and 
sex composition. This model fits the data poorly and the very large scaled deviance 
with 13 degrees of freedom indicates that the null hypothesis must be rejected. In 
Model 1.2, the effects of specific family sizes are considered as additional factors, 
which fits the data much better by greatly reducing the scaled deviance. From 
Model 1.3 to Model 1.5, the factors of sex compositions at parity one to parity four 
are added hierarchically, and each additional factor of sex compositions improves 
the results significantly. A preferred model is chosen on the basis of fit to data, 
parsimony and substantive plausibility. A less parsimonious model is selected if it 
provides a significant improvement in fit of model to data. Therefore, model 1.5 is 
the preferred model which contains effects of all family sizes and the sex of children 
under question, and it is best in fitting the data.
Table 6.15 presents the coefficients from the preferred model for data in
Table 6.13, which offers quantitative estimates of effect of family size and sex
distribution in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces.  ^ The result confirms that the impact
of the sex of the children on desire for additional children is not equally important
at each family size. As is reflected by the odds ratios in Table 6.15, for instance,
one-daughter families in Hebei province were 1.7 times more likely to want more
children than were one-son families. Likewise, among three-and four-child families,
those with all daughters were 11.2 times more likely to say they wanted more
3 In Table 6.15, Estimate column displays the effects on log odds and S. E column shows 
their standard errors; the Odds ratios are the exponential log odds. All-daughter families 
are the reference categories.
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children than were those with at least one son. In summary, the quantitative 
analysis suggests that strong preference for a son was an important factor which 
affected the intentions for further births among women in the two provinces. The 
desire for at least one son became stronger as the family size increased from one to 
three or four children.
Source: C
hina 1985 ID
FS survey data tape.
keyw
ords: IN
T= intentions; N
 = fam
ily size; N
S fam
ily size and sex com
position; N
ls = one-son fam
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ilies w
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6.7.2 Sex preferen ce for the n ex t ch ild
The directly-stated sex preference data showed explicit and strong son preference 
in the two provinces. Among all women who wanted more children, about 48 per 
cent preferred their next child to be a boy, while slightly more than 30 per cent 
wanted a girl, and about 20 per cent of women stated no specific preference (Table 
6.16). Sex preference for the next child was strongly affected by the sex of living 
children. Inspection of the parities and sex composition reveals a striking contrast 
that more than 50 per cent of childless women hoped that their first child would be 
a boy; only 3 per cent of them wanted a girl. This has important implications for 
the one-child population policy. If those women who preferred their first child to be 
a boy, had a girl, they would be more likely to break the policy limit and to have 
more than one child, in order to have a son. The women who were indifferent about 
the sex of the next child were mainly concentrated among those who were childless 
and those women with one boy and one girl. There are several possible 
explanations: for those childless women who stated no preference for the sex of 
their first child, it was probably, to a large extent, because they would have at 
least two children. Indeed, more than 90 per cent of them stated a desired family 
size of two or more children. Women with one boy and one girl had probably 
already achieved their desired sex composition. It is also possible that some women 
really had no preference about the sex composition of their children and thus did 
not care whether their next child was a boy or a girl (UN, 1987: 64)
Of women with two or more children, 100 per cent of all-daughter families 
wanted a boy, and a large majority of families with one boy and one girl wanted a 
boy, but virtually none wanted a girl. However, a very high proportion of families 
with two boys wanted a girl.
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Table 6.16 Cross-classification of sex preference for the next child by family size 
and sex composition, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, 
China, 1985
Hebei province Shaanxi province Shanghai municipality
Family size and Boy Girl No pref. Boy Girl No pref. Boy Girl No pref.
sex composition % % % % % % % % %
No living child 53.9 2.9 43.2 52.7 2.9 44.4 15.7 20.9 63.4
One child
Girl 91.1 1.4 7.5 83.9 1.6 14.5 60.9 0.9 38.2
Boy 8.2 74.9 16.9 5.5 79.1 15.4 1.4 84.4 14.2
Two children
2 girls 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
1 girl, 1 boy 68.4 0.0 31.6 64.2 4.5 31.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 boys 9.1 90.9 0.0 3.2 96.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
Three children
3 girls 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 girls, 1 boy 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 girl, 2 boys 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 80.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 boys 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Four children
4 girls 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 girls, 1 boy 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 girls, 2 boys 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 girl, 3 boys 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 boys 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 47.8 33.2 19.0 48.6 30.8 20.6 24.9 41.9 33.2
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: The women with no living children were also included in this table, since the preference 
for the sex of the first child has important policy implications in China.
Women in Shanghai did not state a son preference for their next child, and 
even showed some daughter preference: 42 per cent of women preferred their next 
child to be a girl, while 25 per cent preferred a boy; a relatively high proportion (61 
per cent) of those with one girl wanted a boy, while an even higher proportion (84 
per cent) of those with one boy wanted a girl. One-third of women in Shanghai did 
not specify their sex preference for the next child, and this proportion is 
considerably higher than in the other two provinces. This contrasts with the 
pattern that was found in the World Fertility Survey, in which the proportion of 
women who reported 'undecided' declined with increasing levels of development
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(UN, 1987: 66). Apart from the possible reasons mentioned above, probably the 
women thought that to express a desire for the sex of their next child was against 
the new norm that has been established through decades-long efforts in 
propaganda and education among the masses. The propaganda disseminated the 
ideal of equal social and economic status for both sexes.
6.8 Discussion and conclusion
Stated fertility preference is one of the most controversial issues in demography. 
However, it is the best available direct indicator of desired fertility. Although the 
quality of such preference data is lower than the quality of the reproductive 
behaviour data which are the focus of other chapters, using both these mutually 
complementary kinds of data makes it possible to test and confirm what seem to be 
the plausible interpretations and firm conclusions. Although the preference 
responses were taken at face value for statistical analysis in this chapter, many 
caveats were considered in the interpretation.
It is to be expected that the mean desired family size in Shanghai, one of 
the most advanced areas of China, is lower than that in the two less developed 
provinces. The comparison of the three areas suggests that macro-level socio­
economic factors play a decisive role in determining the general level of desired 
fertility. The findings confirm that the general level of desired family size in China 
is lower than in other developing countries. In addition to the strong population 
policy and the family planning program, China was experiencing socio-economic 
change before and during the period of fertility decline. However, the extent of 
development has been considerably less than in a number of other developing 
countries that have much higher levels of fertility. The differentials in the general 
level of desired fertility among the three regions are largely due to the differences 
in socio-economic settings. The family planning program appears to have achieved 
the best results in the areas with more advanced levels of development. The higher
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the level of development, the larger the proportion of people who desired low 
fertility. The changes in socio-economic environment, such as urbanization, 
improved education, increased market-oriented employment opportunities and 
higher living standards, may have brought about changes in the costs and benefits 
of children, leading to a desire for smaller families.
The analysis shows a unique narrow pattern of distribution of reported 
desired family size. There are strong associations between desired family size and 
current family size, but not current age. At least in these cross-sectional data, 
there is no strong evidence that younger women reported desiring fewer children 
than older women, when the parities are controlled. One possible explanation is 
that women's preferences have changed little over time, the other is that women's 
preferences do change, but that they change almost equally in all age groups 
(Lightboume, 1984: 121). This second explanation seems more plausible given the 
situation in China: namely, that all those women, regardless of their age, at the 
same point in time at which the survey was conducted, were exposed to the same 
social-economic environment, especially the effect of dramatically reduced fertility 
and the powerful population policy.
At the same time, there is a tendency for women with one or two children in 
these three regions to understate their total number of children desired, while it is 
much less evident that some women with two or more children may have 
rationalized their desired family size. These factors imply the strong influence of 
the population policy which inhibits third or higher-order births. However, the 
rather weak impact of rationalization may be partly attributable to the widely 
available and effective family planning program, which enables women to control 
their unwanted pregnancies.
The policy effect is also mirrored by a marked jump in the proportion of 
'excess' births between two-child and three-child families, and by a clear cut in the
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proportion wanting more children between women with one child and those with 
two children in the two provinces, and between women who are childless and those 
who had one child in Shanghai municipality.
In China, the critical family size from the point of view of population policy 
is two. The survey found that the general desired family size was about three in 
the two peasant-dominated provinces, and around two in more developed 
Shanghai. It is recognized fully that the stated desired family size and the 
proportions wanting more children were biased downwards by the respondents in 
order to comply with the perceived social norm or policy target about the number of 
children, in the face-to-face interviews. However, even if the responses are accepted 
at face value, the gap between women's individual desires and the government’s 
policy target is one or more children in all the three areas. This implies that a 
significant part of the achieved decline in fertility may have been caused by 
unwilling submission to the pressure of the government population policy; thus it 
can be considered an unstable component of fertility. It is likely to fluctuate with 
changes in population policy, and with changes in the socio-political and economic 
systems.
Further rises in unplanned and higher-order births were reported in China 
in 1986 ( Population and Development Review, 1987: 363). A nation-wide survey 
conducted by the State Statistics Bureau revealed that the discrepancy between 
planned and actual demographic indicators was even greater than anticipated 
(.Population and Development Review, 1987: 363). The birth rate in 1986 was 20.8. 
This represents a total fertility rate of about 2.4, which is considerably higher than 
the 1985 total fertility rate of 2.2 and the 1984 total fertility of 1.9-2.0. Bulges in 
the age structure may account for about one-third of the increase in births 
(.Population and Development Review, 1987: 364), but the two major factors are a 
relaxation of the Chinese population policy and the introduction of the production 
responsibility system.
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The explanatory mechanism, as discussed in Chapter 3, is related to the 
system of political organization. In China the organization of the family planning 
program has been closely tied to the organization of the political system. The 
highly centralized vertical administrative system was operated by the support of 
the political cadres and the members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at 
each horizontal level. At the base in cities were cadres and CCP members of 
neighbourhoods and in rural areas cadres and CCP members of production 
brigades and teams (now villages). The attitudes and activities of cadres and CCP 
members at the base level are crucial in implementing any government policies or 
programs. Inevitably, in different areas the attitudes and practices of cadres and 
CCP members have also been affected by different socio-economic backgrounds and 
traditional culture. On one hand, the different institutional effort in the family 
planning program in the three areas may explain the regional differentials in 
fertility preference; on the other hand, it may also be related to regional differences 
in the extent of relaxation of the population policy.
The attitudinal data portray a strong son preference in Shaanxi and Hebei, 
where most respondents lived in rural areas, while some daughter preference was 
reported in urban Shanghai. The preferences expressed were exclusively those of 
the women. There is evidence that husbands are more likely than wives to express 
a son preference (Knodel and Prachuabmoh, 1976; Coombs and Fernandez, 1978). 
If the sex preference of the husband were to be considered, a stronger influence of 
son preference could be expected.
The strong son preference in the two rural provinces can be traced to a 
variety of causes, such as historical tradition and cultural values, as well as 
economic considerations. The persistence of son preference in China demonstrates 
the deeply-rooted Confucian traditions and is also a reflection of the current status 
of women in China (Arnold and Liu, 1986: 222). In China it is widely believed (and 
practised) that a son should inherit the family line and family property, although
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the new marriage law protects the legitimate rights and interests of women. Sons 
are favoured over daughters in the allocation of household tasks and the duration 
of schooling (Greenhalgh, 1985: 302). Although the Chinese government has 
promoted sexual equality and greatly improved the social status of women, women 
in rural areas still have much lower status than men.
Economic considerations are also important. Sons are regarded as stronger 
and more useful labour than daughters in the countryside. Male labour is more 
suited to the heavy manual nature of farming in most of rural China. According to 
the traditional customs of marriage, daughters are expected to live with their 
husbands' families (in the extended family) or move to the husbands' places of 
residence (in the nuclear family). Sons are thought to be responsible for financial 
support of their parents in old age.
Arnold and Liu (1986) inferred a son preference among the population in 
most of China's provinces from an examination of behavioural measures of fertility 
and family planning, using data from China's One-per-thousand National Fertility 
Sample Survey. People in the capital city, Beijing, and metropolitan Shanghai did 
not appear to have a preference for sons. Based on the attitudinal data, the 
present study found some daughter preference in Shanghai, for which there are 
several possible explanations. First, municipalities like Shanghai and Beijing are 
the most advanced areas in the country. Rapid economic changes have been 
accompanied by considerable modification of traditional culture and customs. 
Government policy and measures for improving the status of women were more 
successfully implemented in these cities. Second, modernization has provided 
women with more equal access to education and employment, and the improved 
education and increasing female labour force participation has made women more 
economically independent and has raised their socio-economic status. However, it 
is possible that Shanghai women are much more sensitive to the current social 
norms and gave what they thought were the acceptable responses to the
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interviewers. This may explain why son preference was also evident in Shanghai, 
when examining the family-building process (Chapter 7).
The relaxation of the strict one-child policy has created an opportunity for 
women with sex-unbalanced families or women desiring more children to continue 
childbearing. Since rural economic decentralization, households have replaced the 
collectivized production brigades and teams as the basic production units. Rural 
cadres have experienced greater difficulties controlling the activities of more 
mobile household farmers, including their reproductive activities (Whyte and Gu, 
1987: 472). The financial rewards for maintaining the one-child family and 
punishment for additional births are no longer effective forces (Greenhalgh, 1990d: 
26-31). Funds to guarantee care for the aged have been reduced or are not 
available. Most of rural China remains under a labour-intensive production 
pattern. More children means more labour inputs and more family income, 
providing a driving force for increased fertility.
If it is to regain strict control over population growth, the Chinese 
government must create a new system at the base level in rural areas. However, 
such action would seem to conflict with current economic circumstances and with 
desired fertility. Thus, in the long run, the attainment or continuation of low and 
stable fertility must rely more strongly on substantial socio-economic development, 
as well as on further improvements in women's education and social status.
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C hapter 7 The effect o f sex  preferen ce on su b seq u en t  
fertility  1
7.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the impact of sex preference on couples' family building 
processes at both the micro-level and the macro-level on the basis of the China 
1985 In-Depth Fertility Survey (IDFS) data. The micro-level analysis begins with 
the association between the sex of the existing surviving children and sequential 
parity progression, without taking socio-economic conditions into account. The 
analysis is then extended to incorporate some selected socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics of women with special reference to those who had two 
or more living children before or during the period of the One-Child Policy; this is 
in order to evaluate the roles of sex preference and socio-economic characteristics of 
individual women in determining further childbearing under population policies 
and programs of different strengths. The macro-level analysis investigates to what 
extent, under China's intensified family planning program and population policy 
pressure, sex preference still exerts an impact on current family planning practices 
and recent fertility.
7.2 Sex composition and family building
Considerable attention has been paid to sequential fertility decision-making in 
family-building dynamics (Namboodiri, 1983). Family-size norms are considered 
one of the critical factors which affect the changing decision patterns in the life 
course (Crook, 1978; Höllerbach, 1983: 360; Mason, 1983; Namboodiri, 1983: 445). 
The influence of demographic and socio-economic factors on fertility plans and
1 A paper derived from this chapter was published in the Asia-Pacific Population Journal, 
Vol. 7, No. 4, 1992 (see Appendix A).
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behaviour across parities has also been investigated, with somewhat less 
consistent conclusions (Namboodiri, 1974; Rosenzweig and Seiver, 1975; Simon, 
1975; Khan and Sirageldin, 1977; Young, 1977; Park, 1978).
Namboodiri (1983) gave an extensive review of the literature of the 
characteristics of fertility plans and behaviour linked to the life course, and linked 
to revisions in plans and plan-implementation failures, etc. He argued that fertility 
plans are adjusted to suit changing circumstances, and various unpredictable 
factors or other involuntary phenomena can result in plan-implementation failures. 
Bongaarts (1984: 14) quantified the occurrence of the events caused by those 
factors using United States data, and concluded that the majority of newlyweds 
would experience at least one unplanned event during their family-building 
process. He believed that the probability of these unplanned events, related to the 
biological aspects of the family building process such as involuntary childlessness 
and unwanted sex combinations, also applies in most other societies.
A number of studies (Sheps, 1963; McClelland, 1979; Cleland, Verrall and 
Vaessen, 1983; Yamaguchi, 1989) addressed the influence of sex preference on 
sequential fertility, especially referring to Asia where strong son preference 
persists in many countries (Park, 1978, 1983; Chowdhury and Bairagi,1990).
This section uses retrospective birth history data for all respondents with 
one or more living children at the time of the survey to identify the association 
between the sex of preceding children and subsequent childbearing, without taking 
socio-economic conditions into account.
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate the impact of the sex composition of the first 
two or three children on subsequent childbearing. An examination of the 
proportions for the first two children (Table 7.2) indicates that women are much 
more likely to go on to have more children if their first two children are daughters, 
in contrast to those who have had at least one son, or two sons for their first two
196
children. First daughter-daughter (DD) combinations in the initial family 
formation are likely to lead to a larger family than other combinations. In fact, a 
higher proportion of first-two-daughter families have had four or more children 
than families whose first two children are other sex combinations, 38 per cent 
compared with 25 per cent for Hebei; 46 per cent compared with 34 per cent for 
Shaanxi and 10 per cent compared with 6 per cent for Shanghai. It is interesting 
to note that women with the sex combination of son-daughter (SD) seem more 
likely to continue childbearing than those with DS (daughter-son) combinations. 
Hereafter, analogous abbreviations are used to describe these relationships.
Among the women who have had three or more children (Table 7.2), the 
differences in family building between DDD and SSS families are also marked. 
But the data seem to show that women's preference is not simply for sons. The 
highest proportions of women who had stopped childbearing are among mothers 
with combinations of SSD, SDS, DSS and DDS (and SSS in Shaanxi). It is also 
observed that women with two daughters and one son, especially in the order SDD 
or DSD, would try again. It appears that the sex of the third child plays an 
important role in the decision about further family building if the first two children 
are a son and a daughter.
Table 7.3 is a summary from the survey data of the probabilities of families 
with different size and sex distribution having an additional child. As Table 7.3 
shows, of the women who have had at least one living child, about three quarters 
in the two provinces and 44 per cent in Shanghai would probably proceed to the 
second or higher parity by the survey date. In the two provinces, considerably 
more than 50 per cent of women with at least two living children are likely to 
progress to third or higher-order births, and even of those with at least three 
living children, more than half in Shaanxi and about half in Hebei are likely to 
continue bearing children. However, in Shanghai municipality the proportions 
drop by about 10 per cent each time the number of living children increases by one
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child. These patterns appear to reflect the differentials in the efforts of 
implementation of population policy as well as in the level of social and economic 
development among the regions (see Chapters 2 and 3).
Table 7.1 Proportional distribution of family size for women with two or more 
children according to sex composition of first two children in family, Hebei and 
Shaanxi provinces, Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Sex
composition 
of first 
two children
Total number of living children
Sum N2 3 4 5+
(Per cent)
Hebei province
DD 29.6 32.1 21.1 17.2 100.0 795
DS 48.3 27.0 17.2 7.5 100.0 889
SD 42.9 29.9 15.5 11.7 100.0 921
SS 48.6 28.0 13.5 9.9 100.0 882
Shaanxi province
DD 23.7 30.8 23.9 21.6 100.0 620
DS 39.1 26.7 21.0 13.2 100.0 797
SD 36.5 29.6 18.5 15.3 100.0 756
SS 37.3 29.7 20.2 12.9 100.0 762
Shanghai municipality
DD 61.6 28.7 8.9 0.7 100.0 414
DS 72.0 22.4 4.7 0.9 100.0 425
SD 69.9 22.2 7.4 0.5 100.0 392
SS 73.0 23.6 3.2 0.2 100.0 441
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape. 
Note: D = daughter, S = son
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Table 7.2 Proportional distribution of family size for women with three or more 
children according to sex composition of first three children in family, Hebei and 
Shaanxi provinces, Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Sex
composition Total number of living children
of first ------------------------------------------------
three children 3 4 5 6+ Sum N
(Per cent)
Hebei province
DDD 34.8 33.2 19.0 13.0 100.0 253
DDS 54.4 27.4 13.0 5.2 100.0 307
DSD 45.5 37.4 12.2 5.0 100.0 222
DSS 58.4 29.4 8.0 4.2 100.0 238
SDD 46.5 29.9 16.2 7.4 100.0 271
SDS 58.4 24.3 9.8 7.5 100.0 255
SSD 60.2 21.9 11.4 6.5 100.0 201
SSS 50.0 29.8 14.7 5.6 100.0 252
Shaanxi province
DDD 29.1 34.5 22.2 14.3 100.0 203
DDS 48.9 28.9 12.6 9.6 100.0 270
DSD 42.7 35.1 13.8 8.4 100.0 225
DSS 45.0 33.8 12.7 8.5 100.0 260
SDD 38.1 35.3 15.1 11.5 100.0 218
SDS 53.8 24.0 14.5 7.6 100.0 262
SSD 43.3 33.3 17.9 5.4 100.0 240
SSS 51.3 31.1 11.8 5.9 100.0 238
Shanghai municipality 
DDD 69.5 26.8 3.7 0.0 100.0 82
DDS 80.5 19.5 0.0 0.0 100.0 77
DSD 72.1 21.3 4.9 1.6 100.0 61
DSS 87.9 12.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 58
SDD 67.9 28.6 3.6 0.0 100.0 56
SDS 79.0 21.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 62
SSD 96.7 3.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 60
SSS 78.0 20.3 0.0 1.7 100.0 59
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape. 
Note: D = daughter, S = son
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Table 7.3 Probability of having an (N+l)th child for women with N or more 
children, for N = 1, 2, 3 and 4, according to number of living children and sons of 
the women, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Hebei province Shaanxi province Shanghai municipality
Number of 
first N living 
children & 
sons
Probability 
of having 
an (N+l)th 
child
Number of 
women
Probability 
of having 
an (N+l)th 
child
Number of 
women
Probability 
of having 
an (N+l)th 
child
Number of 
women
(N=l)
No son 77.0 2186 80.1 1770 46.4 1808
One son 71.2 2533 76.8 1976 41.5 2006
Total 73.9 4719 78.4 3746 43.8 3814
(N=2)
No son 70.4 795 76.3 620 38.4 414
One son 54.5 1810 62.1 1553 29.0 817
Two sons 51.4 882 62.7 762 27.0 441
Total 57.3 3487 65.3 2935 30.8 1672
(N=3)
No son 65.2 253 70.9 203 30.5 82
One son 50.8 800 56.4 713 25.8 194
Two sons 41.1 694 52.5 762 12.2 180
Three sons 50.0 252 48.7 238 22.0 59
Total 49.2 1999 55.4 1916 21.4 515
(N=4)
No son 65.3 75 67.2 61 33.3 6
One son 44.1 290 47.9 282 14.0 50
Two sons 33.4 344 38.2 393 0.0 32
Three sons 37.1 210 38.8 278 0.0 14
Four sons 46.0 63 39.6 48 12.5 8
Total 40.6 982 42.7 1062 9.1 110
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
In the two provinces, if couples did not have a son, impressively large 
proportions would continue bearing children until they got a son. This tendency is 
consistent over different stages of family building (from family size one to four), 
although the proportions are slightly lower at later stages. Relatively small 
differences exist between first-daughter and first-son families, which may reflect
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the fact that most parents want to have more than one child. With further 
increases from first-two-child families up to first-four-child families, however, 
depending on the sexes of the preceding children, the probabilities are 
substantially different between no-son and at least one-son families. When the first 
three or four children are considered, the data also indicate some differences in the 
effect of an excess of sons compared with an excess of daughters. The results 
suggest that women would be more likely to have another child if they had an 
excess of daughters in the first three or four births. A similar tendency is also 
found in Shanghai but the impact seems to be relatively weak. There is no 
indication that couples seek at least one daughter, although among families with 
three or more children, two sons plus one or two daughters appears to be a 
favourite choice, and in fact, the lowest probability of having another child was 
found among these groups.
7.3 Socio-econom ic d ifferen tia ls in  fam ily  b u ild in g
The effects of socio-economic characteristics on the general macro-level fertility in 
China are well documented (e.g. Tien, 1984; Poston and Gu, 1987; Wang, 1988). 
However, their role is not clear in the sequential fertility decisions of individual 
families regarding additional births. The diversity of social and economic 
characteristics among women with a different number and sex structure of living 
children should also be explored.
In this section, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multiple classification 
analysis (MCA) were applied to ascertain the statistical significance and 
association between the decision to have another child and the set of social and 
economic factors when some demographic factors are controlled. Women who have 
had at least two children were selected rather than all respondents. The sex 
composition of the first two living children was treated as the independent 
variable, which was also classified by the variables of residence, education and
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occupation^. Date of the first marriage and age when the second child was born 
were treated as covariates. The reason for using marriage cohort instead of birth 
cohort is that a marriage cohort's rates of family building and overall family size 
are less variable than those of a birth cohort (Newell, 1988). The dependent 
variable is the proportion of respondents who have had a third child, since a 
majority of women in the two provinces want at least two children, and whether to 
have a third child seems to be a key decision in the family building process. 
Women who had their second child were divided into two groups according to the 
time period of the second birth: before 1979 and 1979 or after. This allows us to 
detect the impact of the intensified family planning program, especially the One- 
Child Policy that officially started in early 1979.
A hierarchical approach was used in the ANOVA and MCA procedures, 
which means that the effect of a factor is adjusted only for the effect of factors 
already assessed, and the covariate effect is adjusted only for the covariates 
already assessed (SPSS Inc., 1988: 370). Therefore, demographic variables were 
introduced first as covariates, then the selected social and economic variables were 
included, and last, the sex of the first two children was introduced after the effects 
of all other independent variables were taken into account. This approach allows 
us to assess the net effect of sex composition on the probability of having a third 
child.
For women whose second child was born in 1979 or after, all the two-way or 
higher-way interactions of the independent variables are insignificant except in
2 The occupation factor was regrouped into two broad categories: (a) non-agriculture, 
including professional, service and industry; and (b) agricultural, including agriculture 
and those who reported having never worked, since most women in rural areas reported 
themselves as having never worked instead of having worked part-time in agriculture or 
in their household (Tu, 1991: 262). Child deaths were also included as one of the 
independent variables in the preliminary analysis. However, the results showed that child 
deaths were insignificant in the decision to bear the third child during the second time 
period for all the regions. Although the variable was significant in the first period, it 
interacted with occupation and sex composition of children in Shaanxi province. Therefore, 
child deaths are not fitted in the final model.
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Shaanxi, where there is a weakly significant (at the 0.047 level) two-way 
interaction between education and sex composition; this is negligible, and the 
overall two-way interaction of all factors is insignificant. Therefore, MCA analysis 
was applied.
In Hebei province, for women whose second child was born before 1979, a 
two-way interaction between residence and occupation is significant at the 0.05 
level. A joint variable of residence and occupation was created and fitted in the 
model. Creating this joint variable changed the beta values of education and sex 
composition by only 0.01, and did not in any way change the conclusion. For 
convenience of comparison, therefore, the MCA results are still presented using the 
original independent variables.
Shanghai women who had a second birth in 1979 or later are omitted from 
the MCA analysis because they are so few in number (only 218 cases), and some 
cases are of doubtful validity.
The analysis of variance in Tables 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 shows that the raw 
regression coefficients of the two demographic covariates are both negative. The 
effect on bearing a third child of the date at first marriage and age at the birth of 
the second child is statistically significant. The two covariates account for about 70 
per cent of the total explained variation in the period before 1979, while the figures 
drop to 40 per cent or less in 1979 or after. The date at first marriage, or the 
marriage cohort as mentioned earlier, is the more important covariate, and 
captures more than 80 per cent of the variation explained by the covariates in all 
the three regions before 1979, while the age at the birth of the second child 
accounts for less than 20 per cent.
It may be worth noting that the pattern changes to the opposite after 1979 
in Shaanxi province, that is , about 40 per cent of the covariance is accounted for 
by the date of first marriage, and 60 per cent by the age at the second birth, while
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the same pattern holds in Hebei but with a 10-percentage-points reduction in the 
explanatory power of date of first marriage. The levels of significance of these 
covariates for the period 1979 and after are higher than those in the earlier period.
Table 7.4 Analysis of variance of probability of having third child for women with 
two children, according to sex composition of living children, year of the second 
birth, and selected characteristics of women, Hebei province, China
Second child born before 1979 Second child born 1979 or after
Source of 
variation
Sum of Mean
squares DF squares F
Sum of Mean
squares DF squares F
Covariates 84.17 2 42.08 302.00*** 7.03 2 3.51 29.45***
Date of first marriage 69.29 1 69.29 497.21*** 5.15 1 5.15 43.12***
Age at second birth 14.88 1 14.88 106.79*** 1.88 1 1.88 15.78***
Main effects 28.70 7 4.10 29.43*** 7.49 7 1.07 8.97***
Residence 6.39 1 6.39 45.84*** 0.62 1 0.62 5.16*
Education 1.90 2 1.90 6.80** 1.19 2 1.19 4.97**
Occupation 4.50 1 4.50 32.28*** 0.37 1 0.37 3.11
Sex composition 15.92 3 5.31 38.09*** 5.32 3 1.77 14.87*** .
2-way interactions 5.60 17 0.33 2.36** 1.87 17 0.11 0.92
Explained 121.71 49 2.48 17.83*** 17.20 46 0.37 3.13***
Residual 333.46 2393 0.14 118.97 997 0.12
Total 455.17 2442 0.19 136.17 1043 0.13
Covariates Raw regression coefficient Raw regression coefficient
Date of first marriage -0.002 -0.002
Age at second birth -0.026 -0.017
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape. 
Note: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Among the four demographic and socio-economic variables, sex composition 
accounts for 50 per cent or more of the main effects on continuing childbearing in 
the two provinces before 1979. It is more interesting to note that the percentages 
increase to 71 per cent for Hebei and even 91 per cent for Shaanxi in the period 
1979 and after. This change is also reflected in the F ratios. Although all the four
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characteristics are substantially significant in the first period, in the later period 
the residence and occupation variables become rather weak or even no longer 
significant in Hebei, and all the three other socio-economic variables are 
insignificant except sex composition in Shaanxi. Only the sex of living children 
remains as the most significant variable throughout the two periods.
Table 7.5 Analysis of variance of probability of having third child for women with 
two children, according to sex composition of living children, year of the second 
birth, and selected characteristics of women, Shaanxi province, China
Second child born before 1979 Second child born 1979 or after
Source of 
variation
Sum of Mean
squares DF squares F
Sum of Mean
squares DF squares F
Covariates 54.49 2 29.75 245.81*** 7.55 2 3.78 28.52***
Date of first m arriage 45.50 1 45.50 376.02*** 2.97 1 2.97 22.41***
Age a t second birth 13.99 1 13.99 115.59*** 4.58 1 4.58 34.63***
Main effects 9.26 7 1.32 10.94*** 9.59 7 1.37 10.35***
Residence 1.36 1 1.36 11.21** 0.00 1 0.00 0.002
Education 1.43 2 0.72 5.91** 0.46 2 0.23 1.73
Occupation 1.76 1 1.76 14.57*** 0.44 1 0.44 3.31
Sex composition 4.71 3 1.57 12.98*** 8.69 3 2.90 21.90***
2-way interactions 3.24 17 0.19 1.58 2.38 17 0.14 1.06
Explained 75.87 49 1.55 12.80*** 21.77 43 0.51 3.82***
Residual 258.48 2136 0.12 93.31 705 0.13
Total 334.35 2185 0.15 115.08 748 0.15
Covariates Raw regression coefficient Raw regression coefficient
Date of first marriage -0.002 -0.002
Age a t second birth -0.028 -0.03
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape. 
Note: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001
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Table 7.6 Analysis of variance of probability of having third child for women with 
two children, according to sex composition of living children, year of the second 
birth, and selected characteristics of women, Shanghai municipality, China
Second child born before 1979 Second child born 1979 or after
Source of 
variation
Sum of Mean
squares DF squares F
Sum of Mean
squares DF squares F
Co variates 111.97 2 55.98 389.53*** 0.02 2 0.01 0.70
Date of first marriage 97.90 1 97.90 681.17*** 0.02 1 0.02 1.30
Age at second birth 14.07 1 14.07 97.89*** 0.00 1 0.00 0.11
Main effects 13.03 7 1.86 12.96*** 0.12 7 0.02 1.26
Residence 4.18 1 4.18 29.07*** 0.00 1 0.00 0.12
Education 2.60 2 1.30 9.04*** 0.06 2 0.03 2.32
Occupation 1.67 1 1.67 11.61** 0.00 1 0.00 0.01
Sex composition 4.59 3 1.53 10.64*** 0.06 3 0.02 1.35
2-way interactions 1.62 17 0.10 0.66
Explained 126.62 26 4.87 33.89*** 0.14 9 0.02 1.14
Residual 205.09 1427 0.14 2.82 208 0.01
Total 331.71 1453 0.23 2.96 217 0.01
Covariates Raw regression coefficient Raw regression coefficient
Date of first marriage -.004 .000
Age at second birth -.033 .001
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape. 
Note: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001
As can also be seen in MCA tables (Tables 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9), the highest 
values of Beta for the sex composition factor indicate that the sex of the first two 
living children, after adjustment is made for the demographic covariates and the 
other three socio-economic factors, has the most significant effect on bearing the 
third child. The Beta value of sex of children in Hebei remained the same during 
the two periods, but in Shaanxi, the Beta value more than doubled in the later 
period compared with the earlier period. These findings may suggest that among 
the four social and economic variables, sex preference is the strongest driving force
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for bearing the third child for women with two children. When the women are 
grouped by the year of the second birth, i.e., before or after the One-Child Policy 
was announced, it is evident that the vigorous population control policies have 
greatly reduced the probability of having the third child. About 60 percentage- 
points decrease is found when comparing the grand means between two periods in 
the two provinces. It seems that the policy pressure has suppressed the effect of 
social and economic factors but not the sex composition of children, which has 
continued to exert a great influence even during the One-Child Campaign.
Table 7.7 Multiple classification analysis of probability of having third child for 
women with two children, according to sex composition of living children, year of 
second birth, and selected characteristics of women, Hebei province, China
Second child born before 1979 Second child bom 1979 or after
Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
Variables N Prob. Eta Prob. Beta N Prob. Eta Prob. Beta
Residence
Urban [443] 66 68 [126] 8 10
Rural [2000] 77 0.10 76 0.07 [918] 16 0.07 16 0.06
Education 
No schooling [1136] 79 74 [458] 19 18
Primary [1017] 75 77 [384] 11 11
Secondary & higher [290] 59 0.14 71 0.05 [202] 13 0.11 16 0.08
Occupation
Non-agriculture [277] 58 62 [75] 5 8
Agriculture [2166] 77 0.14 77 0.11 [969] 16 0.08 16 0.05
Sex of living children
DD [545] 90 90 [250] 27 27
DS [614] 70 71 [275] 10 11
SD [663] 73 73 [258] 15 14
SS [621] 69 0.19 68 0.19 [261] 9 0.20 9 0.20
Total women 
Grand mean
[2443]
75
[1044]
15
Multiple R squared 0.248 0.107
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape. 
Note: S = son, D =daughter
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Table 7.8 Multiple classification analysis of probability of having third child for 
women with two children, according to sex composition of living children, year of 
second birth, and selected characteristics of women, Shaanxi province, China
Second child bom before 1979 Second child bom 1979 or after
Variables N
Unadjusted 
Prob. Eta
Adjusted 
Prob. Beta N
Unadjusted 
Prob. Eta
Adjusted 
Prob. Beta
Residence
Urban [443] 76 81 [110] 15 22
Rural [1743] 80 0.07 81 0.00 [639] 20 0.05 18 0.03
Education
No schooling [1088] 84 80 [335] 25 21
Prim ary [821] 82 84 [199] 17 16
Secondary & higher [277] 68 0.13 77 0.05 [215] 12 0.14 18 0.06
Occupation
Non-agriculture [338] 71 73 [59] 7 10
Agriculture [1848] 83 0.10 83 0.09 [690] 20 0.09 20 0.07
Sex of living children
DD [452] 90 90 [168] 39 39
DS [578] 79 79 [219] 13 14
SD [571] 79 79 [185] 14 13
SS [585] 78 0.12 78 0.12 [177] 12 0.28 13 0.28
Total women [2186] [749]
Grand mean 81 19
Multiple R squared 0.206 0.149
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape. 
Note: S = son, D =daughter
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Table 7.9 Multiple classification analysis of probability of having third child for 
women with two children, according to sex composition of living children, year of 
second birth, and selected characteristics of women, Shanghai municipality, 
China
Second child bom before 1979 Second child bom 1979 or after
Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
Variables N Prob. Eta Prob. Beta N Prob. Eta Prob. Beta
Residence
Urban [640] 31 34 [34] 3
Rural [814] 38 0.08 36 0.02 [184] 1
Education 
No schooling [327] 59 40 [21] 4
Primary [627] 37 37 [132] 0
Secondary & higher [500] 17 0.32 29 0.09 [65] 3
Occupation
Non-agriculture [1019] 29 32 [112] 1
Agriculture [435] 49 0.18 41 0.09 [106] 1
Sex of living children
DD [355] 44 45 [59] 3
DS [369] 32 32 [56] 1
SD [341] 34 32 [51] 0
SS [389] 30 0.11 31 0.12 [52] 0
Total women 
Grand mean
[1454]
35
[218]
Multiple R squared 0.377
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape. 
Note: S = son, D =daughter
7.4 The overall effect o f sex  p reference on fam ily p lann in g  and  
fertility
The previous section indicates that couples' sex preference strongly affected their 
family-building decision in the two provinces and had some influence in Shanghai 
before the launching of the One-Child Campaign. The empirical evidence shows 
that sex preference is not equally important at all parities (Williamson, 1978; Park, 
1978, 1983; Bulatao, 1981; Widmer, McClelland and Nickerson, 1981; Chapter 6,
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this thesis). However, the overall effect of sex preference on fertility appears to 
have been scarcely documented. To what extent does sex preference produce excess 
births? The quantitative assessment of the effect of sex preference on fertility has 
been a subject of considerable interest and speculation among demographers.
Arnold (1985) proposed a measure to quantify the overall effect of current 
sex composition of families on family planning practice and future fertility, and he 
believed that findings based on this approach have particular implications for 
population policies and programs. When applied to data from Korea, China and 
another 27 countries (Arnold, 1985, 1987b), the results demonstrate that sex 
preference does not have as much influence on family planning behaviour as had 
previously been thought, which implies that efforts to change son preference 
attitudes are unlikely to have a major impact on reducing fertility levels. Arnold 
(1985: 283; 1987b: 44) interprets this finding to be the result of random biological 
family-building processes, which means that most couples will gain an acceptable 
sex combination of children when they approach their desired family size.
Bairagi (1987) comments that Arnold's approach will underestimate the 
effect of sex preference on fertility as a result of the presence of heterogeneity in 
sex preference. However, Arnold (1987a) insists that, on balance, the 
underestimation caused by heterogeneity of sex preferences will be offset by either 
sampling variations or risk factors (McClelland, 1979) that result in 
overestimation, and that the overall bias should be minimal when the method is 
used in developing countries in a normal situation.
Chowdhury and Bairagi (1990) suggest an index, the sex preference effect 
on fertility (SPEF), which is a modification of Arnold's measure. The SPEF index 
estimates the expected decline in fertility in the absence of sex preference for 
children by initial parity level, while Arnold's index estimates the expected decline 
in fertility for all women irrespective of their parities. The SPEF index was applied
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to Bangladesh, and the result seemed to confirm Chowdhury and Bairagi's 
hypothesis that given two populations with strong sex preference, the effect of sex 
preference on fertility is stronger in the population with higher contraceptive 
prevalence than in a similar population with lower contraceptive prevalence.3 In 
contrast to Arnold, Chowdhury and Bairagi (1990) argue that programs to improve 
attitudes toward children of both sexes may reduce fertility; unfortunately, they 
did not further discuss the reasons behind the hypothesis and findings.
The following sections use both Arnold’s original index and the SPEF index 
to test the effect of sex preference on current family planning practice and on 
recent fertility in the three provincial regions which have somewhat different 
contraceptive prevalence levels.
7.4.1 Sex  p referen ce and fam ily  p lan n in g  p ractice
In this section, the association between sex composition of living children and 
current use of contraception is investigated. The data on contraceptive practice are 
based on all currently married, fecund women. Women who were infecund or past 
menopause were excluded because they were not at risk of conception. Pregnant 
women, though not currently exposed to risk of conception, were included in the 
denominator for calculation of the prevalence rate because their exclusion could 
distort the comparison among the three regions. Women who were sterilized for a 
contraceptive reason were also included if they did not report themselves as 
sterilized for other reasons or as having experienced menopause. Therefore, 
current use refers to reported use at time of survey of any method of contraception, 
including female and male sterilization.
In addition to the analysis of cross-tabulation of current use by parity and
number of living sons, Arnold’s original measure is used to estimate the overall
3 Park (1978) also shows that even in one population with strong son preference, such as 
Korea, within a different time period, the influence of the preference on fertility is related 
to the time when contraception was made widely available in the population.
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effect of preference on contraceptive behaviour. Arnold’s index attempts to 
estimate the possible effect on fertility in the situation of no sex preference. The 
approach assumes that all women at each parity will follow the same behaviour as 
those women at the same parity who are currently most satisfied with the sex 
composition of their children. The index is defined as:
CiPi / Pi
Where Cj equals the maximum rate of contraceptive use at each parity^ (implying 
the most satisfaction with the sex composition of their children); and Pj equals the 
number of women at each parity.4 The difference between the assumed 
contraceptive use rate and the actual rate is the quantitative overall effect of sex 
preference on contraceptive practice.
The family planning program was intensified after the launching of the 
One-Child Campaign in 1979. Six years later (1985), contraceptive practice had 
become nearly universal. The first columns of Tables 7.10, 7.11 and 7.12 present 
data on current contraceptive use rates for the three regions. The current use rates 
were about 90 per cent for women with three or more children in Shaanxi, for those 
with two or more children in Hebei, and for all women except those who were 
childless in Shanghai. Nevertheless, closer examination of the IDFS survey data 
shows fairly homogeneous son preference in the two provinces, consistent with 
findings from 1982 national level survey data (Arnold, 1985).
Among one-child families, the difference between the proportion of couples 
using contraception when their only child is a boy or a girl is about 8 per cent for 
Shaanxi and Hebei and zero for Shanghai. The difference increases to 10 per cent 
in Shaanxi but drops to 6 per cent in Hebei while remaining zero in Shanghai 
when two-daughter families are compared with two-son families.
4 A detailed description and demonstration of the measure is in Arnold, 1985.
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Table 7.10 The effect of sex preference on contraceptive use of currently married, 
fecund women, Hebei province, China, 1985
Num ber and 
sex of living 
children
Per cent using 
contraception
Per cent using 
contraception 
excluding 
sterilization
Per cent 
sterilized
Num ber
of
women
In the absence of 
sex preference 
Per cent using Per cent 
contraception sterilized
Num ber of
living children 1.7 1.7 0.0 352 1.7 0.0
One child 1147
No son 68.7 68.1 0.6 467 76.2 1.3
One son 76.2 74.9 1.3 680 76.2 1.3
Two children 1387
No son 86.3 30.4 55.9 211 92.3 74.8
One son 91.3 23.3 68.0 772 92.3 74.8
Two sons 92.3 17.5 74.8 404 92.3 74.8
Three children 976
No son 92.6 25.9 66.7 81 95.0 72.1
One son 93.2 21.1 72.1 380 95.0 72.1
Two sons 92.4 25.3 67.1 395 95.0 72.1
Three sons 95.0 34.2 60.8 120 95.0 72.1
Four children 545
No son 88.5 30.8 57.7 26 93.5 60.6
One son 93.5 42.5 51.0 153 93.5 60.6
Two sons 89.3 36.5 52.8 214 93.5 60.6
Three sons 87.4 45.4 42.0 119 93.5 60.6
Four sons 90.9 30.3 60.6 33 93.5 60.6
Five or more
children 354
Daughters>sons 85.6 49.8 35.8 201 95.2 35.8
Daughters=sons 95.2 61.9 33.3 21 95.2 35.8
Daughters<sons 83.3 53.0 30.3 132 95.2 35.8
Total 79.9 37.6 42.4 4761 82.6 46.5
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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Table 7.11 The effect of sex preference on contraceptive use of currently married, 
fecund women, Shaanxi province, China, 1985
Num ber and 
sex of living 
children
Per cent using 
contraception
Per cent using 
contraception 
excluding 
sterilization
Per cent 
sterilized
Num ber
of
women
In the absence of 
sex preference 
Per cent using Per cent 
contraception sterilized
Num ber of
living children 3.9 3.9 0.0 332 3.9 0.0
One child 700
No son 55.8 55.8 0.0 308 63.5 1.8
One son 63.5 61.7 1.8 392 63.5 1.8
Two children 883
No son 77.2 51.2 26.0 123 88.6 50.2
One son 88.6 45.0 43.6 511 88.6 50.2
Two sons 86.7 36.5 50.2 249 88.6 50.2
Three children 783
No son 90.0 54.0 36.0 50 95.6 53.1
One son 88.3 39.2 49.1 283 95.6 53.1 •
Two sons 94.1 46.6 47.5 337 95.6 53.1
Three sons 95.6 42.5 53.1 113 95.6 53.1
Four children 552
No son 94.4 44.4 50.0 18 94.8 50.0
One son 91.6 44.3 47.3 131 94.8 50.0
Two sons 91.5 52.2 39.3 224 94.8 50.0
Three sons 94.8 53.2 41.6 154 94.8 50.0
Four sons 92.0 48.0 44.0 25 94.8 50.0
Five or more
children 390
Daughters>sons 86.2 56.9 29.3 188 89.5 37.5
Daughters=sons 90.0 52.5 37.5 40 89.5 37.5
Daughters<sons 89.5 56.2 33.3 162 89.5 37.5
Total 76.1 45.3 30.8 3640 78.6 35.5
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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Table 7.12 The effect of sex preference on contraceptive use of currently married, 
fecund women, Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Num ber and 
sex of living 
children
Per cent using 
contraception
Per cent using 
contraception 
excluding 
sterilization
Per cent 
sterilized
Num ber
of
women
In the absence of 
sex preference 
Per cent using Per cent 
contraception sterilized
Num ber of
living children 11.8 11.8 0.0 313 11.8 0.0
One child 2066
No son 89.9 88.5 1.4 935 89.9 1.4
One son 89.7 88.5 1.2 1131 89.9 1.4
Two children 1109
No son 94.2 71.0 23.2 241 94.2 31.6
One son 93.9 64.7 29.2 555 94.2 31.6
Two sons 94.2 62.6 31.6 313 94.2 31.6
Three children 385
No son 92.7 45.4 47.3 55 94.9 67.4
One son 94.9 36.9 58.0 138 94.9 67.4
Two sons 92.5 27.4 65.1 146 94.9 67.4
Three sons 91.3 23.9 67.4 46 94.9 67.4
Four children 86
No son 100.0 33.3 66.7 3 100.0 80.8
One son 92.1 42.1 50.0 38 100.0 80.8
Two sons 92.3 11.5 80.8 26 100.0 80.8
Three sons 91.7 16.7 75.0 12 100.0 80.8
Four sons 100.0 42.9 57.1 7 100.0 80.8
Five or more
children 9
Daughters>sons 85.7 42.8 42.9 7 100.0 100.0
Daughters=son s 100.0 0.0 100.0 1 100.0 100.0
Daughters<sons 100.0 0.0 100.0 1 100.0 100.0
Total 85.2 69.2 16.0 3968 85.7 18.1
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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Son preference is more clearly evident in the percentage distribution of 
couples sterilized (column three of Tables 7.10, 7.11 and 7.12). The effect of 
population policy on limitation of the family size is reflected by comparison of total 
use rate and sterilization rate. Couples are pressured much less by population 
policy to make a choice between reversible and non-reversible methods than to 
make a choice whether or not to accept contraception. It therefore seems plausible 
that the pattern of use of sterilization is a better indicator of the effect of sex 
preference on use of family planning. As can be seen in column 3 of Tables 7.10, 
7.11 and 7.12, no sterilization is undergone by childless women, and it is rarely 
used by couples with only one child. Sterilization mainly occurs among couples 
who have had at least two children, which implies an intention to avoid additional 
children over the number permitted by the current population policy, rather than a 
choice of voluntary childlessness or one-child parenthood (Tien, 1982: 290)
The most striking contrast exists among two-child families. In Shaanxi the 
proportion of couples who were sterilized is nearly twice as high among two-son 
families as among two-daughter families, and the corresponding difference among 
Hebei couples is 19 percentage points. Even in Shanghai son preference is 
somewhat evident among couples with three or fewer children. The pattern might 
suggest that under current population policy pressure, since most couples want at 
least two children, two-child families are a critical family size. At this family size, 
son preference greatly affects subsequent fertility. Those women who are satisfied 
with the sex of the first two children will stop, otherwise they will continue to have 
another birth.
In general, the dominant pattern indicates a strong desire to have at least 
one son and a substantial propensity to have two sons. Couples who have only 
daughters are less likely to be using contraception than those who have one or two
sons.
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The last two columns of Tables 7.10, 7.11 and 7.12 estimate the use of 
contraception or sterilization in the absence of any sex preference. The assumption 
is that at each parity the proportions using contraception or sterilization for all 
couples would be the same as the highest proportion at that same parity for 
couples with any combination of boys and girls (Arnold, 1985; 1987b). However, as 
expected, in the absence of sex preference, the estimated proportion using 
contraception would increase about 2.7 percentage points in Hebei and 2.5 in 
Shaanxi, and would be virtually unchanged in Shanghai. The difference between 
estimated and actual rates among sterilization users is 4.1 percentage points for 
Hebei and 4.7 for Shaanxi. The cross-classification results show that the current 
impact of sex of living children on contraceptive use rate is more modest than that 
observed on the stated desired fertility (see Chapter 6).
7.4.2 Sex p referen ce  and recen t fertility
The association between the sex structure of living children and contraceptive 
prevalence rate was examined in the previous section. This section assesses the 
overall effect of sex preference on recent fertility. The proportion of women having 
at least one birth in the five-year period preceding the survey is chosen as the 
measure of recent fertility, in order to apply the SPEF index, and to test the 
hypothesis suggested by Chowdhury and Bairagi (1990) in the special case of 
China. In China, two different factors come into play as fertility declines. On the 
one hand, contraceptive services have become widely available and contraceptive 
practice is nearly universal; on the other hand, population policy on birth 
limitation has been intensifying as well.
The approximately longitudinal study design provides a dynamic picture 
which makes it possible to ascertain the effect of sex preference on recent fertility 
among the survey cohort women over a five-year period which coincides with the 
most powerful period of birth control in China. The proportions of women giving
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birth are cross-classified by number and sex of the living children at the start of 
the five-year period, 1980. This reconstruction of family size and composition was 
made possible by the survey's birth history data in the standard recode files, which 
contain detailed information for each birth on the sex, date of birth, birth order 
and, if applicable, the age at death. Note that the distribution of number of women 
among the parity and sex composition of children categories is quite different from 
their distribution of current family size and composition, since the distribution of 
proportion of women giving birth refers to a time point five years before the survey.
The SPEF index is a method to assess the quantitative impact of sex 
preference on fertility. The percentage of women who had given birth to at least 
one child in the five-year period preceding the survey is a measure of recent 
fertility. SPEF estimates the expected reduction in the percentages of women who 
have had at least one birth, in the absence of the effect of sex preference. The 
SPEF index is transformed from Arnold's measure by Chowdhury and 
Bairagi(1990: 751-752):
SPEF=(1 - XjFjWy/ XjFyWjj) x 100 for women of parity^
SPEF=(1 - Xj XjFiWy/ X  ^Xj X FjjWy) X 100 for all women combined
where: Fy = proportion giving birth among women with j sons in parityj(j< or = i) 
Fj = minimum of Fy over j in parity^,
Wy = number of women with j sons in parity}.
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Table 7.13 shows, as expected, that during the period of rapid fertility 
decline and the intense birth control campaign, the percentage of women giving 
birth during the five-year interval is substantially decreased and lower than in the 
case of Bangladesh (Chowdhury and Bairagi, 1990). The major aim of China's 
current population policy is to eliminate all births equal to three or more per 
couple, and to encourage most couples to have no more than one child. The policy 
impact is clearly visible in the pattern of the percentages according to parity. About 
65 per cent of women with one living child in the two provinces have had at least 
one birth during the five years, while the proportion drops sharply to about one 
quarter among women with two living children, and then decreases as the family 
size becomes larger.
The result also confirms the previous findings by using different measures, 
which indicate a very strong desire in the two provinces to have at least one son. 
As can be seen in Table 7.13, at each family size , the percentage giving birth is 
substantially higher among women with only daughters than among women with 
at least one son. Up to parity two, the more sons the women have, the smaller the 
proportion of them giving birth. In addition, women with no daughters among 
parity three and four are more likely to give birth than women who have had one 
daughter. This pattern is also found in Bangladesh (Chowdhury and Bairagi, 
1990: 754), which may suggest that there is a general desire to have a daughter 
but probably not before two sons are born.
An inverse relationship is also found between the percentage giving birth 
and the level of SPEF index. The SPEF values generally go up as the family size 
increases. The overall effect of sex preference on recent fertility estimated from the 
SPEF index are about 9 per cent in Hebei and 10 per cent for Shaanxi, which is 
substantial in the case of China. Although the overall effect is 2.9 per cent in 
Shanghai, among one-child families, the SPEF value for Shanghai is about the
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same as, and its value at parity two is even higher than, those of Hebei and 
Shaanxi.
Table 7.13 Percentage of women having at least one birth over 5 years, by 
number of living children and number of living sons at start of study and values of 
index of sex preference effect on fertility ( SPEF), Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, 
Shanghai municipality, China, 1980-1985
Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
Number Number Number Per cent 
of living of living of giving
children sons women birth
Number Per cent 
of giving
SPEF women birth
Number Per cent 
of giving
SPEF women birth SPEF
0 1676 79.2 0.0 1250 73.8 0.0 1696 80.9 0.0
1 740 65.0 11.0 489 65.2 12.2 907 12.0 11.7
0 332 73.8 222 74.8 398 13.8
1 408 57.8 267 57.3 509 10.6
2 987 26.6 25.6 667 27.1 30.7 1029 1.1 36.4
0 155 54.8 129 55.0 218 1.4
1 544 22.2 352 21.3 521 1.2
2 288 19.8 186 18.8 290 0.7
3 822 15.6 37.6 688 11.0 46.5 401 0 0
0 65 44.6 46 34.8 54 0 0
1 315 17.1 232 12.9 143 0 0
2 330 9.7 304 5.9 158 0 0
3 112 11.6 106 11.3 46 0 0
4 484 5.6 67.6 564 7.6 40.9 100 0 0
0 26 34.6 18 11.1 4 0 0
1 127 5.5 130 13.8 43 0 0
2 192 3.6 222 4.5 32 0 0
3 111 1.8 167 6.0 14 0 0
4 28 7.1 27 11.1 7 0 0
5+ 371 3.0 96.6 426 8.0 43.6 10 0 0
0 17 5.9 16 43.8 1 0 0
S<D 181 2.2 193 4.7 7 0 0
S=D 21 4.8 166 9.0 1 0 0
S>D 144 3.5 44 4.5 1 0 0
5 more S 8 0.1 7 14.3 0 0 0
Total 5080 44.0 8.8 4084 38.6 10.3 4143 36.0 1.13
21.4* 23.6* 14.0*
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: S = son D = daughter
* Assuming that childless women follow the preference pattern that other women followed.
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Moreover, the SPEF index assumes that there is no sex preference among 
the childless women who account for 33, 31 and 42 per cent of the total 
respondents for Hebei, Shaanxi and Shanghai, respectively. However, in the 
calculation of overall SPEF index these women are included in the denominator. 
This is why the overall index is substantially lower than the value in each parity 
level. Therefore, if it were assumed that the women who were childless at the start 
of the study time would follow the preference pattern that other women followed, 
the actual effect might increase remarkably. As indicated at the bottom of Table 
7.13, the overall impact would increase to 21 per cent for Hebei, 24 per cent for 
Shaanxi and 14 per cent for Shanghai.
7.5 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter investigates the relationship between sex preference and reproductive 
behaviour in some other ways: (a) the effect of couples' sex preference on their 
subsequent fertility, (b) the adoption of family planning techniques in relation to 
the existing sex composition of living children, and (c) sex preference and its effect 
on recent fertility.
In Hebei and Shaanxi, a very strong desire to have at least one son is 
observed among women at different parity levels. Women whose first two or three 
children are daughters only are less likely to use contraception, particularly 
sterilization, and are more likely to progress to larger families than women with at 
least one son or mixed-sex families. It appears that the greater the number of 
living sons, the more likely is the woman to stop bearing additional children. 
There is no indication of any preference for at least one daughter, probably until 
two sons have been born.
The probabilities of women having another child across parities differ 
among the three regions, especially between the two provinces and metropolitan
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Shanghai. This might be interpreted as the consequence of different macro-level 
social and economic development and timing of the initiation of the family planning 
program (Shi, 1988), and differences in the actual strength of population control 
among the three areas.
Evidence from the study at the individual family level suggests that the sex 
of previous children is the most important factor which operates persistently in the 
couples' family building decisions. Before the launching of the One-Child 
Campaign (1979), the wide availability of contraceptive knowledge and facilities, 
and the popular use of contraception promoted a closer association between sex 
preference and actual behaviour. Both the sex preference and the socio-economic 
characteristics of women played a significant role in fertility planning. However, 
the vigorous family planning program indicated by the One-Child Campaign 
appears to have substantially suppressed (in Hebei) and overridden (in Shaanxi), 
the role of some socio-economic characteristics of women within provinces in the 
decision to progress from a small family (two children) to a larger family (three or 
more). But the influence of son preference became even stronger when it was 
subjected to the tighter population policy. In other words, the wish to achieve a 
satisfying sex composition is the only significant motivation for two-child families 
to have additional births even at the risk of defying the birth control policy that 
eliminates all third or higher-order births.
It is not surprising to find that the overall effect of sex preference on 
contraceptive practice estimated from Arnold's original index is rather moderate. 
Several possible explanations should be mentioned: first, the denominator used to 
calculate the contraceptive rates is based on only currently married, fecund women 
while in analysis of fertility, the target population refers to all ever married 
women. Secondly, contraceptive practice had become almost universal in the three 
regions by 1985, six years after the launching of the One-Child Campaign. 
Consequently the prevalence rates are close to or about the same as in developed
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countries. Couples who have had one or two children have virtually no choices 
about whether to adopt contraception, but they do have some choices about the 
specific techniques of birth control, especially between reversible and non- 
re versible methods. Thirdly, current use incorporated intentions both to limit 
family size and to space births.
The empirical studies of developing countries did show that the association 
between sex composition and contraceptive use is much weaker than the 
association observed between sex composition and actual fertility or stated desire 
to limit family size (Cleland et al., 1983). Nevertheless, on the basis of 1982 survey 
data for China, Wang (1988) found that the number, sex and the survival status of 
the first two births had much greater effect than socio-economic characteristics of 
women in the probability of using contraception in Hebei.
The overall effect of sex preference on recent fertility estimated from the 
SPEF index is 8 to 10 per cent for the two provinces, which is not insubstantial in 
the case of China, while the effect in Shanghai is rather small. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, the SPEF index is based on the sex composition at a single point 
in time, five years before the survey. The sex preference effect among women who 
were childless at that time cannot be detected and included in the index; such 
women accounted for more than one-third of the total respondents for the two 
provinces and 40 per cent for Shanghai. This exclusion could cause 
underestimation of the influence of sex preference.
The results also show some divergence from the proposition of Chowdhury 
and Bairagi. It is true that adequate contraceptive services and a sizable 
contraceptive prevalence level constitute an important condition under which the 
effect of son preference became visible and would be fulfilled. However, it cannot 
be interpreted as the higher the contraceptive prevalence level, the more 
pronounced the impact of the preference. In the case of China, the highest
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prevalence rate is in Shanghai, followed by Hebei then Shaanxi; but the values of 
SPEF index show the reverse pattern. This unique pattern may reflect two facts: 
first, the sex preference was indeed substantially weakening in Shanghai. 
Secondly, the very high prevalence level is the response to the pressure of 
government population policy.
The evidence in this chapter documents the strong, pervasive son preference 
which persisted during the powerful family planning program period and the One- 
Child Campaign in the two provinces, while their level of fertility were 
dramatically declining. The preference for a son was also evident in Shanghai 
before the vigorous family planning program was implemented. This might imply 
that the great effort of China's birth control programs did, to a large extent, reduce 
couples' demand for children, but did not change their attitudes towards male 
superiority’, which is deeply rooted in the traditional cultural and social structures. 
This attitude, however, did not prevent the average family size from decreasing 
from as high as six children to two or three children, since the impact of son 
preference is relatively weaker at higher birth orders. It will have a more powerful 
influence on fertility as the average family size decreases further.
There is also empirical evidence that sex preference affects other 
reproductive behaviour such as length of breastfeeding, birth intervals, and 
abortion (Arnold and Liu, 1986; Tu, 1989, 1991), that is, both the level and the 
tempo of childbearing. When all the factors are considered, it may be argued that 
the efforts both to improve the level of socio-economic development and to change 
the sex preference will exert a substantial impact on future fertility.
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C hapter 8 The con fou n din g effect o f son  p referen ce and  
p opulation  p o licy  on sex  ratios at b irth  1
8.1 Introduction
Why have the sex ratios at birth risen, especially among higher-order births, since 
the implementation of the strict policies of birth control? Detailed studies are 
required at both the national and the provincial level. This chapter examines the 
confounding effect of son preference and population policy, especially the One-Child 
Policy, on sex ratios at birth at both the family and the societal level in Hebei and 
Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality. Using the China 1985 In-Depth 
Fertility Survey (IDFS) data, which include all births to the respondents aged 15- 
49, the first part tests whether the strong son preference has persistently affected 
women's childbearing over the past several decades. This would be indicated by 
significant differentials in sex ratios between small and large families, and 
between last-bom children and preceding ones, i.e., by high sex ratios in small 
families and in last-bom children. By further concentrating on births occurring 
between 1975 and 1984, the second part analyses the confounding effect of son 
preference and population policy on sex ratios at birth and particularly at higher- 
order births at the societal level in the face of rapid fertility transition. In the third 
part, the potential influence of sex-selected abortion on sex ratios is investigated, 
and births are also analysed by place of delivery and by the kind of assistance 
during delivery, contributing to an understanding of the rise in the sex ratio by 
birth order.
The sex ratio of a population is defined as the number of males per 100 
females, and the variation can be attributed to sex differences in migration or 
mortality. The primary sex ratio is defined as the number of males per 100
1 A paper derived from this chapter was accepted for publication in the Journal of 
Biosocial Science. It is forthcoming in one of the 1993 issues (see Appendix B).
225
females at the time of conception ( Markle, 1974: 131). The biological mechanisms 
for sex determination have become known only in the 20th century (Williamson, 
1978: 4). Evidence shows that more males than females are actually conceived and 
the biological reasons for this remain largely mysteries (Williamson, 1978: 4), 
although several explanations for the high primary sex ratio have been offered 
(Markle, 1974: 131).
The present study focuses on secondary sex ratios or the sex ratios at birth, 
which are believed to be biologically very stable (Johansson and Nygren, 1991: 36), 
not varying significantly with parity, by age of mother, among socio-economic 
groups or between regions. Observed variation in sex ratios at birth could be 
directly caused by unobserved differential primary sex ratios, and different rates of 
miscarriage and stillbirths (Markle, 1974: 131; Johansson and Nygren 1991: 36). 
Sex ratios at birth may be indirectly influenced by natural and health factors 
within the population environment; or by social factors which may be conducive to 
variation by family size, birth order, or socioeconomic subgroups (Markle, 1974; 
Park, 1983; Coale, 1984; Hull, 1990; Johansson and Nygren, 1991).
8.2 Sex ratios at b irth  by fam ily  size
8.2.1 The all-births approach
As a consequence of male-preferring stopping rules of childbearing (Sheps, 1963; 
McClelland, 1979; Yamaguchi, 1989;), empirical data from south Korea indicate 
that in a population with son preference, the sex ratios of children in small families 
are high, while those in large families are low, and the sex ratios of the last-born 
children are high in comparison with those of preceding births at a given family 
size (Park, 1983: 334).
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Arnold and Liu (1986) verified the above propositions in the case of China 
on the basis of the 1982 One-per-Thousand Fertility Survey, which referred to the 
births since the 1930s to women aged 15-67 at the survey date.
The analysis of this section uses the all-births approach adopted from Park 
(1983). All live births to the respondents aged 15-49 in the samples of the 1985 
IDFS survey ( 12,456 for Hebei, 11,438 for Shaanxi and 6381 for Shanghai) are 
included. About 95 per cent of the births have occurred since 1960 and more than 
60 per cent have occurred since 1970, and these may better reflect the recent 
situation than the data from the 1982 survey. In examination of the sex ratios by 
birth order, multiple births (about 25-30 births in each area) are excluded.
The method of partitioning chi-square, a refined statistical approach, was 
applied for the all-births comparisons by family size and by region. The method of 
partitioning chi-square is a strategy which uses the test of independence on 
subtables formed from the larger table. It has been recommended that the 
likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic (L^) be partitioned rather than the Pearson chi- 
square statistic (X^) (Fienberg, 1981; Park, 1983). While there is rarely much 
difference between the two values, i ß  is convenient when the chi-square is 
partitioned. It can be broken into several additive parts, and the component i ß  
values sum to the total values exactly. Given the observed frequency for the ith cell 
of a table and the corresponding expected frequency Ej under some hypothesis, 
i ß  takes the form
i ß  = 2 (0{ Loge Oi/Ej)
(Park, 1983: 335).
8.2.1 Sex ratios of all children by family size
The consequences of son preference on the sex ratios at birth are presented in 
Table 8.1 and mainly represent the situation of the past three decades. The data
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demonstrate a strong and persistent son preference in Hebei and Shaanxi and a 
moderate son preference in Shanghai. The overall sex ratios in the two provinces, 
110 in Hebei and 112 in Shaanxi, are higher than 108.4, the 1981 national level 
estimated from the 1982 One-per-Thousand fertility survey (Coale, 1984; Arnold 
and Liu, 1986), while the ratio in Shanghai, 109, is close to the national level.
In this study the family size of a woman is that recorded at the survey date. 
In all three study regions there is an inverse relationship between the sex ratios at 
birth and the size of family, and this is more pronounced in Hebei and Shaanxi 
than in Shanghai. As can be seen in Table 8.1, in Hebei and Shaanxi the sex 
ratios of all children are very high in families with two and three children and 
extremely high in one-child families. They then drop rapidly starting from three- 
child families in Hebei and from four-child families in Shaanxi. In Shanghai, the 
sex ratios of one-child and two-child families are also quite high and the ratios 
decrease from three-child or larger families. The overall sex ratios for the small 
families (one to three-child families for the two provinces; one to two-child families 
for Shanghai) are 124.0, 127.1, 116.0 as against 94.4, 102.1, 95.7 for the large 
families (four or more children for the two provinces; three or more for Shanghai) in 
Hebei, Shaanxi, and Shanghai, respectively.
Table 8.1 gives a general picture. The variances in sex ratios by family size 
are highly significant, showing i ß  values of 76 and 36 for 4 degrees of freedom in 
Hebei and Shaanxi respectively; and 17 for 3 degrees of freedom in Shanghai. 
Then, the general picture is divided into several parts by the method of 
partitioning the chi-square statistic. Tables 8.2 and 8.2 present the results of 
partitioning of i ß  values for sex ratios of children by family size or birth order. The 
families were arbitrarily classified into 'small' (one to three children) and 'large' 
(four or more children) in Hebei and Shaanxi, and one to two children for 'small', 
and three or more children for 'large' families in Shanghai.
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Table 8.1 Sex ratios of children by family size and birth order, Hebei and Shaanxi 
provinces, reported by ever married women who were aged 15-49 in 1985 IDFS 
survey
All except 
Last-bom last-bom 
child child
Birth order of children
Family
size
All
children
1st
child
2nd 3rd 4th
child child child
5 th + 
child
Hebei province
1 144.0 144.0 144.0
2 126.4 133.3 120.0 120.0 133.3
3 114.8 134.8 106.0 111.9 100.4 134.8
4 103.0 143.4 92.7 85.9 85.9 107.8 143.4
5+ 88.0 113.2 83.5 96.4 72.4 81.6 84.6 100.7
Total 110.0 134.9 97.3 115.5 104.3 111.4 111.2 100.7
L2 75.8*** 5.86 35.1*** 32.3*** 45.1*** 21.9*** 19.4***
d.f. 4 4 3 4 3 2 1
Shaanxi province
1 129.1 129.1 129.1
2 126.9 141.2 114.3 114.3 141.2
3 126.6 159.8 113.1 120.8 105.9 159.8
4 107.6 127.7 101.8 95.1 109.8 101.1 127.7
5+ 99.3 115.5 96.3 95.4 95.7 95.4 99.5 105.5
Total 112.2 134.7 102.8 111.3 113.8 117.0 110.7 105.5
L2 36.0*** 10.7* 10.0* 13.4** 17.4*** 28.3*** 4.9*
d.f. 4 4 3 4 3 2 1
Shanghai municipality
1 118.6 118.6
2 113.5 121.1 106.6 106.6 121.1
3 101.3 109.9 97.5 95.8 99.2 109.9
4+ 85.8 138.6 74.1 85.9 67.3 80.2 108.7
Total 108.9 119.0 95.5 110.5 108.2 101.0 108.7
L2 16.8*** 1.73 12.2*** 8.1* 13.6*** 3
d.f. 3 3 2 3 2 1
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: L2 = likelihood ratio chi-square statistic; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
d.f. = degrees of freedom
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From Tables 8.2 and 8.3, it is clear that the variation in i ß  for sex ratios of 
siblings is mainly due to the highly significant differences between small and large 
families. Among all children, the difference between small and larger families 
accounts for 75 per cent of the variation for Hebei, 94 per cent for Shaanxi and 76 
per cent for Shanghai.
Table 8.2 Partitioning of chi-square for sex ratio of living children by family size, 
Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, China, 1985
Source
Hebei
L2 d.f.
Shaanxi 
L2 d.f.
All children 75 .8* * * 4 36.0*** 4
Within small families 11 .0* * 2 0.1 2
Within large families 8 .2* * 1 2.4 1
Between small and large families 56 .6* * * 1 33.6*** 1
First child 32 .3* * * 4 13.4** 4
Within small families 9 .3* * 2 1.6 2
Within large families 0.0 1 0.0 1
Between small and large families 22.1*** 1 11.8*** 1
Second child 45.1*** 3 17.4*** 3
Between family size 2 and 3 11.6*** 1 8.6*** 1
Between family size 4 and 5+ 2.1 1 1.5 1
Between small and large families 31.4*** 1 7.2** 1
Third child 21.9*** 2 28.3*** 2
Between family size 4 and 5+ 5.5* 1 0.3 1
Between family size 3 and 4+ 16.4*** 1 28.0*** 1
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: 'Small families' denotes family size 3 or less and 'large families' denotes family size 4 and 
above, unless otherwise indicated.
L2 = likelihood ratio chi-square statistic; d.f. = degrees of freedom, * p<0.05; **p<0.01;
*** p<0.001.
When the birth order is controlled, the significant differentials between 
small and large families persist across all orders of births and in all the three study 
areas. No significant differences exist between family size four and five or more in 
Shaanxi and Hebei provinces except for a weak significance among the third order
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births in Hebei, while significant differences were found within small families in 
Hebei for both first and second births, and for second births only in Shaanxi. It is 
noteworthy that significant variations exist with regard to the second child 
between family sizes two and three, and with regard to the third child between 
three-child and four-child families. It seems that son preference affecting the 
decision of couples with two or three children to continue or stop childbearing is 
more critical in Hebei and Shaanxi.
Table 8.3 Partitioning of chi-square for sex ratio of living children by family size, 
Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Shanghai
Source L2 d.f.
All children 16.8*** 3
Within small families 0.5 1
Within large families 3.3 1
Between small and large families 13.0*** 1
First child 8.1* 3
Within small families 2.1 1
Within large famillies 0.4 1
Between small and large families 5.6* 1
Second child 13.6*** 2
Between family size 3 and 4+ 4.6* 1
Berween family size 2 and 3+ 9.1** 1
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: 'Small families' denotes family size 2 or less and 'large 
families' denotes family size 3 and above, unless other 
wise indicated.
L2 = likelihood ratio chi-square statistic; d.f. = degrees 
of freedom, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.
In this study the last-bom child is the last live birth that a woman had 
before the survey date. The sex ratios of all last-bom children in the two provinces 
are 135 (Table 8.1), which is substantially higher than the 123 at the national level 
(Arnold and Liu, 1986: 239), and even slightly higher than that of South Korea, 
where the ratio was 133 according to the 1974 Korean National Fertility Survey
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(Park, 1983: 336). The sex ratio of all last-bom children in Shanghai is also very 
high (119), but it is slightly lower than the national level. Apparently, there is no 
pronounced impact of family size on sex ratios of the last-bom child: the i ß  values 
(Table 8.1) indicate little or no significant variation across family sizes for the last- 
bom children. But the general reverse pattern between family sizes and sex ratios 
at birth remains the same for each birth order as for all births.
The i ß  values presented in Table 8.4 show the difference between the last- 
born child and the preceding children by family size and birth order. When family 
size is controlled, the sex ratios between the last birth and the preceding ones are 
significantly different in all family sizes for Shaanxi and in three-child and four- 
child families for Hebei. The ratio is significant only among four-child families in 
Shanghai. When last births are excluded, the sex ratios between or within birth 
orders are not significantly different.
Table 8.4 Difference between the sex ratios of the last child and preceding 
children by family size, Hebei, Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, 
China, 1985
Source
Hebei
L2 d.f.
Shaanxi 
L2 d.f.
Shanghai 
L2 d.f.
Two-child families
Between order 1 and 2 1.96 1 5.2* 1 2.2 1
Three-child families 10.9** 2 16.4*** 2 1.2 2
Between order 1 and 2 1.5 1 1.7 1 0.1 1
Between the last and preceding children 9.4** 1 14.7*** 1 1.1 1
Four-child families 26.1*** 3 6.7 3 5.6 3
Within order 1, 2, and 3 5.2 2 1.5 2 1.3 2
Between the last and preceding children 20.9*** 1 5.3* 1 4.4* 1
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: L2 = likelihood ratio chi-square statistic; d.f. = degrees of freedom, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01,
*** p<0.001.
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8.3 Sex ratios at birth: period analysis
In recent years many authors have raised the issue of abnormal sex ratios for 
higher-parity births in China. Coale (1984: 25-26), and Liu and Li (1984: 157-158) 
found that sex ratios at birth in 1981 increased as birth order increased in both 
rural and urban China. On the basis of the same data (the 1982 One-per-Thousand 
Fertility Survey in China), however, Arnold and Liu (1986: 240) asserted that the 
sex ratios of all births were fairly constant across birth orders, and that the 
anomalous findings of Coale and Liu did not seem to have occurred regularly for 
births in earlier years. Again, comparing the results of the 1987 One-per-Cent 
Fertility Survey with the 1982 One-per-Thousand Fertility Survey, Hull (1990: 68) 
pointed out that the reported sex ratios at birth for 1986 showed a clear pattern of 
high ratios for second and higher-order births, and demonstrated that the ratios for 
1986 were appreciably higher than those for 1981 at each parity. Using the 1988 
Two-per-Thousand fertility survey data, Johansson and Nygren (1991) verified the 
previous findings about the higher- than-normal sex ratios at birth for reported 
higher-order births in the 1980s, and further revealed that the sex ratios were far 
above normal for live births outside birth control quotas while the ratios for births 
within the quota were close to normal. However, it is not clear whether or not the 
higher sex ratios at birth and the birth-order effect on the sex ratio at birth 
occurred before 1981.
This section, apart from verifying the previous findings, explores the 
regional differentials in the macro-level consequences of son preference on sex 
ratios at birth, and particularly the birth-order effect during the period of the 
strong family planning program, both before and after the launching of the One- 
Child Campaign.
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8.3.1 The selected-birth approach
Coale's ( 1984), and Liu and Li's (1984) findings were drawn from births in 1981 
only, and Hull's (1990) results came from the births 18 months before the end of 
1986. Hence, the effect of birth order on the sex ratios at birth was evident from 
the births occurred around a period of one year at different time points during the 
1980s.
Arnold and Liu’s (1986) analysis was based on the entire huge sampling 
cohort in the 1982 One-per-Thousand Fertility Survey. This has a long time span 
starting from ever married women aged 15 in the year 1930 and so provides us 
with 40 years of childbearing history. This approach (all-births approach) is very 
useful in demonstrating the effects of sex preference on family size over this 
historical period by examining the sex ratios of siblings and last-bom children, as 
was shown above. However, misleading conclusions can be drawn if this approach 
is used to observe the sex ratios at birth for early years and to examine changes 
over time without considering the problems of selective bias in retrospective birth 
history data. In illustrating the sex ratios at birth during 1960-87, Johansson and 
Nygren (1991: 39) concluded that the 1988 survey data on births are less reliable 
for the early years, when erratic sex ratios are observed for 20-25 years ago. 
Johansson and Nygren's observation is based on the whole sampling cohort of the 
Two-per-Thousand Fertility Survey in 1988, including married women aged 15-57 
years. It is true that for several reasons the birth history data are less reliable for 
the early years. When women are asked to recall the date and sex of births which 
may have taken place decades ago, they may omit and misdate the births, or they 
may misstate the sex of the births through recall lapse. However, attention should 
also be paid to the methodological problem, selectivity bias. The births available for 
analysis in the survey data may be only a selected subset of all available births, 
that is, some births may be omitted by the upper age limit of the women in the 
sample (Rindfuss, Palmore and Bumpass, 1982). For example, in China's 1988
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fertility survey women aged 15-57 years were interviewed, and therefore, among 
all children bom  during 1966-70, only those bom  to m others then aged 35 years or 
under would have been included. Children born during th a t period to m others aged 
36 or older were excluded by the upper age lim it of the 1988 survey sample.
This section uses the selected-birth approach (Rindfuss e t al., 1982)2. The 
advantage of this approach is th a t the comparisons across tim e are unbiased. The 
b irths which occurred in  the time period 1975-84 were selected. The earliest births 
in  1975 could only be included in the sample if they had occurred to women aged 40 
or under a t the time. Therefore, b irths to women above age 40 in 1985 were 
excluded from the analysis. The b irths which occurred between 1975 and 1984 
were grouped by two five-year periods, to overcome the annual fluctuations which 
m ight be caused by m isdating the b irths, and to reduce the standard  deviations by 
the increased sample size of each grouping^. The survey interview date was April, 
1985, so b irths in the first four m onths of 1985 were excluded.
8.3.2 Sex ratios at birth 1975-84
The five-year grouped data  in Table 8.5 reveal th a t between 1975 and 1984, the 
period of the intense family planning program, the overall sex ratios, 113 for Hebei 
and 115 for Shaanxi, are considerably higher than  the norm al 106 level by about 
three standard  deviations, while in Shanghai the ratio is slightly higher than  the 
expected level. The sex ratios a t b irth  of the second period (1980-84) are higher 
th an  those of the first period (1975-79), particularly in Hebei province, where the 
ratio  for 1975-79 was close to the national level estim ated from the 1982 survey, 
and it increased substantially  during the period 1980-84 (from 110 to 115 ).
2 This paper contains a detailed discussion of the issue of selectivity bias and suggested 
strategies.
3 The standard deviation (SD) is calculated on the assumption that the normal sex ratio at 
birth is 106 males per 100 females, following previous research by Coale (1984) and Hull 
(1990): SD = [sqrt (.5146 x .4854/N)x( 17.48542)] x 100
= [2.1212/ sqrt N] x 100
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Table 8.5 Sex ratios a t b irth  in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai 
municipality, China, 1975-1984, reported by women who were aged 40 or less in 
1985 IDFS survey
Births
Sex
ratios
Standard
deviationYear Total Males Females
Hebei province
1975-79 2348 1228 1120 109.6 4.4
1980-84 2873 1537 1336 115.0 4.0
Total 5221 2765 2456 112.6 2.9
Shaanxi province
1975-79 1915 1019 896 113.7 4.8
1980-84 2050 1103 947 116.5 4.7
Total 3965 2122 1843 115.1 3.4
Shanghai municipality
1975-79 1102 576 526 109.5 6.4
1980-84 1567 816 751 108.7 5.4
Total 2669 1392 1277 109.0 4.1
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
The ratios for Shaanxi were very high over the whole ten-year period, while there 
was a slight increase between the two five-year periods (from 114 to 117 ). The 
ratios for births to women aged 40 or under in Shanghai rem ained around 108-109 
during the ten-year period. In the two provinces, the high and increasing sex ratios 
a t b irth  during the two periods seem to reflect the influence of the population 
policy, particularly the One-Child Policy th a t was officially announced in 1979. The 
evidence from the Fourth National Population Census of China reveals th a t sex 
ratios a t b irth  in 1989 are 112.4 for Hebei, 111.6 for Shaanxi and 105.0 for 
Shanghai, and the ratios slightly increase to 115.5 for Hebei, 113.6 for Shaanxi 
and 105.8 for Shanghai in the first half of 1990 (National Population Census
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Office, 1990). Hence, the sex ratios derived from the 1985 IDFS survey for the 
period 1975-84 are close to the results of the fourth census for 1989 and the first 
half of 1990.
8.3.3 Birth order and sex ratios at birth
A comparison can be made of the results from the two different approaches. Table 
8.1 displays the sex ratios from the all-births approach. All live births to the 
respondents in the samples (12,456 for Hebei, 11,438 for Shaanxi, and 6381 for 
Shanghai) are included. As expected, there are no clear and persistent patterns of 
birth-order effect, since the births occurred during quite a long period, from the 
early 1950s until 1985, under changing circumstances in terms of socioeconomic 
development and, particularly, the strength of population policy. Higher sex ratios 
at birth may not have occurred before the implementation of a vigorous family 
planning program.
However, the results from the selected births (Table 8.6) show that in 
regions with strong son preference, such as Hebei and Shaanxi, not only were the 
overall sex ratios at birth higher than normal, but also the effect of birth order on 
sex ratios occurred over a quite long term, which could be traced back to as early as 
the middle 1970s and coincided with the period of vigorous implementation of the 
family planning program, particularly the One-Child Campaign.
A fairly clear pattern of birth-order effect is shown in Table 8.6 for Shaanxi 
based on the selected births to women aged 40 or under during 1975-84. The ratio 
of first births appears normal, suggesting that women in Shaanxi want at least 
two children, and the sex of the first child may have less influence on the bearing of 
the next child than on births in higher orders. But starting from the second birth 
order, the ratios are higher as birth order increases. A similar pattern is 
demonstrated in Hebei except that the ratio of first births is surprisingly high and 
the ratio of second births is unusually low.
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Table 8.6 Sex ratios a t b irth  by b irth  order in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and 
Shanghai municipality, China, 1975-1984, reported by women who were aged 40 or 
less in 1985 IDFS survey
Order of births
1st 2nd 3rd 4th+ All births
Hebei province
Total births 2343 1642 840 396 5221
Male 1260 835 448 222 2765
Female 1083 807 392 174 2456
Sex ratios 116.3 103.5 114.3 127.6 112.6
Standard deviation 4.4 5.2 7.3 10.7 2.9
Shaanxi province
Total births 1579 1170 657 559 3965
Male 817 630 356 319 2122
Female 762 540 301 240 1843
Sex ratios 107.2 116.7 118.3 132.9 115.1
Standard deviation 5.3 6.2 8.3 9.0 3.4
Shanghai municipality
Total births 2116 553 2669
Male 1118 274 1392
Female 998 279 1277
Sex ratios 112.0 98.2 109.0
Standard deviation 4.6 9.0 4.1
Source: China 1985 IDFs survey data tape.
Note: 2nd birth order in Shanghai included all higher births.
In Shanghai, there is also a very high sex ratio of first-order births and a very low 
sex ratio  of second-order births. A part from the sampling variations these 
phenom ena may be partly  due to the stronger impact of the One-Child Policy on 
the reporting of the first two orders of births, particularly in metropolitan 
Shanghai. Furtherm ore, because only about 14 per cent of second births were to 
urban women of whom fewer progress to higher parity, the general picture of birth-
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order effect may eventually reflect the rural women's childbearing behaviour. In 
Shanghai municipality, the strict One-Child Policy is clearly mirrored in the birth- 
order effect. As is shown in Table 8.6, the sex ratio of the first child is considerably 
higher than normal, while the ratios for second and higher parities are obviously 
unreliable (with a standard deviation of 9), yielding a value lower than 100, but 
with 95 per cent confidence limits of 80 to 116.
8.4 Explanations for the high sex ratios at birth
Under the current population policy, urban couples can have only one child, while 
peasants are allowed a second child, within the birth plan quota and with 
reasonable spacing, if the first-born is a girl; third or higher order births are 
prohibited. How did couples with strong son preference deal with their unfavoured 
girls? The possible explanations proposed are: not reporting the births of surviving 
female children; unreported female infanticide ( Coale, 1984: 26; Hull, 1990: 72-76; 
Johansson and Nygren, 1991: 50); sex-selective abortion (Hull, 1990: 73); and 
unreported female-baby adoption (Johansson and Nygren, 1991: 50). These 
possible explanations are related to the pressure of the One-Child Campaign 
(Coale, 1984: 26; Hull, 1990: 72; Johansson and Nygren, 1991); some of them can 
be investigated from available data.
8.4.1 Place of delivery and assistance during delivery
The 1985 IDFS survey includes the variables place of delivery and assistance 
during delivery, for each live birth. By the two different approaches mentioned 
above, these data are used to compare the births which occurred under the 
circumstances of policy and program efforts, with those in the situation over 
several decades, and also to avoid selectivity bias.
Table 8.7 presents the distribution of live births according to the place of 
delivery by birth order and residence for the three regions. More than 90 per cent
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of all deliveries to women aged 15-49 in rural areas of the two provinces occurred 
at home or elsewhere rather than in hospitals and clinics. Comparing all births 
with births during 1975-84 to women aged 40 or under shows a trend of a decrease 
in the proportions of babies born at home and elsewhere and an increase in the 
proportion born at hospitals and clinics. However, a closer examination by birth 
order showed that this variation is mainly due to the decrease in the proportion of 
first-order births which occurred at home or elsewhere. For the second and higher- 
order births in rural Hebei and Shaanxi, the proportions of babies born at home 
and elsewhere are still higher than 90 per cent.
As expected, more babies were born in hospitals and clinics in urban areas 
than in rural areas. When all births to the whole sampling cohort are compared 
with selected births during the ten-year program period, the decline in total 
proportions of babies born at home or elsewhere is considerable in urban but not in 
rural areas; but surprisingly, the proportions of babies born at home and elsewhere 
for second and higher-order births in urban Hebei and Shaanxi are even higher in 
the selected ten-year period than in all births to the sampling cohort. Again, the 
overall decrease is due to the decline in the proportion of first births which occurred 
at home. The trend of change in the proportions in Shanghai appears normal, and 
shows an increase in the proportion of births occurring in hospital for each birth
order.
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Table 8.7 Percentage of children ever born, by birth order, by place of delivery, by 
women's residence, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, 
China, 1985
All births Births during 1975-1984
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Birth
order
Hospital& Home& Hospital& Home& 
clinic elsewhere clinic elsewhere
Hospital& Home& Hospital& Home& 
clinic elsewhere clinic elsewhere
1 39.6 60.4
Hebei province 
7.8 92.2 50.2 49.8 11.6 88.4
2 24.4 75.6 3.2 96.8 24.0 76.0 4.5 95.5
3 16.4 83.6 2.6 97.4 12.0 88.0 3.8 96.2
4 12.3 87.7 1.6 98.4 3.1 96.9 3.5 96.5
5+ 6.4 93.6 1.5 98.5 0.0 100.0 3.0 97.0
Total 27.1 72.9 4.5 95.5 35.7 64.3 7.4 92.6
1 51.8 48.2
Shaanxi province
9.2 90.8 67.8 32.2 16.0 84.0
2 33.1 66.9 4.6 95.4 30.6 69.4 7.9 92.1
3 27.8 72.2 3.2 96.8 19.3 80.7 4.6 95.4
4 23.8 76.2 3.2 96.8 22.6 77.4 4.5 95.5
5+ 17.1 82.9 1.5 98.5 0.0 100.0 2.3 97.7
Total 37.2 62.8 5.3 94.7 48.5 51.5 9.7 90.3
1 96.9 3.1
Shanghai municipality 
53.5 46.5 99.0 1.0 75.2 24.8
2 90.3 9.7 30.9 69.1 96.1 3.9 48.0 52.0
3 84.7 15.3 23.5 76.5 100.0 0.0 43.1 56.9
4+ 86.8 13.2 18.0 82.0 100.0 0.0 20.0 80.0
Total 94.3 5.7 41.5 58.5 98.8 1.2 66.2 33.8
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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The variable, assistance during delivery, provides information on w hether 
the deliveries were assisted by doctors, nurses, midwives or others4. From Table 
8.8, it is readily seen th a t in accordance w ith the places of delivery, a majority of 
babies in the provinces were born w ithout any help from doctors, nurses or 
midwives. However, this has declined over tim e a t the lower b irth  orders. 
Comparing all b irths w ith b irths during 1975-84, in Hebei the drop in the 
proportion w ith others' assistance is 8.5 percentage points and the decrease occurs 
in each order of the births. Although there is a decrease of 5.3 percentage points in 
Shaanxi province, among the th ird  and higher order b irths the proportions with 
others' assistance are actually higher during the ten-year program period th an  in 
births to the whole sampling cohort. A slight drop in the proportion receiving 
assistance by midwives is also evident a t the higher parities in Shaanxi province. 
A more interesting observation is th a t the m agnitudes of differences in the 
proportions reporting others' assistance among each parity  are even larger during 
1975-1984 in both Shaanxi and Hebei provinces than  in the previous decades.
It may be assum ed th a t first-order b irths are less likely to be affected by a 
population policy which restricts the higher-order births. In fact, as seen from the 
above results, the decline in proportions of births a t home and w ithout professional 
persons' assistance during delivery mainly occurred a t first-order births. This trend 
is consistent w ith the improvements in accessibility to the health  care service over 
the past decades. However, the sm aller increase in these proportions a t second and 
high orders seems to suggest a phenomenon th a t couples deliberately avoid the 
exposure of their higher-order births by having their babies born a t home or 
elsewhere without any professional assistance. If this is so, then parents may
4 The rank of the classification is presented according to the survey questionnaire.
Doctors, nurses and midwives are those who have professional medical certificates and 
usually work at hospitals and clinics. 'Others' refers to persons who do not have 
professional medical certificates. They may be traditional delivery attendants, other family 
members of the respondents or others. This point is not clarified by the questionnaire.
If the delivery is assisted by persons from two different categories, the respondent is asked 
to report the person with higher rank in the classification.
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refrain from reporting or registering their higher-order births in order to escape all 
kinds of penalties. The effect of the strong son preference would be more 
underreporting of female babies than of males.
Table 8.8 Percentage of children ever bom by birth order, by assistance during 
delivery, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
All Births Births in 1975-1984
Birth
order
Doctor &
nurse Midwife
Doctor &
Others nurse Midwife Others
Hebei province
1 21.4 13.1 65.5 26.6 17.0 56.4
2 14.6 12.5 72.9 16.4 15.7 67.8
3 11.8 10.3 77.8 14.2 12.9 72.9
4+ 7.7 6.9 85.5 9.8 10.6 79.5
Total 15.6 11.5 72.9 20.1 15.4 64.4
Shaanxi province
1 15.3 14.3 70.4 20.9 19.2 59.8
2 8.9 11.9 79.2 8.5 14.4 77.0
3 7.7 9.8 82.5 6.8 8.8 84.3
4+ 5.9 7.4 86.8 4.7 5.0 90.3
Total 10.1 11.3 78.6 12.6 14.1 73.3
Shanghai municipality
1 73.9 18.8 7.3 79.0 18.6 2.4
2 65.1 21.7 13.1 71.5 20.7 7.9
3 55.8 24.1 20.0 73.0 20.6 6.3
4+ 52.1 24.2 23.7 50.0 16.7 33.3
Total 69.0 20.3 10.6 77.4 19.0 3.6
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: Four respondents who did not state the assistance during delivery 
were excluded in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces.
Although the number of babies born in the hospitals and clinics is not 
sufficient to yield a valid estimation of sex ratio, in the two provinces the births at 
home or elsewhere provide a valid picture of the change of the sex ratios by birth 
order. The sex ratios of the upper panel of Table 8.9 include all births for the past
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decades to women aged 15-49. Not surprisingly, the general pattern of sex ratios is 
consistent with the pattern observed in Table 8.1, which shows higher sex ratios in 
small families (one to three children) and low sex ratios among large families (four 
or more children). This pattern implies a strong son preference.
In the bottom panel of Table 8.9, the sex ratios of births during 1975-84 to 
women aged 40 or under indicate a striking contrast with the upper panel. For 
those babies born at home or elsewhere the sex ratios of high-order births are very 
high, especially among birth order four or higher. These high-order births are the 
target of the population policy and family planning program.
Table 8.9 Sex ratios of children by place of delivery, by birth order, Hebei and 
Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai
Birth Hospital Home Hospital Home Hospital Home
Order Clinic Elsewhere Clinic Elsewhere Clinic Elsewhere
All births to women aged 15-49
1 138.5 112.2 113.1 110.9 111.8 106.1
2 102.5 114.3 113.8 102.6 115.5
3 111.2 — 116.9 — 95.3
4+ 107.3 - 107.1 - -
Births to women aged 40 or less during 1975-84
1 142.8 111.1 117.2 103.6 112.6
2 102.8 — 117.4 - —
3 113.9 — 119.3 - —
4+ 128.0 — 132.8 —
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: Sex ratios for the parities with less than 300 total births were not shown 
in this table because of the very high standard deviations.
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8.4.2 Sex selected abortion
Although there is no strong statistical evidence of the incidence of sex-selected
abortions, some of the publicity about individual cases is noticeable and the
potential effect of sex-selected abortions is not trivial. The estimated sex ratios at
birth in the left side of Table 8.10 are based on different assumptions about sex of
the aborted foetus. As can be seen in the bottom panel of the table, in Shanghai, if
it is assumed 50 per cent of female foetuses were aborted, the sex ratios of the ten-
year period would be normal if there had been no abortions. Likewise, assuming 55
per cent of female foetuses for Hebei and 60 per cent for Shaanxi, the sex ratios for
the two provinces would be close to normal if there had been no abortions.
Table 8.10 Estimated sex ratios at birth on the assumed sex of foetus of induced 
abortions, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Year
Births
£
a
Sex Induced 1 
ratios abortions
>ex ratios based on assumed sex of the 
iborted foetus
Slormal
ratios
50%
female
55%
female
60%
female
All
femaleTotal Male Female
Hebei province
1975-79 2348 1228 1120 109.6 240 109.3 108.7 106.7 104.7 90.3
1980-84 2873 1537 1336 115.0 672 113.3 112.0 107.8 103.8 76.5
Total 5221 2765 2456 112.6 912 111.6 110.6 107.4 104.2 82.1
Shaanxi province
1975-79 1915 1019 896 113.7 187 113.0 112.4 110.4 108.5 94.1
1980-84 2050 1103 947 116.5 401 114.7 113.6 109.9 106.4 81.8
Total 3965 2122 1843 115.1 588 113.9 113.1 110.2 107.4 87.3
Shanghai municipality
1975-79 1102 576 526 109.5 610 108.2 106.0 98.7 91.9 50.7
1980-84 1567 816 751 108.7 1375 107.4 104.5 95.2 86.7 38.4
Total 2669 1392 1277 109.0 1985 107.7 105.1 96.5 88.6 42.7
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: Selected births and abortions to women aged 40 or under.
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This suggests that, if the knowledge and facilities for sex-determination are 
widely available; if the regulations fail to prevent the use of sex-detecting 
techniques for this purpose; if induced abortion continues to be a major backup 
method in birth control; and if there is no substantial change in the strong son 
preference; then there will be a sizable impact of sex-selective abortion on sex 
ratios at births in the two provinces.
8.4.3 Other factors
Empirical data show that a slight increase in the sex ratio among live births in 
Sweden can be related to a decrease in the proportion of stillbirths and probably to 
a decline in the proportion of miscarriages; and the latter may be a result of the 
improved nutritional status of women (Johansson and Nygren, 1991: 36). However, 
this is not the case in China. Table 8.11 indicates that the ratios of spontaneous 
abortion and miscarriage have been slightly increasing instead of going down since 
the initiation of the One-Child Campaign, which seems to contradict the fact that 
people's living standards in general, and women's nutritional status in particular, 
have improved over the last two decades. This opposite tendency is most 
pronounced in Shanghai where the level of development and living standard is 
highest among the three sampling areas and probably in the entire country. This 
phenomenon may be partly due to misplacing the pregnancy outcome between 
induced abortion and miscarriage in respondents' reports. Another possible 
explanation is that some infant deaths are reported as miscarriage or stillbirths 
and that some, especially female babies, might suffer from neglect and die early, 
but are reported as miscarriages or stillbirths. However, so far, there is no direct 
and hard evidence in the survey data and elsewhere, and particularly no 
information about the sex of the foetus, which can be used to verify the 
propositions. Therefore, these arguments have to remain inconclusive.
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Table 8.11 E stim ated  abortion ratios per 100 live b irths, Hebei and Shaanxi 
provinces and Shanghai municipality, China, 1985
Hebei province Shaanxi province Shanghai municipality
Live
Year births
Abortion ratios
Live
births
Abortion ratios
Live
births
Abortion ratios
A B A B A B
1975 402 10.9 3.5 388 7.7 4.6 172 51.7 4.7
1976 450 8.0 4.0 382 8.4 6.3 228 43.4 6.1
1977 417 9.1 3.1 356 11.2 5.6 210 53.8 7.6
1978 513 9.4 3.5 356 9.6 7.6 222 64.0 5.9
1979 554 13.4 5.4 425 12.0 8.5 261 64.0 5.7
1980 562 18.3 4.8 344 20.1 7.6 239 79.5 8.8
1981 648 13.4 3.5 410 16.8 8.0 330 69.4 9.1
1982 640 27.8 3.4 407 20.9 7.6 384 67.2 9.4
1983 517 38.1 8.3 398 26.6 9.8 334 111.7 7.8
1984 497 21.5 6.4 478 15.1 6.3 272 119.5 7.7
Total 5200 17.5 4.6 3944 14.9 7.2 2652 74.8 7.5
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: A refers to induced abortions, B refers to spontaneous abortions.
Estim ated from the 1985 IDFS survey data, the sex ratios of infant deaths 
between 1979 and 1985 were 168.3 for Hebei, 147.4 for Shaanxi and 128.6 for 
Shanghai. A part from Shanghai, the ratios are substantially  higher than  the 
suggested in ternational 'norm al' level of 130 (Johansson and Nygren, 1991: 48), 
and so excess female infant deaths w ithin this period are not evident in this survey 
result. However, the ra th e r small num ber of infant deaths in the sample may not 
be considered to provide a valid estimation. The 1985 IDFS survey also has a 
question about num ber of boys and girls adopted; unfortunately, the data  do not 
include the date of the adoption. The relatively low sex ratios of the accumulated 
num ber of children adopted are 38.9 for Hebei, 73.6 for Shaanxi and 64.0 for 
Shanghai, suggesting th a t about twice as many girls as boys are adopted. The 
average is higher th an  the national level during the 1980s estim ated from the 1988
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Two-per-Thousand Fertility Survey (Johansson and Nygren, 1991: 44), but the 
number of reported adopted children is very small.
8.5 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter analysed the data from China 1985 IDFS survey. The results 
demonstrated higher sex ratios in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces than in Shanghai 
municipality, suggesting a strong and persistent son preference in Hebei and 
Shaanxi and moderate son preferences for Shanghai. The micro-level consequences 
of son preference on the sex ratio at birth were suggested by the first part of this 
chapter, which mainly represented the situation of the past 20 years. An inverse 
pattern of the sex ratios at birth to the size of families was found in all the three 
study regions and was more pronounced in Hebei and Shaanxi than in Shanghai. 
The sex ratios of all children were very high in family sizes two and three, and 
extremely high in one-child families. The ratios for last-bom children were also 
very much higher in the two provinces and considerably higher in Shanghai than 
the ratios of the preceding births. The impact of birth order on sex ratios at birth 
was less clear and persistent in terms of all births over the past three decades to all 
respondents. It seems that son preference affecting the decision of couples with two 
or three children to continue or stop childbearing is more critical in Hebei and 
Shaanxi.
The macro-level consequences of son preference on sex ratios at birth were 
presented in the second part of this chapter, which focused on the period of the 
powerful family planning program. The results showed that in the regions with 
strong son preference, such as Hebei and Shaanxi, not only were the overall sex 
ratios at birth higher than normal, but also the effect of birth order on sex ratios 
occurred over a quite long term, which could be traced back to as early as the 
middle 1970s, and coincided with the period of vigorous implementation of the 
family planning program, particularly the One-Child Campaign. In Shanghai,
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although the overall sex ratio at birth was close to the normal range, the ratio for 
first-order births was significantly higher than normal.
From the comparison of micro and macro-level analysis, it appears that son 
preference is the major social or cultural factor that affects the sex ratios at birth 
at the family level, as indicated by the sex ratios of siblings of different family sizes 
and of the last-bom children. The main operating mechanism is the adoption of the 
'stopping rules’ in family building by couples according to their desire for a certain 
number and sex of children. However, if the strict birth control policy did not exist, 
the overall sex ratios at birth would probably be normal and there would be no 
such a strong general birth-order effect on sex ratios at birth, though the sex ratio 
for the higher-order births and for the last-bom child would probably still be high, 
as a result of traditional preference for sons. In the case of Hebei and Shaanxi, the 
overall ratios in the family-level analysis were also higher than expected, because 
more than 60 per cent of the births occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. The 
macro-level analysis considered the births that occurred under exposure to the 
strong family planning program and even the One-Child Campaign. It suggests 
that both the abnormal overall sex ratios at birth and higher sex ratios at higher 
parities are attributable to couples' response to the population policy. The implicit 
but substantial contradiction between the national goal of population control, 
particularly the One-Child Policy, and couples' family building aspirations or 
actual fertility behaviour should be a matter of major concern. The implications of 
the One-Child Policy are clearly indicated by the extremely high sex ratio of one- 
child families in the study regions, where more couples than usual complied with 
the one-child limit if the first child was a son. However, as seen from Chapter 6, 
among one-child women in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, more than 90 per cent 
wished to have two or more children if it were not for the government population 
policy. Couples wanted and tried hard to have at least one son or even two sons 
(see Chapter 7). Those couples whose first child or both children were daughters
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faced a hard decision whether to obey the population policy or to continue 
childbearing until they had their desired number of sons, at the risk of offending 
against the birth control policy. Under the current population policy of birth 
control, which brought many economic penalties and psychological pressures to 
bear upon births outside birth planning and with short spacing, how did couples 
with strong son preference deal with their unfavoured girls?
As mentioned above, several possible explanations have been proposed. So 
far, no direct evidence can be derived from the survey data to confirm the 
underreporting of female babies who have stayed with their parents. Johansson 
and Nygren (1991: 50) estimated that half of the 'missing' girls in the survey of the 
1980s were adopted children not reported as live births by their natural mothers. 
It is true that many more female than male babies were given away for adoption 
according to both the 1985 IDFS survey and the 1988 Two-per-Thousand Fertility 
Survey. However, it is not clear at what stage of family building the children were 
adopted. Were those adopting parents urban couples who were childless or rural 
couples who had only one child before they adopted the children? It would be 
desirable to investigate the family size and sex composition of the adopting 
parents, since those couples were under the same constraints as the couples who 
gave their babies away. Why did the adopting parents willingly report or register 
their adopted children, when the children's natural parents did not? Limited access 
to the 1988 Two-per-Thousand Fertility Survey prevents this issue being assessed 
in the present study.
The reported births by place of delivery and by assistance during delivery 
showed that a very high proportion of births, especially higher-order births, took 
place at home or elsewhere and without any professional person's assistance. These 
proportions for higher-order births even increased during the period when the strict 
population policy was enforced, which obviously contradicts the general trend of 
improved health care. It is also evident that, for those babies born at home or
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elsewhere in the two provinces, sex ratios are substantially higher than normal 
among high-order births. This seems to provide indirect evidence of couples' 
response to the population policy. Couples may have a good chance to conceal their 
babies when they have second or higher-order births, particularly female births. 
Since most of the babies were bom at home or elsewhere, possibly without any eye­
witness from outside the families, the female babies could be mistreated or even 
killed immediately after they were born, and would not be registered or reported in 
a census or survey. Neither the 1985 IDFS survey nor the 1988 Two-per-Thousand 
Fertility Survey can clarify the speculation that the live births of some females who 
were neglected and died early were reported as stillbirths or miscarriages, since 
the survey data do not contain information on the sex of the foetus.
As revealed by the central government newspaper (.People's Daily, April 26, 
1990: 2), during 1989, the birth control staff in Shaanxi province uncovered about 
half a million families which had 'excess' births, and imposed fines, totalling 120 
million yuan (about 25 million US dollars), on those families. The Chinese 
government had set up special measures in the Fourth National Census to 
investigate the unregistered babies and children born outside the birth plan issued 
by the local government. The document5 issued by the Population Census Leading 
Office of the State Council, encourages local cadres and couples to reveal those 
unregistered children by announcement of exemption from punishment to those 
cadres and couples who report their unregistered children in the census. However, 
variations among provinces in implementation of the government general rule 
were observed. Some provincial authorities planned an amnesty or reduction of 
fines for outside-plan births, while some authorities did not make a concession 
(Cartier, 1991). Yet there is no official report about the number of 'black children’ 
detected by the recent census. Hull and Wen (1992) found that there was little, if 
any, evidence of re-emergence of uncounted girls in the 1990 census. The problem
5 See the newspaper, Zhong Go Ren Kou Bao (China's Population), 18 June, 1990.
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of under-reporting births is something far more complicated than merely the 
failure of parents to report births; it includes the serious deficiencies in local 
registration data and the falsities in birth information provided by local cadres 
(Hull and Wen, 1992).
So far, there is no direct evidence to confirm the possible explanation of sex- 
selective abortions; however, the potential effect is not trivial. The China 1985 
National Health Services Sample Survey included questions on the distribution of 
Ultrasound B machines. The 101 counties covered by the survey had 67 ultrasound 
machines, 49 of which were located in general hospitals, five in maternal and child 
health centres, and three in traditional medical hospitals or other facilities. The 
number of people examined by the machines annually was 70,169, or over 1,000 
patients per machine (Chinese Public Health Yearbook, 1987: 528-529). If this 
information is representative of the national situation, it indicates that ultrasound 
machines were relatively widely available in 1985 and moderately intensively used 
in rural China (Hull and Wen, 1992). The key issue is whether these ultrasound 
machines were being used to determine the sex of foetuses for couples who wanted 
to terminate pregnancies if the foetuses were females. Many Chinese local 
newspaper reports have revealed that ultrasound testing to determine the sex of 
foetuses has become widespread in China and many girls are being aborted. 
Although the Chinese government has repeatedly ordered the cessation of 
ultrasound use to determine the sex of babies, unfortunately many hospitals and 
clinics continue to provide the service. Recently, it is reported that many private 
businessmen have also used this service for profit (Yangcheng Evening News, 1993, 
June 20).
In summary, the great variations in sex ratio at birth among different sizes 
of families, particularly between small and large families, may be the results of 
parents' independent and autonomous fertility decisions that accord with their 
strong son preference. The extremely high sex ratio of one-child families appears to
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be, to a larger extent, an outcome of the One-Child Policy. More importantly, the 
high and rising overall sex ratios at birth, and the increasing sex ratios across 
parities, seem to reflect massive reactions to the government population policy. The 
responses imply that a substantial number of women or couples are no longer 
merely passive recipients in the grip of government policy pressures. They strive 
for fulfilment of their desired number of sons or children. The severe social 
consequences (Hull, 1990) of the 'missing girls' should be of high priority in policy 
concerns among the government decision-makers at all levels.
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C hapter 9 D iscu ssion  and con clu sion s
In accordance with the objectives and analytical framework, this thesis has 
addressed the impact of four aspects of social environment on fertility decline in 
China. The analysis compared women's current fertility with their fertility and 
nuptiality preferences during the period of rapid fertility decline, with special 
reference to Hebei and Shaanxi provinces and Shanghai municipality. It explored 
the gap between the government's birth control targets and couples' individual 
aspirations for children, the reasons for the differences, and the policy implications. 
It also evaluated the role of government intervention through policy and family 
planning programs, the role of socio-economic development and the influence of 
traditional culture in fertility decline. This chapter summarizes the empirical 
findings from the study of the three provincial regions, and discusses the 
implications for understanding the unique mechanism of China’s fertility transition 
and the future perspectives.
9.1 China's unique fertility transition
China's fertility decline greatly differed from the classic pattern of fertility 
transition. As a country that was fundamentally poor and where most people were 
in a self-supporting and semi-self-supporting agricultural economy, the fertility 
rate was much higher when it began to decline than had been the corresponding 
situation in European countries. The tempo of fertility decline was unprecedentedly 
fast, while in European countries the reduction in fertility was a natural and 
gradual long-term process. The most salient feature of Chinese fertility transition 
is government intervention through a stringent population policy, which played a 
crucial role in the radical and sustained fertility decline during the 1970s, and in 
maintaining the relatively low fertility level in the 1980s. This fact challenges the 
conventional transition theory of a clear-cut relationship between modernization
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and fertility transition. The rapid fertility decline in mainland China may be 
divided into two broad components: gradual decline and accelerated decline. The 
gradual decline component was attributable to several decades of changes in social 
institutions, socio-economic and cultural environment. The effects of these changes 
on fertility were gradual and relatively stable, and were evident in the long term. 
The acceleration component was attributable to the implementation of strong 
population policies and family planning programs, which are the central focus of 
this thesis.
How was it that the distinctive Chinese population policy could be enforced 
in a country with a thousand million people? The unique centralized political 
system enables China's regime to enforce the rigid population policy. This strong 
system was dominated by a single 'super' party, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). Under this system the CCP and its government leaders exercised enormous 
power within the hierarchical power structure. The several dozen millions of CCP 
members were the most active elements of the political and administrative control 
network. Ideology was the most abstract formulation of policy in China. The 
integration of the ideology of leaders and CCP members from the top to the bottom 
was an important monitoring mechanism in policy enforcement, which was also 
facilitated by the central control system. Mass movement was the effective 
approach to ensure population policy implementation at the local levels, 
particularly in the 1970s. Furthermore, China's family planning program was built 
as an integral part of the whole political and administrative structure. Thus, the 
centrally controlled system made it possible for the government to mobilize China’s 
very limited resources to concentrate on the birth control campaigns and the family 
planning services.
The changes in fertility trends and practices of family planning in the three 
study regions suggest that the demographic transition occurred in China with 
dramatic suddenness, particularly in less developed regions, such as Hebei and
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Shaanxi provinces, though in some advanced areas, such as Shanghai 
municipality, the onset of fertility decline preceded the intensified family planning 
program and the explicit population policy. The remarkable changes in birth 
control practices across marriage cohorts in the three regions suggest that the 
radical fertility decline was triggered by the rapid spread of the government 
supported family planning program that implemented the mandatory population 
policy. This is particularly true in those largely rural regions such as Hebei and 
Shaanxi where the conditions of socio-economic development were not sufficient to 
induce a dramatic and sustained fertility decline. This study shows that the 
probabilities of women having another child, across parities, differ among the three 
regions, especially between the two provinces and metropolitan Shanghai. 
Comparison of the three provincial regions indicated more powerful fertility 
constraints in metropolitan Shanghai than in the two provinces. Thus, it mirrored 
the different macro-levels of social and economic development and the regional 
variations of initiation, strength and acceptance of the birth control policy and 
family planning programs.
9.2 F ertility  control
The empirical evidence of the three regions suggests that China's dramatic 
fertility decline was accompanied by a unique pattern of fertility control, with low 
fertility, but with relatively low contraceptive effectiveness and high incidence of 
induced abortion. During the period of rapid fertility decline, contraception and 
induced abortion prevalence increased concurrently, particularly in large cities 
such as Shanghai. As this study shows, although contraception and induced 
abortion were almost equally important in the choices of methods for starting birth 
control among Shanghai women who married before 1970, induced abortion then 
took over from contraception as the more common method among the women who 
married since the 1970s. In Hebei and Shaanxi, the first substantial jump in 
induced abortion ratios occurred in 1979, in association with the initiation of the
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One-Child Campaign. The increment in induced abortion was mainly due to the 
rapid rise in abortion incidence for women who already had one or more live births, 
which was driven by the birth quota system under the stringent birth control 
policy. Furthermore, the dominant role of sterilization guaranteed higher 
contraceptive effectiveness in Hebei and Shaanxi than in Shanghai. Hence, if the 
contraceptive methods in the two peasant-dominated provinces had not relied 
heavily on sterilization, the induced abortion ratios would be substantially higher 
than the current levels in the two provinces. The high proportions (57 per cent for 
Hebei and 65 per cent for Shaanxi ) of contraceptive non-users among women 
whose last pregnancy ended in induced abortion suggest that a considerable 
number of couples initially might not want to limit their family size in line with the 
birth quota stipulation, and to some extent, that these induced abortions were not 
the result of couples' voluntary decisions. This indicates that induced abortion had 
a particular role in maintaining low fertility levels in advanced urban areas such 
as Shanghai, while it played an important role in limiting family size in less’ 
developed regions such as Hebei and Shaanxi.
9.3 D esired  fam ily size
The China 1985 IDFS survey found that the general desired family size was 
about three in the two peasant-dominated provinces, and about two in more 
developed Shanghai; an overwhelming majority of women desired at least two 
children; almost no women preferred to remain childless in any of the three 
regions, and only three to four per cent of women in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces 
wished to have only one child; even in Shanghai municipality only 25 per cent 
claimed to prefer one child. It is recognized fully that the stated desired family size 
and the proportions wanting more children were biased downwards by the 
respondents in order to comply, in the face-to-face interviews, with the perceived 
social norm or policy target about the number of children. The analysis of the 1985 
IDFS survey data shows that there was a general tendency for women with one or
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two children in these three regions to understate the number of children they 
ultimately wanted. However, even if the responses are accepted at face value, the 
gap between women's individual desires and the government's policy target is one 
or more children in all the three areas.
In all the three regions, the mean number of living children was less than 
the mean number of children desired, especially among women under age 35 in the 
two provinces and under 40 in Shanghai municipality. Furthermore, of women at 
the ages of peak childbearing, urban women reported larger deficit fertility than 
rural women, which apparently was the result of the more rigid birth control policy 
and more powerful family planning program in urban China. These gaps between 
current fertility, desired fertility, and the government target fertility imply that a 
significant part of the achieved decline in fertility may have been caused by 
unwilling submission to the pressure of the government population policy; thus it 
can be considered an unstable level of fertility. Fertility is likely to fluctuate with 
changes in population policy, and with changes in the socio-political and economic 
systems.
9.4 Son  p re fe re n c e
The analysis of this study also documents the strong, pervasive son 
preference which persisted even during the period of the most powerful family 
planning program in the two provinces, and while their fertility dramatically 
declined. In Hebei and Shaanxi, a very strong desire to have at least one son 
appears to be the most important factor that operates persistently in the couples' 
family building decisions. Women whose first two or three children are daughters 
only are less likely to use contraception, particularly sterilization, and are more 
likely to go on to larger families than women with at least one son or mixed-sex 
children. In Shaanxi the proportion of couples who were sterilized is nearly twice 
as high among two-son families than among two-daughter families, and the
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corresponding difference among Hebei couples is 19 percentage points. Among 
families where the first two children are daughters, a substantially higher 
proportion, 38 per cent for Hebei and 46 per cent for Shaanxi, have had four or 
more children, compared with 25 per cent for Hebei and 34 per cent for Shaanxi 
among families whose first two children included at least one son.
The extremely high sex ratio of one-child families appears to be, to a larger 
extent, an outcome of the One-Child Policy, as more couples than usual complied 
with the one-child limit if the first child was a son. The results also demonstrated 
higher sex ratios in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces than in Shanghai municipality, 
suggesting a strong and persistent son preference in the two provinces and 
moderate son preference for Shanghai.
In China, the critical family size from the point of view of population policy 
is two for rural couples. Whether the third or higher order births can be eliminated 
is crucial to the success of the further reduction of fertility. The empirical tests in 
this study found that the strong birth control policy overrode or suppressed the 
influences of some major socio-economic characteristics of women with two children 
to go on bearing a third child in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces. Hence, compared 
with some major socio-economic characteristics, son preference is the most 
significant factor which continued to exert a great influence on bearing the third 
child even during the period of vigorous birth control campaigns; and the overall 
quantitative effect of sex preference on recent fertility is substantial.
This evidence implies that the great effort of China's birth control programs 
did, to some extent, reduce couples' demand for children, but did not change their 
attitudes towards 'male superiority’, which is deeply rooted in the traditional 
cultural and social structures. This attitude, however, did not prevent the average 
number of children per family from decreasing from as many as six children to 
fewer than three. Son preference will have a more powerful influence on fertility as
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the average family size decreases further. However, if the strict birth control policy 
did not exist, the overall sex ratios at birth might be normal and there might be no 
general increasing trend in sex ratios at birth as birth order increases, with the 
exception of the high sex ratio for the last-bom child
On the basis of the births which occurred under exposure to the strong 
family planning program and the One-Child Campaign, the high and rising overall 
sex ratios at birth, and the increasing sex ratios across parities seem to be 
attributable to couples' response to the population policy. The responses again 
imply the substantial conflict between the national goal of population control, 
particularly the One-Child Policy, and couples' family building aspirations, and 
that a considerable number of women or couples are not merely passive subjects in 
the grip of government policy pressures. They strive for fulfilment of their desired 
number of sons or children. In regions such as Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, 
couples may have a good chance to conceal their babies when they have second or 
higher-order births, particularly female births. Since most of the babies were born 
at home or elsewhere, possibly without any eye-witness from outside the families, 
the female babies could be concealed, mistreated or even killed immediately after 
they were born, and would not be registered or reported in a census or survey. This 
study estimated that for births between 1975 and 1984 to women aged 40 or under 
in Hebei and Shaanxi, the sex ratios of higher-order births at home or elsewhere 
were very high. These high-order births are the target of the population policy and 
family planning program. Meanwhile, the potential effect of sex-selected abortion 
should not be neglected. The severe social consequences of the 'missing girls' 
should be of high priority in policy concerns among the Chinese government 
decision-makers at all levels.
There is also empirical evidence that sex preference affects other 
reproductive behaviour such as length of breastfeeding and birth intervals (Tu, 
1990), that is, both the level and tempo of childbearing. When all the factors are
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considered, it may be argued that the efforts both to improve the level of socio­
economic development and to change the sex preference will exert a substantial 
impact on future fertility.
9.5 Marriage preference
Although the general trends in the proportions of early and late marriage 
were the results of the same marriage laws, policies and regulations that were 
issued by the central government, the differentials in the overall mean age at first 
marriage among the three regions are mainly attributable to the macro-level of 
socio-economic development and the extent of changes in the traditional culture 
and customs, as well as the institutional efforts in the marriage regulations that, 
to a large extent, were operating on the basis of the two former factors. The 
remarkable increase in the age at marriage during the 1970s and the decline in the 
1980s mainly reflect the responses of couples to the radical changes in the 
marriage laws and the administrative regulations. Nevertheless, empirical 
evidence of the three regions suggests that women's individual socio-economic 
characteristics and marriage matching process can explain part of the 
discrepancies in age at first marriage within the regions.
It is noticeable that the traditional marriage norms that favoured early 
marriage for girls and the practice of adolescent marriage and arranged marriage 
for girls have remained, to some extent, in the two agriculture-oriented provinces, 
while there has been a considerable and general shift away from early marriage 
and parental control over marriage. The analysis indicates that, in Hebei and 
Shaanxi, the custom of arranged marriage is an important determinant of the 
acceptance of a legal minimum age at marriage and the government targeted late 
age at marriage. Although the Chinese government discourages betrothal before 
marriage and betrothed couples cannot receive any protection from the marriage 
law, it continues to be a widespread custom in rural China. The traditional custom
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of betrothal during the teens is still prevalent in Shaanxi, the inland province, 
while it is less so in the coastal province Hebei and the metropolitan Shanghai. 
These marriage traditions are among the major obstacles to the acceptance of late 
marriage.
9.6 The impact of economic reform
Several decades of ideological education about communism and collectivism 
have been challenged by full-scale economic and administrative decentralization. 
The economic reform also undermined the norms and values promoted by 
communist or socialist ideology. Ideological changes have occurred both among the 
leaders at all levels and among the masses. The central leaders no longer have the 
confidence and ability to integrate the ideology in the society from the top to the 
bottom; the leadership is switching from an ideological to a pragmatic approach. 
The people, particularly the young generations, have become increasingly 
pragmatic and materialistic.
The social control function of the basic work units has diminished, and the 
mechanism of administrative control and economic penalties in birth limitation 
have been greatly undermined, particularly in rural areas. The rural household 
responsibility system has great impact on childbearing in many ways. The mass 
movement strategy in birth control lost its momentum, and thus, the central 
leaders had to abandon this approach. The leaders have admitted that family 
planning is encountering great difficulties. Unlike the early birth-control 
campaigns that made fairly explicit links between immediate benefits and family 
limitation, the One-Child Policy directly threatened the current benefits and the 
perceived future interests of young couples, particularly farmers. It is unlikely that 
those young couples, particularly young farmers, to whom children are crucial 
means to economic and social security for their old age, would willingly accept the
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selfless norm to sacrifice themselves for the whole nation's prosperity, unless 
political and administrative pressures forced them to submit.
As this study revealed, in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, the acceptance 
rates of the One-Child Certificate were much lower than the policy requirement; 
this suggests strong resistance to the one-child limit. The modification of the rigid 
One-Child Policy towards the conditional two-children policy for rural couples is a 
big step of relaxation; it seems that the policy-makers have admitted and accepted 
the fact that most women in rural areas have had and will continue to have at 
least two children before they really stop childbearing, and that it is impossible to 
reach the One-child target among rural couples in the current social, economic and 
cultural settings.
Meanwhile, the family planning administrators became aware that it was 
no longer adequate to rely solely on population policy in birth control, and that it 
was imperative to apply legislative means. However, there is as yet no established 
national family planning law or regulations, although regional family planning 
legislation has been developed steadily since the 1980s. The main reason for 
deferring a national law on birth control is the feasibility of law enforcement. 
Around ten years experience in implementing the regional regulations clearly 
indicated the conflict between the government's birth cohort target and the masses' 
desire for more children: according to the current regional stipulation, the average 
number of children allowed among women of childbearing age was 1.62 (see 
Chapter 3, Note 5); while China’s total fertility rates were around 2.31 to 2.59 
between 1986 and 1990, about 43 to 60 per cent higher than the fertility level 
required by the regulations.
It has been observed that the desired family size for women in Hebei and 
Shaanxi was about three children with at least one or two sons. It is likely that 
women who have had only two children would choose to have more if the policy
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restrictions currently imposed were relaxed. Indeed, in the analysis of the 1985 
IDFS survey data, the probabilities of families with different size and sex 
distribution having an additional child indicate that in Hebei and Shaanxi 
provinces, considerably more than 50 per cent of women with two living children 
were likely to progress to third or higher-order births, and even of those with at 
least three living children, more than half in Shaanxi and about half in Hebei were 
likely to continue bearing children. In Shanghai the desired family size is about 
two children; most one-child women were practising contraception in response to 
the government population policy and using reversible methods. Therefore, it is 
likely that a substantial proportion of them would chose to have a second child if 
the strict birth regulations were eased. The same data also show that of the women 
who have had at least one living child, about three-quarters in the two provinces 
and 44 per cent in Shanghai would probably proceed to the second or higher-order 
births.
Although economic reform is well under way, reform of the political and 
administrative systems is far from comparable. If it is to regain strict control over 
population growth, the Chinese government must create a new system at the local 
level in rural areas which can be supported by the administrative cadres at the 
local level. The attitudes and activities of cadres at the local level are crucial in 
implementing any government policies or programs. However, such action would 
seem to conflict with current economic circumstances and with desired fertility. 
Inevitably, in different areas the attitudes and practices of cadres have also been 
affected by different socio-economic backgrounds and traditional culture.
9.7 F uture popu lation  trends
As regards future total population trends, to simply lower fertility through 
tightening the population policy on births would not in itself be sufficient to 
achieve a reduction in population growth to the government's target levels. Nor can
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anything be done to change the fact that increasing numbers of young persons will 
enter the marriage market in the coming years. In China nowadays, particularly 
in rural areas, almost no couple uses contraception immediately after marriage, 
and early marriage usually results in early childbearing. Hence, there would have 
to be a rise in the age at marriage to reduce fertility.
Is it feasible to further increase the proportion of late marriages through 
greater efforts to promote late marriage and to discourage early marriage? Even 
during the late 1970s, the period of the most vigorous family planning program, 
about half the women in Hebei and Shaanxi still married earlier than the strongly 
urged target age for later marriage, though the number of women who married 
below the legal minimum age decreased. The proportion of late marriages had been 
substantially decreasing; it dropped more than 20 percentage points in Hebei and 
more than 10 percentage points in Shaanxi by the year 1985. This seems to signal 
both that the socio-economic conditions in the peasant-dominated regions have not 
yet developed to the stage when most women would willingly accept the late 
marriage requirement, and also that the rapid decentralization of the 
administrative system and the economic system has greatly weakened the efforts 
of the programs and marriage regulations that operated successfully in the 
previous highly centralized system.
The current pressing solutions are to further increase the acceptance of 
contraceptive practices among newlyweds (Tien, 1992); and to increase the first 
birth interval, that has shortened since the rapid fertility decline and offset the 
effect of delayed marriage on fertility (Ye, 1992). In the meantime, it is necessary 
to improve the quality and variety of contraceptive methods, particularly in rural 
areas. The most popular available means of contraception are IUD and 
sterilization in rural areas, and almost no couples use contraception before the first 
birth. Therefore, to encourage couples to use the pill or condom before their first 
birth is a challenge for the family planning program in terms of knowledge,
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education and better supply of services. The expected induced abortion trend in the 
near future may depend on the extent of the government's commitment to increase 
contraceptive education and to improve the use-effectiveness, and whether the 
relaxation of the stringent birth control policy will allow more couples to have more 
children than the policy quota permits.
In brief, the stringent population policy and powerful family planning 
program have indeed greatly reduced fertility within a short period, without 
fundamental changes in socio-economic development. However, the fertility trend 
in the 1980s indicated that the role of the One-Child Policy in further fertility 
decline was limited; it could prevent fertility from turning upwards, but not bring a 
further substantial decline from the level achieved in the late 1970s. In the long 
term, a further substantial increase in age at marriage and the attainment or 
continuation of low and stable fertility will have to rely more strongly on 
fundamental changes in socio-economic development and further improvements in 
women's education and social status, as well as on changes in some elements of the 
traditional culture which favour higher fertility.
At present, given that a nationally applicable family planning law is not 
achievable in the short run, but that all the regional regulations were formulated 
on the basis of the national policy guidelines, the application of population policies 
has had in the past, and will continue to have, a crucial impact on fertility 
dynamics and population change in China.
Some scholars have suggested that taking into consideration the 
momentum of population growth, the severe social costs and side effects of the One- 
Child Policy, and the present stage of social-economic development and cultural 
evolution, it is wise to modify the One-Child Policy to a universal two-children 
policy with birth spacing (e.g. Bongaarts and Greenhalgh, 1985; Li, S., 1989; Zeng, 
1991).
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9.8 A d eclin e  to below -rep lacem ent fertility  ?
When I was writing this concluding chapter, I received a copy of a press 
release by Peng Peiyun, Minister of the State Family Planning Commission, of a 
speech given on 21 April 1993 to launch the results of a sample survey on progress 
in China’s family planning program. The survey was conducted by the State 
Family Planning Commission from September to October, 1992, with a sample 
size of 385,000. In the speech at the press conference, Peng gave evidence of 
'remarkable' progress in family planning in terms of total number of population, 
the natural growth rate, the contraceptive prevalence rate, the proportion of 
unplanned births and the mean age at first marriage. Meanwhile, she seemed to 
deliberately avoid releasing the figure of China's overall total fertility rate in 1992, 
while she just vaguely mentioned that 'the total fertility rate of Chinese women 
had reduced to the replacement level in 1992’, and presented the data of total 
fertility rate that was disaggregated by three categories of provinces on the basis of 
'foundation for family planning
A special report draft (Nygren and Hoem, 1993) derived from the 1992 
survey data estimated that the total fertility rate for China in 1992 was around 
1.75, which is substantially below replacement level and even lower than the 
average level (1.8) of European countries in the period 1985-1990. It is hard to 
explain how the total fertility rate could drop by more than a quarter of the 1990 
level (2.35), within a period of only two years, while the decline in total fertility 
rate stalled in the entire 1980s. The preliminary analysis of the survey data 
carried out by Nygren and Hoem suggested that the main reason for this decline is 
an increased compliance with the birth control regulations: 'couples better 
complied with second-child regulations'; 'the reductions of third and higher order 
births have probably been achieved mainly through sterilization of women already 
having two children’ (Nygren and Hoem, 1993: 23). It is not surprising that some
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US-based international media groups interpreted the results as the consequence of 
coercive measures by the Chinese government.
Limited access to the 1992 fertility survey data and time constraints 
prevent these issues being assessed in the present study. It appears that the 
fertility rates estimated from the 1992 survey were substantially biased downward 
through underreporting of births. As Nygren and Hoem (1993: 24) pointed out in 
their report, 'the data quality in this survey might not be good enough to suggest 
an exact current fertility level in China’. Even Peng admitted in her speech that 
'the actual fertility rate at present may be higher than the outcome of the survey’, 
and that 'the fertility level already achieved at present is not stable and may be 
likely to swing back to a high level again’.
Even if the 1992 fertility survey is taken at face value, the results support 
the argument of this study that China did successfully control its fertility at the 
society level, but not yet at the individual level in terms of couples' voluntary 
control of their reproductive behaviour. This is clearly reflected in the unique 
fertility control pattern with low fertility, but relatively low contraceptive 
effectiveness and high induced abortion, and in the gap between current fertility 
and desired fertility. The future fertility level in China will, at least in the short 
term, largely depend on the policy implementation. Any relaxation of the 
population policy and regulations could lead to a fertility rebound.
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A ppendix for C hapter 4
The cumulative probabilities of first-use contraception or induced abortion by 
number of pregnancies before first use were computed from the pregnancy histories 
using the fife table-technique. To construct a life table needs two basic data: for 
each interval, whether or not the women first used contraception or abortion; and 
the number of pregnancies from first marriage to the interview date. Women who 
have never practised family planning to the interview date are considered to be 
withdrawn. The probability was computed as follows:
x = number of pregnancies since first marriage (number of pregnancies is treated 
as the interval)
N(x)= number of women entering the interval.
W(x)= number of women withdrawn during the interval due to interview
F(x)= number of women first-used contraception or induced abortion during the 
interval
N'(x)= number of women exposed to risk during the interval= N(x)-W(x)-F(x)
P(x)= probability of first-use in the interval= F(x)/N’(x)
Q(x)= probability of no use in the interval= 1-P(X)
CQ(X)= cumulative probability of no use by the end of interval= Q(x)x CQ(x-l)
CP(x)= cumulative probability of first-use by the end of interval x =1-CQ(X)
269
Table A4.1 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of pregnancies 
before firstuse, Hebei province
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
Fix)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) F(x) NXx) NXx) 1 -  Fix) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 5080 246 62 4834 0.01 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 4772 313 1217 4459 0.27 0.73 0.73 0.27 0.01
2 3242 172 1176 3070 0.38 0.62 0.45 0.55 0.01
3 1894 62 775 1832 0.42 0.58 0.26 0.74 0.01
4 1057 48 465 1009 0.46 0.54 0.14 0.86 0.02
5 544 26 259 518 0.50 0.50 0.07 0.93 0.02
6 259 18 134 241 0.56 0.44 0.03 0.97 0.03
7 107 17 53 90 0.59 0.41 0.01 0.99 0.05
8 37 5 24 32 0.75 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.08
9 8 0 6 8 0.75 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.15
10
Total
2 1
908
1
4172
1 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Table A4.2 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of pregnancies 
before first use, Shaanxi province
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(x)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) F(x) NXx) NXx) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 4084 209 44 3875 0.01 0.99 0.99 0.01 0.00
1 3831 331 682 3500 0.19 0.81 0.80 0.20 0.01
2 2818 163 732 2655 0.28 0.72 0.58 0.42 0.01
3 1923 70 602 1853 0.32 0.68 0.39 0.61 0.01
4 1251 43 437 1208 0.36 0.64 0.25 0.75 0.01
5 771 41 294 730 0.40 0.60 0.15 0.85 0.02
6 436 14 203 422 0.48 0.52 0.08 0.92 0.02
7 219 9 96 210 0.46 0.54 0.04 0.96 0.03
8 114 6 51 108 0.47 0.53 0.02 0.98 0.05
9 57 3 26 54 0.48 0.52 0.01 0.99 0.07
10 28 6 22 22 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Total 895 3189
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Table A4.3 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of pregnancies 
before first use, Shanghai municipality
Num ber No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cum ulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
FXxV Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) FXx) N \x ) N ’(x) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 4143 132 224 4011 0.06 0.94 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 3787 249 1484 3538 0.42 0.58 0.58 0.42 0.01
2 2054 56 1120 1998 0.56 0.44 0.26 0.74 0.01
3 878 23 521 855 0.61 0.39 0.10 0.90 0.02
4 334 14 208 320 0.65 0.35 0.03 0.97 0.03
5 112 8 76 104 0.73 0.27 0.01 0.99 0.04
6 28 1 19 27 0.70 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.09
7 8 0 5 8 0.63 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.17
8 3 0 3 3 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 483 3660
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Table A4.4 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number of 
pregnancy before first use, Hebei province
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(x)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) Fix) N \x) N'(x) 1 -  Fix) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 5080 253 30 4827 0.01 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 4797 895 394 3902 0.10 0.90 0.90 0.10 0.00
2 3508 1102 290 2406 0.12 0.88 0.79 0.21 0.01
3 2116 812 151 1304 0.12 0.88 0.70 0.30 0.01
4 1153 489 106 664 0.16 0.84 0.59 0.41 0.01
5 558 269 40 289 0.14 0.86 0.51 0.49 0.02
6 249 129 26 120 0.22 0.78 0.40 0.60 0.04
7 94 62 4 32 0.13 0.88 0.35 0.65 0.06
8 28 23 3 5 0.60 0.40 0.14 0.86 0.22
9 2 1 0 1 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.86 0.00
10 1 1 0 0
Total 4036 1044
Table A4.5 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Shaanxi province
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(x)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) F(x) N'(x) N'(x) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 4084 218 28 3866 0.01 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 3838 608 240 3230 0.07 0.93 0.93 0.07 0.00
2 2990 774 178 2216 0.08 0.92 0.85 0.15 0.01
3 2038 613 128 1425 0.09 0.91 0.77 0.23 0.01
4 1297 437 94 860 0.11 0.89 0.69 0.31 0.01
5 766 309 59 457 0.13 0.87 0.60 0.40 0.02
6 398 170 32 228 0.14 0.86 0.52 0.48 0.02
7 196 87 13 109 0.12 0.88 0.46 0.54 0.03
8 96 46 5 50 0.10 0.90 0.41 0.59 0.04
9 45 18 5 27 0.19 0.81 0.33 0.67 0.07
10 22 21 1 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Total 3301 783
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Table A4.6 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number of 
pregnancy before first use, Shanghai municipality
Num ber No. of No. of No. of No. of
of women women women women
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed
X N(x) W(x) FXx) N'(x)
0 4143 176 219 3967
1 3748 946 1268 2802
2 1534 438 482 1096
3 614 238 190 376
4 186 89 49 97
5 48 24 17 24
6 7 4 3 3
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 1915 2228
Prob, of 
first-use  
P(x)= 
F(x)/ 
N ’(x)
Prob, of 
no-use
Q(x)= 
1- P(x)
Cum ulat. 
Prob, of 
no-use 
CQ(x)= 
Q(x)*CQ(x-l)
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use  
CP(x)= 
l-CQ(x)
Standard
deviation
0.06 0.94 1.00 0.00 0.00
0.45 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.01
0.44 0.56 0.31 0.69 0.01
0.51 0.49 0.15 0.85 0.03
0.51 0.49 0.08 0.92 0.05
0.71 0.29 0.02 0.98 0.09
1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
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Table A4.7 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of pregnancies 
before first use, Hebei province, 1950-69 marriage cohort
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(xV Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) F(x) NXx) NXx) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1856 24 3 1832 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 1829 15 109 1814 0.06 0.94 0.94 0.06 0.01
2 1705 20 295 1685 0.18 0.82 0.78 0.22 0.01
3 1390 28 424 1362 0.31 0.69 0.53 0.47 0.01
4 938 36 384 902 0.43 0.57 0.31 0.69 0.02
5 518 23 241 495 0.49 0.51 0.16 0.84 0.02
6 254 17 130 237 0.55 0.45 0.07 0.93 0.03
7 107 17 53 90 0.59 0.41 0.03 0.97 0.05
8 37 5 24 32 0.75 0.25 0.01 0.99 0.08
9 8 0 6 8 0.75 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.15
10 2 1 1 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Total 186 1670
Table A4.8 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of pregnancies 
before first use, Hebei province, 1970-78 marriage cohort
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
Fix)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) Fix) NXx) NXx) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1656 17 16 1639 0.01 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 1623 27 521 1596 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.01
2 1075 43 605 1032 0.59 0.41 0.28 0.72 0.02
3 427 20 301 407 0.74 0.26 0.07 0.93 0.02
4 106 8 74 98 0.76 0.24 0.02 0.98 0.04
5 24 2 17 22 0.77 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.09
6 5 1 4 4 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 118 1538
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Table A4.9 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of pregnancies 
before first use, Hebei province, 1979-85 marraige cohort
N um ber No. of No. of No. of No. of
of women women women women
pregnancies entering w ithdraw n first-use exposed
X N(x) W(x) F(x) N’(x)
0 1568 205 43 1363
1 1320 271 587 1049
2 462 109 276 353
3 77 14 50 63
4 13 4 7 9
5 2 1 1 1
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 604 964
Prob, of 
first-use 
P(x)= 
Fix)/ 
N'(x)
Prob, of 
no-use
Q(x)= 
1- Fix)
Cum ulat. 
Prob, of 
no-use 
CQ(x)= 
Q(x)*CQ(x-l)
Cum ulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use 
CP(x)= 
l-CQ(x)
S tandard
deviation
0.03 0.97 1.00 0.00 0.00
0.56 0.44 0.44 0.56 0.02
0.78 0.22 0.10 0.90 0.02
0.79 0.21 0.02 0.98 0.05
0.78 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.14
0.00
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Table A4.10 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Shaanxi province, 1947-69 marriage cohort
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(xy Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) F(x) N'(x) N’(x) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1800 23 6 1777 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 1771 15 71 1756 0.04 0.96 0.96 0.04 0.00
2 1685 21 185 1664 0.11 0.89 0.85 0.15 0.01
3 1479 26 338 1453 0.23 0.77 0.65 0.35 0.01
4 1115 28 346 1087 0.32 0.68 0.45 0.55 0.01
5 741 32 278 709 0.39 0.61 0.27 0.73 0.02
6 431 14 200 417 0.48 0.52 0.14 0.86 0.02
7 217 9 94 208 0.45 0.55 0.08 0.92 0.03
8 114 6 51 108 0.47 0.53 0.04 0.96 0.05
9 57 3 26 54 0.48 0.52 0.02 0.98 0.07
10 28 6 22 22 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Total 183 1617
Table A4.11 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of
pregnancies before first use , Shaanxi province, 1970-78 marriage cohort
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(x)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) F(x) N'(x) N'(x) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1079 13 5 1066 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 1061 14 301 1047 0.29 0.71 0.71 0.29 0.01
2 746 22 358 724 0.49 0.51 0.36 0.64 0.02
3 366 18 223 348 0.64 0.36 0.13 0.87 0.03
4 125 14 82 111 0.74 0.26 0.03 0.97 0.04
5 29 8 16 21 0.76 0.24 0.01 0.99 0.09
6 5 0 3 5 0.60 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.22
7 2 0 2 2 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 89 990
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Table A4.12 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Shaanxi province, 1979-85 marriage cohort
Num ber No. of No. of No. of No. of
of women women women women
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed
X N(x) W(x) Fix) NXx)
0 1205 173 33 1032
1 999 302 310 697
2 387 120 189 267
3 78 26 41 52
4 11 1 9 10
5 1 1 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 623 582
Prob, of 
first-use  
P(x)= 
Fix)/  
N \x )
Prob, of 
no-use
Q(x)= 
1- Fix)
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
no-use 
CQ(x)= 
Q(x)*CQ(x-l)
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use  
CP(x)= 
l-CQ(x)
Standard
deviation
0.03 0.97 1.00 0.00 0.01
0.44 0.56 0.56 0.44 0.02
0.71 0.29 0.16 0.84 0.03
0.79 0.21 0.03 0.97 0.06
0.90 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.09
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Table A4.13 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Shanghai municipality, 1951-69 marriage cohort
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
Fix)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) Fix) NXx) NXx) 1 -  Fix) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1295 23 22 1272 0.02 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 1250 14 225 1236 0.18 0.82 0.82 0.18 0.01
2 1011 10 363 1001 0.36 0.64 0.52 0.48 0.02
3 638 12 341 626 0.54 0.46 0.24 0.76 0.02
4 285 12 171 273 0.63 0.37 0.09 0.91 0.03
5 102 7 67 95 0.71 0.29 0.03 0.97 0.05
6 28 1 19 27 0.70 0.30 0.01 0.99 0.09
7 8 0 5 8 0.63 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.17
8 3 0 3 3 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 79 1216
Table A4.14 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Shanghai municipality, 1970-78 marriage cohort
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(x)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) F(x) NXx) NXx) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1159 16 50 1143 0.04 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.01
1 1093 12 514 1081 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.48 0.02
2 567 8 386 559 0.69 0.31 0.16 0.84 0.02
3 173 3 128 170 0.75 0.25 0.04 0.96 0.03
4 42 0 32 42 0.76 0.24 0.01 0.99 0.07
5 10 1 9 9 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 40 1119
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Table A4.15 Cumulative probability of first-use of contraception by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Shanghai municipality, 1979-85 marriage cohort
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of
of women women women women
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed
X N(x) W(x) Fix) NXx)
0 1689 93 152 1596
1 1444 223 745 1221
2 476 38 371 438
3 67 8 52 59
4 7 2 5 5
5 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 364 1325
Prob, of 
first-use 
P(x)= 
F(x)/ 
N\x)
Prob, of 
no-use
Q(x)= 
1- Fix)
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
no-vise 
CQ(x)= 
Q(x)*CQ(x-l)
Cumulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use 
CP(x)= 
l-CQ(x)
Standard
deviation
0.10 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.01
0.61 0.39 0.39 0.61 0.01
0.85 0.15 0.06 0.94 0.02
0.88 0.12 0.01 0.99 0.04
1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
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Table A4.16 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Hebei province, 1950-69 marriage cohort
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(x)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) F(x) N \x) N’(x) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1856 24 8 1832 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 1824 19 44 1805 0.02 0.98 0.98 0.02 0.00
2 1761 149 114 1612 0.07 0.93 0.91 0.09 0.01
3 1498 386 94 1112 0.08 0.92 0.83 0.17 0.01
4 1018 395 95 623 0.15 0.85 0.70 0.30 0.01
5 528 244 37 284 0.13 0.87 0.61 0.39 0.02
6 247 127 26 120 0.22 0.78 0.48 0.52 0.04
7 94 62 4 32 0.13 0.88 0.42 0.58 0.06
8 28 23 3 5 0.60 0.40 0.17 0.83 0.22
9 2 1 0 1 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.83
10 1 1 0 0
Total 1431 425
Table A4.17 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number of
pregnancies before first use, Hebei province, 1970-78 marriage cohort
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(x)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) F(x) N’(x) N'(x) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1656 17 8 1639 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 1631 142 156 1489 0.10 0.90 0.90 0.10 0.01
2 1333 605 160 728 0.22 0.78 0.70 0.30 0.02
3 568 380 57 188 0.30 0.70 0.49 0.51 0.03
4 131 91 11 40 0.28 0.73 0.35 0.65 0.07
5 29 24 3 5 0.60 0.40 0.14 0.86 0.22
6 2 2 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 1261 395
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Table A4.18 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Hebei province, 1979-85 marriage cohort
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
Fix)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) Fix) NXx) NXx) 1 -  Fix) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1568 212 14 1356 0.01 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 1342 734 194 608 0.32 0.68 0.68 0.32 0.02
2 414 348 16 66 0.24 0.76 0.52 0.48 0.05
3 50 46 0 4 0.00
4 4 3 0 1
5 1 1 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 1344 224
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Table A4.19 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Shaanxi province, 1947-69 marriage cohort
N um ber No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of C um ulat. Cum ulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering w ithdraw n first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(x)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) FXx) N'(x) NXx) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1800 23 6 1777 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 1771 22 51 1749 0.03 0.97 0.97 0.03 0.00
2 1698 100 82 1598 0.05 0.95 0.92 0.08 0.01
3 1516 270 95 1246 0.08 0.92 0.85 0.15 0.01
4 1151 328 89 823 0.11 0.89 0.76 0.24 0.01
5 734 288 57 446 0.13 0.87 0.66 0.34 0.02
6 389 163 30 226 0.13 0.87 0.57 0.43 0.02
7 196 87 13 109 0.12 0.88 0.51 0.49 0.03
8 96 46 5 50 0.10 0.90 0.45 0.55 0.04
9 45 18 5 27 0.19 0.81 0.37 0.63 0.07
10 22 21 1 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Total 1366 434
Table A4.20 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number o f 
pregnancies before first use, Shaanxi province, 1970-78 marriage cohort
N um ber No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cum ulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering w ithdraw n first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(x)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= S tandard
x N(x) W(x) F(x) N'(x) N'(x) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1079 13 5 1066 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 1061 66 92 995 0.09 0.91 0.91 0.09 0.01
2 903 372 76 531 0.14 0.86 0.78 0.22 0.02
3 455 285 31 170 0.18 0.82 0.64 0.36 0.03
4 139 102 5 37 0.14 0.86 0.55 0.45 0.06
5 32 21 2 11 0.18 0.82 0.45 0.55 0.12
6 9 7 2 2 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 866 213
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Table A4.21 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Shaanxi province, 1979-85 marriage cohort
Number No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cumulat. Cumulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering withdrawn first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(xV Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) F(x) NXx) N'(x) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1205 182 17 1023 0.02 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 1006 520 97 486 0.20 0.80 0.80 0.20 0.02
2 389 302 20 87 0.23 0.77 0.62 0.38 0.05
3 67 58 2 9 0.22 0.78 0.48 0.52 0.14
4 7 7 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 1069 136
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Table A4.22 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Shanghai municipality , 1951-69 marriage cohort
N um ber No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cum ulat. Cum ulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering w ithdraw n first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
FXx)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= S tandard
X N(x) W(x) F(x) N \x) NXx) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1295 26 12 1269 0.01 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00
1 1257 36 202 1221 0.17 0.83 0.83 0.17 0.01
2 1019 185 300 834 0.36 0.64 0.53 0.47 0.02
3 534 197 160 337 0.47 0.53 0.28 0.72 0.03
4 177 83 47 94 0.50 0.50 0.14 0.86 0.05
5 47 23 17 24 0.71 0.29 0.04 0.96 0.09
6 7 4 3 3 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 554 741
Table A4.23 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number o f  
pregnancies before first use, Shanghai municipality, 1970-78 marriage cohort
N um ber No. of No. of No. of No. of Prob, of Prob, of Cum ulat. Cum ulat.
of women women women women first-use no-use Prob, of Prob, of
pregnancies entering w ithdraw n first-use exposed P(x)= no-use first-use
F(x)/ Q(x)= CQ(x)= CP(x)= Standard
X N(x) W(x) F(x) N'(x) N’(x) 1- P(x) Q(x)*CQ(x-l) l-CQ(x) deviation
0 1159 16 71 1143 0.06 0.94 1.00 0.00 0.01
1 1072 173 532 899 0.59 0.41 0.41 0.59 0.02
2 367 155 146 212 0.69 0.31 0.13 0.87 0.03
3 66 31 27 35 0.77 0.23 0.03 0.97 0.07
4 8 5 2 3 0.67 0.33 0.01 0.99 0.27
5 1 1 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 381 778
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Table A4.24 Cumulative probability of first-use of induced abortion by number of 
pregnancies before first use, Shanghai municipality, 1979-85 marriage cohort
N um ber No. of No. of No. of No. of
of women women women women
pregnancies entering w ithdraw n first-use exposed
X N(x) W(x) FXx) NXx)
0 1689 134 136 1555
1 1419 737 534 682
2 148 98 36 50
3 14 10 3 4
4 1 1 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Total 980 709
Prob, of 
first-use 
P(x)= 
FXxV 
N \x)
Prob, of 
no-use
Q(x)= 
1- P(x)
Cum ulat. 
Prob, of 
no-use 
CQ(x)= 
Q(x)*CQ(x-l)
Cum ulat. 
Prob, of 
first-use 
CP(x)= 
l-CQ(x)
Standard
deviation
0.09 0.91 1.00 0.00 0.01
0.78 0.22 0.22 0.78 0.02
0.72 0.28 0.06 0.94 0.06
0.75 0.25 0.02 0.98 0.22
Appendix A
T h e  Effect of Sex Preference 
on  S ubsequent Fertility  in  
Two Provinces of C h in a
China’s birth control programme did reduce couples’ 
demand for children, but it did not change their 
attitudes about ‘male superiority’
By Xingyan Wen*
The effects of socio-economic characteristics on the general macro­
level fertility in China are well documented (e.g. Tien, 1984; Poston and Gu, 
1987; Wang, 1988). However, their role is not clear in the sequential fertility 
decisions of individual families regarding additional births. The diversity of 
social and economic characteristics among women with a different number 
and sex structure of living children also needs to be explored.
* The author of this article is a Ph.D. candidate in the Demography Program, Research 
School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, GPO Box 4, Canberra ACT 2601. 
Australia. He was formerly a research fellow in the Institute of Population Research, Fudan 
University, Shanghai, China. He would like to acknowledge with gratitude the helpful com­
ments and suggestions of Gavin W. Jones, Christabe! M. Young and Lincoln H. Day, as well 
as the assistance of Wendy Cosford. and China’s State Statistical Burea for the use of the 
data.
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This article addresses the impact of sex preference on couples’ family- 
building process at both the micro-level and macro-level. The micro-level 
analysis begins with the association between sex of the existing surviving 
children and sequential parity progression, without taking socio-economic 
conditions into account. The analysis is then extended to incorporate some 
selected socio-economic and demographic characteristics of women with 
special reference to those who had two or more living children before or 
during the period of the one-child policy. This is done in order to evaluate 
the roles of sex preference and socio-economic characteristics of individual 
women in determining further childbearing under population policies and 
programmes of different strengths. The macro-level analysis investigates to 
what extent, under China’s intensified family planning programme and 
population policy pressure, sex preference still exerts an impact on recent 
fertility.
Data and methods
The analysis is based on data from the 1985 China In-depth Fertility 
Survey (IDFS), Phase I, which was organized by the State Statistical Bureau 
(SSB) of China in co-operation with the International Statistical Institute, 
Voorburg, the Netherlands. The survey was carried out in three provincial 
regions of China. The present study uses the data for Hebei and Shaanxi 
provinces; Shanghai municipality was also covered by the survey. Of the two 
peasant-dominated regions, Hebei, a north-eastern coasted province, is the 
more developed; Shaanxi is an inland province on the upper Yellow River. 
More detailed information on the survey procedures was published in the 
Principal Report (SSB, 1986).
The first section uses retrospective birth history data for all respon­
dents with one or more living children at the time of the survey to identify 
the association between the sex of preceding children and subsequent 
childbearing, without taking socio-economic conditions into account.
In the second section, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multiple 
classification analysis (MCA) were applied to ascertain the statistical sig­
nificance and association between the decision to have another child and 
the set of social and economic factors when some demographic factors are 
controlled. Women who have had at least two children were selected rather 
than all respondents. The sex composition of the first two living children 
was treated as the independent variable, which was also classified by the 
variables of residence, education and occupation.^ The date of the 
fust marriage and age when the second child was born were treated as
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covariates. The dependent variable is the proportion of respondents who 
have had a third child, since a majority of women in the two provinces want 
at least two children (SSB, 1986) and whether or not to have a third child 
seems to be a key decision in the family-building process. Women who had 
their second child were divided into two groups according to the time 
period of the second birth: before 1979 and 1979 or after. This made it 
possible to detect the impact of the intensified family planning programme, 
especially the one-child policy that officially started in early 1979.
The third section assesses the overall effect of sex preference on 
recent fertility. The proportion of women having at least one birth in the 
five-year period preceding the survey was chosen as the measure of recent 
fertility. The approximately longitudinal study design provides a dynamic 
picture and makes it possible to ascertain the effect of sex preference on 
recent fertility among the survey cohort women over a five-year period, 
which coincides with the most powerful period of birth control in China. 
The proportions of women giving birth are cross-classified by number and 
sex of the living children at the start of the five-year period, i.e. 19S0. This 
reconstruction of family size and composition was made possible by the 
survey's birth history data in the standard recode files, which contain 
detailed information for each birth on the sex, date of birth, birth order and, 
if applicable, the age at death. Note that the distribution of number of 
women among the parity and sex composition of children categories is quite 
different from their distribution of current family size and composition, 
since the distribution of proportion of women giving birth refers to a time- 
point five years before the survey.
Chowdhury and Bairagi (1990) suggest an index, the sex preference 
effect on fertility (SPEF), which is a modification of Arnold’s measure 
(Arnold, 1985). The SPEF index is a method to assess the quantitative 
impact of sex preference on fertility and it estimates the expected reduction 
in the percentages of women who have had at least one birth, in the absence 
of the effect of sex preference. In this study, the SPEF index is used to test 
the effect of sex preference on recent fertility by both initial parity level and 
overall level.
Results
Sex composition and family building
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the impact of the sex composition of the first 
two or three children on subsequent childbearing. An examination of the
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Table 1: Proportional distribution of family size for women with two or
more children according to sex composition of first two children 
in family, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, China, 1985
(per cent)
Sex composition Total number of living children
of first two children
2 3 4 5 + Sum N
Hebei Province
DD 29.6 32.1 21.1 17.2 100.0 (795)
DS 4S.3 27.0 17.2 7.5 100.0 (889)
SD 42.9 29.9 15.5 11.7 100.0 (921)
SS 48.6 28.0 13.5 9.9 100.0 (882)
Shaanxi Province
DD 23.7 30.8 23.9 21.6 100.0 (620)
DS 39.1 26.7 21.0 13.2 100.0 (797)
SD 36.5 29.6 18.5 15.3 100.0 (756)
SS 37.3 29.7 20.2 12.9 100.0 (762)
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: D = Daughter, S = son
proportions for the first two children (table 1) indicates that women are 
much more likely to go on to have more children if their first two children 
are daughters, in contrast to those who have had at least one son or whose 
first two children are sons. First daughter-daughter (DD) combinations in 
the initial family formation are likely to lead to a larger family than other 
combinations. It is interesting to note that women with the sex combination 
of son-daughter (SD) seem more likely to continue childbearing than those 
with DS (daughter-son) combinations. (Hereafter, analogous abbreviations 
are used to describe these relationships).
Among the women who have had three or more children (table 2), the 
differences in family-building between DDD and SSS families are also 
marked. But the data seem to show that women’s preference is not simply 
for sons. The highest proportions of women who had stopped childbearing 
are among mothers with combinations of SSD, SDS, DSS and DDS (and 
SSS in Shaanxi). It is also observed that women with two daughters and one 
son, especially in the order SDD or DSD, would try again. It appears that 
the sex of the third order child plays an important role in the decision about
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Table 2: Proportional distribution of family size for women with three or
more children according to sex composition of first three children 
in family, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, China, 1985
(per cent)
Sex composition Total number of living children
oi n rs i inree cnnaren
3 4 5 6 + Sum N
Hebei Province
DDD 34.8 33.2 19.0 13.0 100.0 (253)
DDS 54.4 27.4 13.0 5.2 100.0 (307)
DSD 45.5 37.4 12.2 5.0 100.0 (222)
DSS 58.4 29.4 8.0 4.2 100.0 (238)
SDD 46.5 29.9 16.2 7.4 100.0 (271)
SDS ,58.4 24.3 9.8 7.5 100.0 (255)
SSD 60.2 21.9 11.4 6.5 100.0 (201)
SSS 50.0 . 29.8 14.7 5.6 100.0 (252)
Shaanxi Province
DDD 29.1 34.5 22.2 14.3 100.0 (203)
DDS 48.9 28.9 12.6 9.6 100.0 (270)
DSD 42.7 35.1 13.8 8.4 100.0 (225)
DSS 45.0 33.8 12.7 8.5 100.0 (260)
SDD 38.1 35.3 15.1 11.5 100.0 (218)
SDS 53.8 24.0 14.5 7.6 100.0 (262)
SSD 43.3 33.3 17.9 5.4 100.0 (240)
SSS 51.3 31.1 11.8 5.9 100.0 (238)
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Note: D = daughter, S = son
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further family building if the first two children are a son and a daughter.
Table 3 is a summary from the survey data of the probabilities of 
families with different size and sex distribution having an additional child. 
As table 3 shows, of the women who have had at least one living child, 
about three quarters in the two provinces would probably proceed to the 
second or higher parity by the survey date, and considerably more than 50 
per cent of women with at least two living children are likely to progress to 
third or higher-order births. Even of those with at least three living children, 
more than half in Shaanxi and about half in Hebei, are likely to continue 
bearing children.
In the two provinces, if couples did not have a son, impressively large 
proportions would continue bearing children until they got a son. This 
tendency is consistent over different stages of family-building (from family 
size one to four), although the proportions are slightly lower at later stages. 
Relatively small differences exist between first-daughter and first-son 
families, which may reflect the fact that most parents want to have more 
than one child. With further increases in family size, however, depending on 
the sexes of the preceding children, the probabilities are substantially 
different between no-son and at least one-son families. When the first three 
or four children are considered, the data also indicate some differences in 
the effect of an excess of sons compared with an excess of daughters. The 
results suggest that women would be more likely to have another child if 
they had an excess of daughters in the first three or four births. There is no 
indication that couples seek at least one daughter, although among families 
with three or more children, two sons plus one or two daughters appears to 
be a favourite choice.
Socio-economic differentials in family-building
The analysis of variance in tables 4 and 5 shows that the raw' regres­
sion coefficients of the two demographic covariates are both negative. The 
effect on bearing a third child of the date at first marriage and age at the 
birth of the second child are both negative and statistically significant. The 
two covariates account for about 70 per cent of the total explained variation 
in the period before 1979, while the figures drop to 40 per cent or less in 
1979 or after. The date at first marriage, or the marriage cohort as 
mentioned previously, is the more important covariate because it captures 
more than 80 per cent of the variation explained by the covariates in both 
the regions before 1979, while the age at the birth of the second child ac­
counts for less than 20 per cent.
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Table 3: Probability of having and (N + l)th  child for women with N or
more children, for N = 1 ,2 ,3  and 4, according to number of living 
children and sons of the women, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces,
China, 1985
Hebei Province Shaanxi Province
Number of 
first N living 
children & sons
Probability 
of having 
(N +1) th 
child
Number of 
women
Probability 
of having 
(N +1) th 
child
Number of 
women
(N = 1)
No son 77.0 2,186 80.1 1,770
One son 71.2 2,533 76.8 1,976
Total 73.9 4,719 78.4 3,746
(N = 2)
No son 70.4 795 76.3 620
One son 54.5 1,810 62.1 1,553
Two sons 51.4 882 62.7 762
Total 57.3 3,487 65.3 2,935
(N = 3)
No son 65.2 253 70.9 203
One son 50.8 800 56.4 713
Two sons 41.1 694 52.5 762
Three sons 50.0 252 48.7 238
Total 49.2 1,999 55.4 1,916
(N = 4)
No son 65.3 75 67.2 61
One son 44.1 290 47.9 282
Two sons 33.4 344 38.2 393
Three sons 37.1 210 38.8 278
Four sons 46.0 63 39.6 48
Total 40.6 982 42.7 1,062
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
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It may be worth noting that the pattern changes to the opposite after ' 
1979 in Shaanxi Province, that is, about 40 per cent of the covariance is 
accounted for by the date of first marriage, and 60 per cent by the age at 
the second birth, while the same pattern holds in Hebei but with a 10-per­
centage-point reduction in the explanatory power of date of first marriage. 
The levels of significance of these covariates for the period 1979 and after 
are higher than those in the earlier period.
Among the four demographic and socio-economic variables, sex com­
position accounts for 50 per cent or more of the main effects on continuing 
childbearing in the two provinces before 1979. It is more interesting to note 
that the percentages increase to 71 per cent for Hebei and even 91 per cent 
for Shaanxi in the period 1979 and after. This change is also reflected in the 
F (Fisher) ratios. Although all the four characteristics are substantially sig­
nificant in the first period, in the later period the residence and occupation 
variables become rather weak or even no longer significant in Hebei, and all 
three other socio-economic variables are insignificant, except sex composi­
tion in Shaanxi. Only the sex of living children remains as the most sig­
nificant variable throughout the two periods.
As also can be seen in the MCA tables (tables 6 and 7), the highest 
values of beta for the sex composition factor indicate that the sex of the first 
two living children, after adjustment is made for the demographic covariates 
and th£ other three socio-economic factors, has the most significant effect 
on bearing the third child. The beta value of sex of children in Hebei 
remained the same during the two periods, but in Shaanxi, the beta value 
more than doubled in the later period compared with the earlier period. 
These findings may suggest that among the four social and economic vari­
ables, sex preference is the strongest driving force for bearing the third 
child for women with two children. When the women are grouped by the 
year of the second birth, before or after the one-child policy was 
announced, the vigorous population control policies greatly reduced the 
probability of having a third child. An approximately 60-percentage-point 
decrease is found when comparing the grand means between two periods in 
the two provinces. It seems that the policy pressure has suppressed 
the effect of social and economic factors but not the sex composition of 
children, which continued to exert a great influence, even during the one- 
child campaign.
The overall effect of sex preference on fertility
Table 8 shows that, as expected, during the period of rapid fertility 
decline and the intense birth control campaign, the percentage of women
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Table 8: Percentage of women having at least one birth over 5 years, 
by number of living children and number of living sons at start 
of study and values of index of sex preference effect on fertility 
(SPEF), Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, China, 1980-1985
N u m b e r  
o f  liv in g  
c h i ld r e n
N u m b e r  
o f  liv in g  
s o n s
H ebei S h a a n x i
N u m b e r
of
w o m en
P e r  c e n t 
g iv ing  
b i r th S P E F
N u m b e r
of
w o m en
P e r  c e n t 
g iv in g  
b i r th S P E F
0 1,676 79.2 0.0 1,250 73.8 0.0
1 740 65.0 11.0 489 65.2 12.2
0 332 73.8 222 74.8
1 408 57.8 267 57.3
2 987 26.6 25.6 667 27.1 30.7
0 155 54.8 129 55.0
1 544 22.2 352 21.3
2 288 19.8 186 18.8
3 822 15.6 37.6 688 11.0 4 6 5
0 65 44.6 46 34.8
1 315 17.1 232 12.9
2 330 9.7 304 5.9
3 112 11.6 106 11.3
4 484 5.6 67.6 564 7.6 40.9
0 26 34.6 18 11.1
1 127 5 5 130 13.8
2 192 3.6 222 4.5
3 111 1.8 167 6.0
4 28 7.1 27 11.1
5 + 371 3.0 96.6 426 8.0 43.6
0 17 5.9 16 43.8
S <  D 181 2.2 193 4.7
S =  D 21 4.8 166 9.0
S >  D 144 3 5 44 4 5
5 m o re  S 8 0.1 7 14.3
T o ta l 5,080 44.0 8.8 4,084 38.6 1 0 3
21.4* 23.6*
Source: China 1985 IDFS survey data tape.
Notes-. S =  son; D = daughter
* Assuming that childless women follow the preference pattern that other women 
followed.
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giving birth substantially decreased in the five-year interval. The. major aim 
of China’s current population policy is to eliminate all births equal to three 
or more pier couple, and to encourage most couples to have no more than 
one child. The policy impact is clearly visible in the pattern of the percent­
ages according to parity. About 65 per cent of women in the two provinces 
with one living child have had at least one birth during the five-year period, 
while the proportion drops sharply to about one quarter among women with 
two living children, and then decreases as the family size becomes larger.
The result also confirms the previous findings by using different 
measures, which indicate a very strong desire in the two provinces to have at 
least one son. As can be seen in table 8, at each family size, the percentage 
giving birth is substantially higher among women with only daughters than 
among women with at least one son. Up to parity two, the more sons the 
women have, the smaller the proportion of them giving birth. In addition, 
women with no daughters among parity three and four are more likely to 
give birth than women who have had one daughter. This pattern is also 
found in Bangladesh (Chowdhury and Bairagi, 1990: 754), which may sug­
gest that there is a general desire to have a daughter but probably not 
before two sons are born.
An inverse relationship is also found between the percentage giving 
birth and the level of the SPEF index. The SPEF values generally go up as 
the family size increases. The overall effect of sex preference on recent 
fertility, estimated from the SPEF index, is about 9 per cent for Hebei and 
10 per cent for Shaanxi, both of which are substantial percentages in the 
case of China. Moreover, the SPEF index assumes that there is no sex 
preference among the childless women who account for 33 and 31 per cent 
of the total respondents for Hebei and Shaanxi, respectively. However, in 
the calculation of overall SPEF index these women are included in the 
denominator. This is why the overall index is substantially lower than the 
value in each parity level. Therefore, if it were assumed that the women who 
were childless at the start of the study would follow the preference pattern 
that other women followed, the effect might increase remarkably. As 
indicated in the bottom of table 8, the overall impact would increase to 21 
for Hebei and 24 for Shaanxi.
Conclusion
The evidence in this study documents the strong, pervasive son 
preference which persisted during the powerful family planning programme 
period in the two provinces, while their fertility dramatically declined. This
3a Asia-Pacific Population Journal, Vol. 7, No. 4
might imply that the great effort of China’s birth control programme did, to 
some extent, reduce couples’ demand for children, but did not change their 
attitudes towards “male superiority”, which is deeply rooted in the tradition­
al cultural and social structures of China. This attitude, however, did not 
prevent the average number of children per family from decreasing from as 
high as six children to around three children, partly because the impact of 
son preference is relatively weak among higher birth orders. It will have a 
more powerful influence on fertility as the average family size decreases 
further.
In China, the critical family size, from the point of view of population 
policy, is two children for rural couples. Whether or not the third or higher 
order births can be eliminated is crucial to the success of any further reduc­
tion in fertility. The present study found that, compared with some major 
socio-economic characteristics, son preference is the most significant factor 
which, even during the period of vigourous control of population growth, 
continued to exert a great influence on bearing the third child. It also found 
that the overall quantitative effect of sex preference on recent fertility is 
substantial.
There is also empirical evidence that sex preference affects other 
reproductive behaviour such as length of breast-feeding, birth intervals and 
abortion (Arnold and Liu, 1986; Tu, 1990, 1991), that is, both the level and 
the tempo of childbearing. When all the factors are considered, it may be 
argued that the efforts both to improve the level of socio-economic develop­
ment and to change the sex preference will exert a substantial impact on 
future fertility.
Footnote
1. The occupation factor was regrouped into two broad categories: (a) non-agriculture, 
including professional, service and industry, and (b) agricultural, including agriculture and 
those who reported having never worked, since most women in rural areas reported them­
selves as having never worked instead of having worked part-time in agriculture or in their 
household (Tu, 1991: 262). Child deaths were also included as one of the independent vari­
ables in the preliminary analysis. However, the results showed that child deaths were insig­
nificant in the decision to bear the third child during the second time period for both the 
provinces. Although the variable was significant in the first period, it interacted with occupa­
tion and sex composition of children in Shaanxi Province. Therefore, child deaths were not 
fitted in the final model.
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E F F E C T  OF SON P R E F E R E N C E  A ND 
P O P U L A T I O N  P O L I C Y  ON SEX R ATIO S AT 
B I R T H  IN  T W O  P R O V I N C E S  OF C H IN A
XINGYAN WEN
Demography Programme, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, Canberra
Summary. Two samples of births were used to examine the effect of son pref­
erence and population policy on sex ratios in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces of 
China. The results from all births to women aged 15-49 in the 1985 In-Depch 
Fertility Survey indicated a strong son preference but no clear policy impact 
on sex ratios at different birth orders. In a sample of selected births during 
1975-84 to women aged 40 or under, the mixed influences of son preference 
and population policy were clearly reflected in the high and rising overall 
ratios at birth, and the increasing sex ratios with parity. Possible explanations 
for these findings are discussed.
Introduction
China has achieved a remarkable decline in fertility during the last two decades. How­
ever, does this decline represent substantial changes in the traditional culture, which 
has included a strong son preference? Also, why have the sex ratios at birth risen, 
especially among higher order births, since the implementation of the strict policies of 
birth control? Detailed studies are required at both the national and provincial level. 
This paper examines the confounding effects of son preference and population policy, 
especially the one-child family policy (1979), on sex ratios at birth at both the family and 
the societal level in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, China. The potential effect of sex- 
selected abortion on sex ratios is investigated; births are also analysed by place of 
delivery and by the kinds of assistance during delivery, contributing to an understanding 
of the rise in the sex ratio by birth order.
Data and methods
The main data source is the 1985 China In-Depth Fertility Survey (IDFS), Phase I, 
which was carried out in three provincial regions (Shanghai municipality was also 
covered) by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) of the People’s Republic of China. 
Details of the survey procedures and preliminary results were published in 1986 (SSB,
1
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1986). Of the two largely rural provinces, Hebei is the more developed north-east 
coastal province; Shaanxi is an inland province. Background information on the two 
regions is given by Dankert & van Ginneken (1991).
Two different approaches are used to investigate the confounding influences of son 
preference and population policy. First, the all-births approach was adapted from Park 
(1983). It uses all births to the respondents aged 15-49 to test whether the strong son 
preference has persistently affected women’s childbearing over the past several decades. 
This would be indicated by significant differentials in sex ratios between small and large 
families, and between last-bom children and preceding ones, i.e. by high sex ratios in 
small families and in last-bom children. The method of partitioning chi-square is used to 
test the association and significance between sex ratios at birth and family size and birth 
order. The likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic (L2) is used as it can be partitioned into 
several additive parts, and the component L2 values sum to the total values exactly. 
Given the observed frequency for the zth cell of a table nt and the corresponding expected 
frequency m, under some hypothesis, L2 takes the form
L2 = 2(n, Log,, njm )
(Park, 1983).
The second approach, by concentrating on births occurring between 1975 and 1984, 
analyses the confounding effect of son preference and the population policy on sex 
, ratios at birth, particularly among higher order births, at the societal level during the 
period of rapid fertility transition. On the basis of the cohort survey data, the select 
birth approach is used (Rindfuss, Palmore & Bumpass, 1982). The advantage of this 
approach is that the comparisons across time are unbiased. The births which occurred 
in the period 1975-84 were selected. The earliest births in 1975 could only be included 
in the sample if they had occurred to women aged 40 or under at the time of survey, 
births to women above age 40 were excluded from the analysis.
Results
Sex ratios at birth by family size
The consequences of son preference on the sex ratio at birth are presented in Table 
1 and mainly represent the situation of the past three decades. The data demonstrate a 
strong and persistent son preference in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces. A prounounced 
inverse pattern of the sex ratios at birth to the size of families was found. The sex ratios 
of all children were very high in family sizes two and three, and extremely high in one- 
child families. The ratios for last-bom children were also much higher than those of the 
preceding births. There is no pronounced effect of family size on sex ratios of the last- 
born child: the L2 values (Table 1) indicate little or no significant variation across 
family sizes for last-born children.
Table 1 gives a general picture. The variances in sex ratios of all children by family 
size are highly significant, showing L2 values of 76 (4 df) in Hebei and 36 (4 df) in 
Shaanxi.
Table 2 presents the results of partitioning L2 values for sex ratios of children by 
family size and birth order. The families were arbitrarily classified into small (one to
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Tabic 2. Partitioning of chi-square for sex ratio of living children 
by family size, Hebei and Shaanxi
Hebei Shaanxi
L2 df L2 df
All children 
Within small families!
Within large familiesf 
Between small and large families 
First child
Within small families 
Within large families 
Between small and large families 
Second child
Between family size 2 and 3 
Between family size 4 and 5 +  
Between small and large families 
Third child
Between family size 4 and 5 +  
Between family size 3 and 4 +
75-8*** 4 36-0*** 4
11-0** 2 0-1 2
O
O 1 2-4 1
56-6*** 1 33-6*** 1
32-3*** 4 13-4** 4
9-3** 2 • 1-6 2
00 1 0-0 1
22-1*** 1 11-8*** 1
45-1*** 3 17-4*** 3
11-6*** 1 8-6*** 1
2-1 1 1-5 1
31-4*** 1 7-2** 1
21-9*** 2 28-3*** 2
5-5* 1 0-3 l
16-4*** 1 28-0*** 1
Significance: *p<0-05\ **/?<0-01;
fSmall families = 3 or fewer children; large families = 44- children, 
unless otherwise indicated.
three children) and large (four or more children) families. It is clear that the variation 
in L2 for sex ratios of siblings is mainly due to the highly significant differences between 
small and large families. Among all children, the difference between small and large 
families accounts for 75% of the variation for Hebei province and 94% for Shaanxi 
province.
When birth order is controlled, the significant differentials between small and large 
families persist across all orders of births and in both the study regions. Significant 
variations exist with regard to the second child between family sizes two and three, and 
with regard to the third child between three-child and four-child families. It seems 
that son preference as affecting the decision of couples with two or three children to 
continue or stop childbearing is more critical in both provinces.
In this study the last-born child is the last live birth that a woman had before the 
survey date. The sex ratios of all last-born children in the two provinces are about 135, 
which is substantially higher than the 123 at national level (Arnold & Liu, 1986), and 
even slightly higher than that of South Korea where the ratio was 133 according to the 
1974 Korean National Fertility Survey (Park, 1983). The L2 values presented in Table 3 
show the difference between the last-born child and the preceding children by family 
size and birth order. When family size is controlled, the sex ratios between the last birth 
and the preceding ones are significantly different in all family sizes for Shaanxi and in
305
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Table 3. Difference between the sex ratios o f the last child and the 
preceding children by family size, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces
Hebei
L2 df
Shaanxi 
L2 df
Two-child families
Between order 1 and 2 1-96 1 5-2* l
Three-child families 10-9** 2 16-4*** 2
Between order 1 and 2 1-5 1 1-7 l
Between the last and preceding
children 9-4** 1 14-7*** 1
Four-child families 26‘1*** 3 6-7 3
Within order 1, 2, and 3 5-2 2 1-5 2
Between the last and preceding
children 20-9*** 1 5-3* 1
Significance: *p<0-05, **p<0-01, *"*p<0-001.
three-child and four-child families for Hebei. When last births are excluded, the sex 
ratios between or within birth orders are not significantly different.
Sex ratios at birth: period analysis
The analysis of consequences of son preference on sex ratios at birth during the 
period o f the powerful family planning programme, 1975-84, to women aged 40 or 
under, are shown in Table 4. Births were grouped by 5-year intervals to overcome the 
annual fluctuations which might be caused by misdating the births and to reduce the 
standard deviations by the increased sample size of each grouping. The standard devi­
ation is calculated on the assumption that the normal sex ratio at birth is 106 males per 
100 females (Coale, 1984; Hull, 1990). Table 4 shows that over the period 1975-84 the 
overall sex ratios at birth were considerably higher than the normal 106 level in the two 
provinces, and the ratios for 1980-84 are higher than those for 1970-79, particularly in 
Hebei province. This seems to reflect the influence of the strong one-child policy that 
was officially announced in 1979. The evidence from the Fourth National Population 
Census of China reveals that sex ratios at birth in 1989 were 112-4 for Hebei and 111-6 
for Shaanxi in the first half of 1990 (National Population Census Office, 1990). Hence, 
the sex ratios derived from the IDFS survey for the period 1975-84 are close to the 
results of the fourth census for 1989 and the first half o f 1990.
Birth order and sex ratios at birth
A comparison can be made of the results from two different approaches in assessing 
the birth order effect on sex ratios at birth. In Table 1 all live births to the respondents 
in the samples (12,456 for Hebei province, and 11,438 for Shaanxi province) are 
included. As expected, there are no clear and persistent patterns of birth-order effect,
306
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Table 4. Sex ratios at birth in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, 
1975-84 women aged 40 or under in 1985 IDFS survey
B ir t h s
S e x
r a t i o sY e a r T o t a l M a l e s F e m a l e s S D
H e b e i
1 9 7 5 - 7 9 2 3 4 8 1 2 2 8 1 1 2 0 10 9 -6 4 -4
1 9 8 0 - 8 4 2 8 7 3 1 5 3 7 13 3 6 115-0 4-0
T o t a l 5 2 2 1 2 7 6 5 2 4 5 6 112-6 2-9
S h a a n x i
1 9 7 5 - 7 9 1 9 1 5 1 0 1 9 8 9 6 11 3 -7 4-8
1 9 8 0 - 8 4 2 0 5 0 1 1 0 3 9 4 7 116-5 4-7
T o t a l 3 9 6 5 2 1 2 2 1843 115-1 3-4
since the births occurred during quite a long period, from the early 1950s until 1985, 
under changing circumstances in terms of socioeconomic development and, particu­
larly, the strength of the population policy. Higher sex ratios at birth may not have 
occurred before the implementation of the vigorous family planning programme.
However, the results from the selected births (Table 5) show that in regions with 
strong son preference, such as Hebei and Shaanxi provinces, not only were the over­
all sex ratios at birth higher than normal, but also the effect of birth order on sex 
ratios occurred over quite a long term, which could be traced back to the mid-1970s 
and coincided with the period of vigorous implementation of the family planning 
programme, particularly the one-child campaign.
A fairly clear pattern of birth-order effect is shown in Table 5 for Shaanxi province. 
The ratio of first births is close to the normal level, suggesting that women in Shaanxi 
want at least two children and the sex of the first child may have less influence on the 
bearing of the next child than on higher order births. But starting from the second 
birth order, the ratios are higher as birth order increases. A similar pattern is demon­
strated in Hebei province except that the ratio of first births is surprisingly high and the 
ratio of second births is unusually low. Apart from the sampling variations, these 
phenomena may be partly due to the stronger impact of the one-child policy on the 
reporting of the first two orders of births.
Explanations for the high sex ratios at birth
The current population policy of birth control has brought many economic penal­
ties and psychological pressures upon births outside birth planning. The one-child 
policy stipulates that urban couples can have only one child, while peasants are 
allowed a second child, within the birth plan quota and with reasonable spacing, if the 
first-born is a girl; third or higher order births are prohibited. Couples whose first or 
first two children were daughters faced a hard decision whether to obey the population 
policy or to continue childbearing until they had their desired number of sons, at the 
risk of offending against the birth control policy. How did couples with strong son
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Table 5. Sex ratios at birth order in Hebei and Shaanxi provinces,
1975-84, women aged 40 or under in 1985 IDFS survey
B ir th  o r d e r
A l l
b ir th s1 2 3 4  +
H e b e i
T o t a l  b i r t h s 2 3 4 3 1 6 4 2 8 4 0 3 9 6 5221
M a l e 1 2 6 0 8 3 5 4 4 8 2 2 2 2 7 6 5
F e m a l e 1 0 8 3 8 0 7 3 9 2 17 4 2 4 5 6
S e x  r a t io s 11 6 -3 103-5 114-3 127-6 112-6
S D 4 - 4 5-2 7-3 10-7 2-9
S h a a n x i
T o t a l  b i r t h s 1 5 7 9 1 1 7 0 6 5 7 5 5 9 3 9 6 5
M a l e 8 1 7 6 3 0 3 5 6 3 1 9 2 1 2 2
F e m a l e 7 6 2 5 4 0 301 2 4 0 1843
S e x  r a t i o s 1 0 7 - 2 116-7 118-3 132-9 115-1
S D 5-3 6-2 8-3 9-0 3-4
preference deal with their unfavoured girls? Possible explanations proposed are: not 
reporting the births of surviving female children; unreported female infanticide (Coale, 
1984; Hull, 1990; Johansson & Nygren, 1991); sex-selective abortion (Hull, 1990); and 
unreported female-baby adoption (Johansson & Nygren, 1991). Some of these can be 
investigated from available data.
Female-baby adoption. So far, no direct evidence can be derived from the survey 
data to confirm the underreporting of female babies who have stayed with their 
parents.
Johansson & Nygren (1991) estimated that half of the ‘missing’ girls in the survey 
of the 1980s were adopted children not reported as live births by their natural mothers. 
The IDFS survey also has a question about number of boys and girls adopted; unfortu­
nately, the data do not include the date of the adoption. The relatively low sex ratios of 
the accumulated number of children adopted are 38-9 for Hebei and 73-6 for Shaanxi, 
suggesting that about twice as many girls as boys are adopted. The number of reported 
adopted children is very small (75 for Hebei and 158 for Shaanxi). It is true that many 
more female than male babies were given away for adoption according to both the 
1988 Two-per-Thousand fertility survey and the IDFS survey. However, it is not clear 
at what stage of family building the children were adopted. Were the adopting parents 
urban couples who were childless or rural couples who had only one child before they 
adopted the children? It would be desirable to investigate the family size and sex com­
position of the adopting parents, since those couples were under the same constraints 
as the couples who gave their babies away. Why did the adopting parents willingly 
report or register their adopted children, when the children’s natural parents did not? 
Limitations on access to the 1988 Two-per-Thousand fertility survey prevent this issue 
being assessed in the present study.
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Sex ratios at birth by place of delivery. The 1985 IDFS survey includes the variables 
place of delivery and assistance during delivery, for each live birth. These data are used 
to compare the births which occurred under the circumstances of policy and program 
efforts, with those in the situation over several decades, and also to avoid selectivity 
bias.
Tables 6 and 7 present the distribution of live births according to the place of 
delivery and assistance during delivery, by birth order, for all births and for the period 
1975-84. More than 90% of all deliveries to women in rural areas of the two provinces 
occurred at home or elsewhere rather than in hospitals and clinics; and a majority of 
babies were bom without any help from doctors, nurses or midwives.
Comparing all births with births during 1975-84 to women aged 40 or under shows 
a decrease in the proportions of babies born at home and elsewhere and without pro­
fessional assistance. However, a closer examination by birth order shows that this vari­
ation is mainly due to the decrease in the proportion of first order births. Surprisingly, 
the proportions of babies born at home and elsewhere for second and higher order 
births in urban Hebei and Shaanxi are even higher in the selected 10-year period than 
in ail births to the sampling cohort.
It may be assumed that first order births are less likely to be affected by the popu­
lation policy which restricts the higher order births. In fact, the decline in proportions 
of births at home and without professional assistance during delivery mainly occurred 
among first order births. The trend is consistent with the improvements in accessibility 
to the health care service over the past decades. However, the smaller increase in these 
proportions at second and higher orders suggests that couples deliberately avoid the 
exposure of their higher order births by giving birth at home or somewhere else with­
out any professional assistance. If this is so, then parents may refrain from reporting or 
registering their higher order births in order to escape all kinds of penalties. The effect 
of the strong son preference would be more underreporting of female babies than of 
males.
Although the number of babies born in the hospital and clinic is not sufficient to 
yield a valid estimation of sex ratio, in the two provinces the births at home or else­
where provide a valid picture of the change of the sex ratios by birth order (Table 8). 
For all births to women aged 15—49, the general pattern of sex ratios is consistent with 
the pattern observed in Table 1, which shows higher sex ratios in small families (one to 
three children) and low sex ratios among large families (four or more children). This 
pattern implies a strong son preference. However, the sex ratios of births during 1975- 
84 to women aged 40 or under indicate a striking contrast. For those babies bom at 
home or elsewhere the sex ratios of high order births are very high, especially among 
birth order four or higher. These high order births are the target of the population 
policy and family planning programme.
Sex-selected abortion. Although there is no direct statistical evidence of the inci­
dence of sex-selected abortions, some of the publicity about individual cases is notice­
able, and the potential effect of sex-selected abortions on sex ratios is not trivial. The 
estimated sex ratios at birth shown in Table 9 are based on different assumption about 
sex of the aborted fetus. In Hebei province, if it is assumed that 55% of female fetuses 
were aborted the sex ratios of the 10-year period would be close to normal if there had 
been no abortions. Likewise, assuming 60% of female fetuses were aborted in Shaanxi
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Table 7. Percentage of children ever born, by birth order and assistance 
during delivery, Hebei and Shaanxi provinces*
All births Births in 1975-84
Birth
order
Doctor
nurse Midwife Others
Doctor
nurse Midwife Others
Hebei
1 21-4 13-1 65-5 26-6 170 56-4
2 14-6 12-5 72-9 16-4 15-7 67-8
3 11-8 10-3 77-8 14-2 12-9 72-9
4 + 7-7 6-9 85-5 9-8 10-6 79-5
Total 15-6 11*5 72-9 20-1 15-4 64-4
Shaanxi
1 15-3 14-3 70-4 20-9 19-2 59-8
2 8-9 11-9 79-2 8-5 14-4 77-0
3 7-7 9-8 82-5 6-8 8-8 84-3
4 + 5-9 7-4 86-8 4-7 5-0 90-3
To tal 10-1 11-3 78-6 12-6 14-1 73-3
’ Excluding four respondents who did not state the assistance during delivery.
Tabic 8. Sex ratios at birth, by place of deLivery and birth order, 
Hebei and Shaanxi provinces*
Birth
order
Hebei Shaanxi
Hospital
clinic
Home
elsewhere
Hospital
clinic
Home
elsewhere
All births
l 138-5 112-2 113-1 110-9
2 102-5 114-3 113-8
3 111-2 116-9
4 + 107-3 107-1
Births in 1975-89
l 142-8 111-1 117-2 103-6
2 102-8 117-4
3 113-9 119-3
4 + 128-0 132-8
•Sex ratios for parities with fewer than 300 births are not shown because 
of the high SDs.
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province, the sex ratios for the two provinces would be close to normal if there had 
been no abortions.
This suggests that, if the knowledge and facilities of sex-determination became 
widely available, if the regulations fail to prevent the use of sex-detecting equipment 
for this purpose, if induced abortion continues to be a major back-up method in birth 
control, and if there is no substantial change in the strong son preference, then there 
will be a sizeable impact of sex-selective abortion on sex ratios at birth in the two 
provinces.
Discussion
Taking into account all births for the past three decades to the whole sample cohort, it 
appears that the great variations in sex ratio at birth among different sizes of families, 
particularly between small and large families, are mainly the results of respondents’ 
independent and autonomous fertility decisions. The main operating mechanism is the 
adoption of the ‘stopping rules’ (McClelland, 1979) in family building by couples 
according to their desire for a certain number and sex of children. However, if the strict 
birth control policy did not exist, the overall sex ratios at birth would be normal and 
there would be no general birth order effect on sex ratios at birth, though the sex ratio 
for the last-born child is high. In Hebei and Shaanxi, the overall ratios in the family- 
level analysis were also higher than expected, because more than 60% of the births 
occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. The extremely high sex ratio of one-child families 
appears to be, to a larger extent, an outcome of the one-child policy, as more couples 
than usual complied with the one-child limit if the first child was a son.
More importantly, on the basis of selected births which occurred under exposure to 
the strong family planning programme and the one-child campaign, the high and rising 
overall sex ratios at birth, and the increasing sex ratios across parities seem to be 
attributable to couples’ responses to the population policy. The responses imply the 
substantial contradiction between the national goal of population control, particularly 
the one-child policy, and couples’ family building aspirations, and that a substantial 
number of women or couples are not merely passive recipients of government policy 
pressures. They strive for fulfilment of their desired number of sons or children. With 
regard to the higher sex ratios, the available evidence appears to support the argument 
for underreporting of surviving female births. Couples may have a good chance to 
conceal their babies when they have second or higher order births, particularly female 
births. Since most of the babies were bom at home or elsewhere, possibly without any 
eye-witness from outside the families, the female babies could be concealed, mistreated 
or even killed immediately after they were bora, and would not be registered or 
reported in a census or survey. However, the potential effect of sex-selected abortion 
should not be neglected. The severe social consequences (Hull, 1990) of the ‘missing 
girls’ should be of high priority in policy concerns among the government decision­
makers at all levels.
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